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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of those political and 
constitutional theories which mainly since 1919 had their 
impact on the constitutional evolution of India and Pakistan. 
The introductory chapter Begins with a brief account of the 
constitutional and political background. An attempt has 
been made to make a comparative analysis of the constitution- 
making processes of four countries: the U.S.A. and Prance, 
representing the democracies in the West; and Turkey and 
Japan, representing Asia. The second chapter is devoted 
to the constitutional discussions in India during the period 
1919-1935. The third and fourth chapters analyse the 
constitutional and political ideas put forth by Hindu and 
Muslim thinkers. Although the Hindu and Muslim leaders 
concentrated on the ultimate goal of political freedom from 
British rule, this study considers in some detail to what 
extent there was coherent thinking on the system of government 
to be established in independent India and Pakistan* The 
fifth and sixth chapters deal with constitution-making in 
independent India and Pakistan. The final chapter tries to 
analyse the major influences which shaped constitution-making 
in both India and Pakistan.
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6CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
India and Pakistan both adopted the parliamentary 
system after independence., The nationalist leaders called 
for civil rights, self-government, representative government, 
self-determination, autonomy in Euopean political terms, 
because Asian political traditions did not fully comprehend 
those ideas. These political ideastweue derived from European 
political philosophy and history. The colonists of the British 
Empire looked to the British Parliament as the supreme mode}.; 
and the quality of their own politics was regarded as improved, 
and the range of their liberties enlarged, by the extent to 
which they approximated to the model.
The parliamentary system had been consistently proclaimed 
■as their goal by the Westernised e^ lite ever since the first 
Indian National Congress (1885) declared itself to be the 
fgerm of a Native Parliament^ English-educatednCongress 
leaders brought up on the works of English liberal thinkers, 
desired British political institutions which they deemed not 
incapable of transplantation on to Indian soil. 1 Prom our
1. Report of the First Indian National Congress, 1885, p.3.
7earliest school-days'? said C. Sankaran hair in 1897? 'the 
great English writers have been our classics. Englishmen 
have been our professors in Colleges. English history is 
taught us in our schools... It is impossible under this 
training not to be penetrated with English ideas? not to
1
acquire English conceptions of duty? of rights? of brotherhood'. 
But the Congress leaders in the early years were chiefly 
concerned with obtaining political favours for their own 
educated classes. A typical example of this attitude may 
be seen in the presidential address of Surendranath Banerjea 
at the Congress annual session in 1899* 'We should be satisfied'? 
said Banerjea? 'if we obtain representative institutions of 
a modified character for the .educated community who by reason 
of their culture and enlightenment? their assimilation of 
English ideas and their familiarity with English methods of
2
Government might be presumed to be qualified for such a boon.1
Though the ideal of Swaraj or self-government might be at
the back of leaders' minds? there was no definite and clear
voice yet calling upon the British to hand over power to
Indians. Most Westernised elite still accepted British rule as a
dispensation of Divine Providence? an inevitable phase through
3
which India was destined to pass. A 'microscopic minority' 
was to be the standard British epithet for the Indian educated
1. Report of the Thirteenth Indian National Congress, 1897? pp.15-6.
2. Report<of.the'Eleventh Indian National Congress, 1895? p.14.
3. The phrase ..was first used by Lord Dufferin? the Viceroy? in
1888. See Sir V. Lovett? A History of the Indian Nationalist 
Movement? p .42•
8classes who led the Congress right into the twentieth century.
This Microscopic minority* theory - the attitude of contempt
for the emerging urban middle class - was expressed by John
Beames, a civil servant, in a statement to the Aitchison Commission
in .1886* Beames declared: 'In the course of my long experience
I have constantly found natives deficient in courage, shirking
responsibility, careless and indolent. Prom what I have seen
of the large number of natives who have served under me during
the last twenty-nine years, I do not think they possess the
qualifications which fit them to be admitted to the Covenanted
Civil Service.'*1' Whatever might be the racial factor/ involved
in this cold attitude, the British rulers were convinced that
2power could not be 'committed to indigenous # ■agency,! The Indian
leaders, on the other hand, pleaded that 'the problem of bringing
the administration into closer relations with the people is
essentially a problem of associating the educated classes with
the actual work of the administration. With village panchayats
at the bottom, District Councils in the centre, and reformed
Legislative Councils at the top, this problem will have been 
3fairly faced.' Lord Ripon, the Viceroy, who was responsible
for the famous)fi Resolution on Local Self-G-overnment of May, 1882,
attempted to open a channel for the aspirations of the emerging
middle class by the encouragement of local self-government, by
setting up municipalities with an elected element, and by
creating district councils for the rural a$re&£» The new middle
class 'must be prevented from becoming ... a source of serious
4political danger.' Both Ripon and A.O. Hume, a retired civil
1. Public .Service.Commission, Proceedings ,1887, vol.vi, p.50.
2* Report ..of the Public Service Commission, .1886-87, p.36,
3* Royal,Commission upon Decentralization, 1908, vol.viii,
Minutes of Evidence, p. 61; O.K. G-okhale.
4. L.S.S. O'Malley, "General Survey", in L.S.S. O'Malley (ed.), 
Modern India and the West, p.746.
9servant, tried to counteract this middle class movement by
providing ’political education1 to the Indians and by training
* 1them 1 in the working of representative institutions*1 This
policy was contrary to the prevailing British view of the
necessity to resuscitate the 'natural leadership1 (the Princes
and the landholders) of Indian society while keeping the new
Westernised elite in their plade, Ripon, however, denied that
2they were trying to introduce an Bnglish system in India. The
Ripon reforms were warmly welcomed by the politically active
leaders of Indian society, like S.N. Banerjea, G-.K. Gokhale,
B.G-o Tilak, Dadabhai Naoroji, Badruddin Tyabji, and Pherozeshah
Mehta, who were believers in polifciis&l education of the electorate
through participation in local politics and administration as
3an approach towards national self-government. They made a 
reality of the municipal government, but the great mass of 
the people had nothing to do with the political experience which 
was confined to the few, and continued to have an authoritarian 
concept of government. The Decentralisation Commission of 1909, 
which has been called 1 the watershed in the history of Indian 
local government91^ made recommendations similar to those of 
the Resolution of 1882. While they considered the pros and 
cons of centralisation and'decentralisation, but mainly 
conceived in terms of administrative convenience, rather than 
of national political aspirations. The commission suggested 
that 'the foundation of any stable edifice which shall associate
5
the people with the administration must be the village*1
1. L.S.S, O'Malley, "G-eneral Survey1', in L.S.S, O'Malley (ed),
Modern India and the West, p*746.
2. L. Wolf, Life of the first Marquess of Ripon, vol.ii,p•100.
3. See H* Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India,
Pakistan and Burma, p*58.
4. Ibid., p.89.
5* Report of the Royal Commission upon Decentralization in India 
(1909), vol.i, p.239* ’
i  0
On the whole the commission did not think it possible ’to
restore the ancient village system’ but the desirability of
constituting.village panchayats for the administration of
, 1local village affairs was emphasised*
The authors of the Council Acts of 1833? 1861, 1892
and the Act of 1909 did not see their schemes as a departure
from autocracy or steps towards a different system of
government. To quote Macaulay’s well-known words: TThe light
of political science and of history are withdrawn - we are
walking in darkness- we do not distinctly see whither we are
going. It is the wisdom of a man, so situated, to feel his
way, and not to plant his foot till he is well assured that
2the ground before him is firm.* When the original proposals 
for Indian representation in the legislative councils were 
under discussion, Sir Bartle Frere wrote in 1860 of the 
necessity of learning of ’what the natives think of our 
measures, and how the native community will he affected by
3
them*’ Frere compared the role of the Indian councils to
that of the darbar of an Indian prince ’the channel from
which whi-eh the ruler learns how his measures are likely
to affect his subjects, and may hear of discontent before
4
it becomes disaffectioni' The Mori&y^Minto reforms, which 
were given effect by an Act of 1909, were intended to provide 
wide representation of interests. The separate seats were 
created for the landlords, universities, municipalities, commerce, 
and Muslims. The principle of election was now recognised.
The much enlarged provincial legislative councils v/ere given
Report of the Royal Commission upon Decentralization in India 
(1909)', vol.i, pp.238-9.
2* Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3s*, vol.xix, col.513*
3. M/CR, p.51.
4 * Ibid.
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greater powers, including the right to move resolutions, to 
call for a division and to ask- supplementary questions. Non­
officials were in a majority in the legislative councils. A 
small official majority was retained at the centre* Both 
Morley, the Secretary of State, and Minto, the Viceroy,
dismissed the Indian nationalists’ demand for colonial self-
1 2government as !a mere dream,' and 'an impossibility*' India,
in their view, was 'unfit for popular government.' In his
speech to the House of Lords in 1908, Morley remarked: '♦.* if
it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly
or necessarily up to the establishment of a Parliamentary
system in India, I, for one, would have nothing at all to do
with it ..* a Parliamentary system in India is not the goal
4
to v/hich I for one moment would aspire*' Minto equally
emphasised; 'We have aimed at the reform and enlargement of
our Councils, but not at the creation of Parliaments*' Some
of the Conservative peers, on the other hand, criticised the
bill for envisaging a parliamentary system. Midleton thought
that the bill introduced 'some of the very worst features of
6
our own Parliamentary practice.' Curzon found in the
enlargement of the legislative councils a 'revolutionary
Vchange' and 'Parliamentary bodies in Miniature.' In the
words of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 'They (Morley and Minto)
hoped to blend the principle of autocrqcy • with the principle of
constitutionalism... to create a constitutional autocracy.’ They
anticipated that the aristocratic and moderate elements in India
of
would range themselves on the side/the government and oppose any
1* Mary, Countess-of Minto, India, Minto .and Morley, .1905-1910 ,p*99.
2. Ibid., p .505*
5* Ibid., p.101.
4* Parliamentary Debates, 4s., vol.cxcviii, col.1985°
5* Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General of India, 
1909-10, vol.xlviii, p.51.
6. Parliamentary Debates,Lords, vol.i, col.175*
7. Ibid. ■, cols.155-6.
8* M/CR, p.63.
1 JL htfattempt to democratise Indian Institutions. Despite Morley1 s
repudiation the features of his reforms ’do constitute a
decided step forward on a road leading at no distant period
to a stage at which the question of responsible government
2was bound to present itself.’
During the period between 1919-1935 there was a
general agreement that the parliamentary system should be
introduced in India. However, important sections of Indian
opinion questioned the suitability of parliamentary institutions
in India, The workh^f the parliamentary system in Southern
Asia after independence seems to suggest that the system can
be established only with difficulty.
John Plamenatz propounds the thesis that ’the non-
European peoples in changing their institutions have been
almost entirely imitative. They have sought to make ’’progress”
and it is therefore natural that they should have adopted
European methods.’ The Western democratic political system
did not prove to be a very successful experiment for the West
itself: it never became rooted in more than a very few countries -
in practice, it never went further than the North Atlantic and
the Anglo-Saxon orbit. -Even France never settled down to a
prolonged democratic system, in spite of the fact that the
French were adept in preparing recipes for democracy.
Therefore, we witness the breakdown of the formal
Western political structure or to use Rupert Emerson’s phrase ’the
, 4erosion of democracy.’ in the new states of Afro-Asia; and we witness
1* M/CR, p.63.
2. Ibid., p.68.
3 • Jar Flame n fe/tgy 'Onb Alien Ruleoanfl , S e 1 - G- o v e r n m e h t % op A145V; .
4. SeeJ fR. fEmersqn, ’’The Erosion of Democracy”, Journal of Asian 
Studies, November I960, pp.1-8.
the alternatives9 as two major types emerge from the history of the
last decade: the military dictatorship, as adopted in the U.A.R.,
1Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, South Korea, Burma, Turkey, Lebanon,
Nigeria and Ghana; and the semi-totalitarian one-party state,
centered round a charismatic personality: Guinea, Indonesia, Mali
and some other ex-French territories have, in various degrees,
adopted this systerrw^The great exceptions, of course, are the
Philippines, India,/Ceylon which have managed to sustain their
democratic framework. India in the 1 show .case for parliamentary
2democracy in Southern Asia1, whereas among the Southeast Asian 
countries, the Philippines provides the only example where there 
has been a relatively smooth functioning of representative 
institutions.
Werner Levi has pointed out that democracy was established 
on a narrow basis of ruling groups; and for a variety of reasons, 
not all of which reflected deep-seated convictions about its 
superior qualities as a form of government. Nowhere in South and 
Southeast Asia did it come as a result of deliberate choice among 
carefully considered alternatives nor were the mass of its 
beneficiaries prepared for its arrival. Consequently the forms and 
mechanics of Western democracy which existed in Asia were not based 
on the ideological and social r^Lities which made them viable in the
3
West * Emerson also stressed this theme in his Representative 
Government in Southeast Asia. He points out how in making the brief 
but stormy passage across the English Ghannel from Britain to Prance, 
the parliamentary system underwent a drastic change. In Southeast 
Asia, Western institutions are being translated through far greater
1* Pakistan returned to constitutional government on March 1, 1962,
when a constitution was promulgated by President Ayub.' But a copy­
book adoption of Parliamentary government was renounced.
2. W« Levi, "The Fate of Democracy in South and Southeast Asia",
Par Eastern Survey, February 1959, p.25.
See also R. Emerson, From Empire to Nation, ch.xv.
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distances of time, of cultui’e and of race, and it is only
reasonable to expect that these Western-style representative
institutions will in due course develop particular attributes
of their own which will differentiate them sharply from their
prototypes. Emerson has also referred to what he calls 1 the
most important as well as the most obvious thing.1 The basic
cultural heritage of the peoples of Southeast Asia is totally
different from that of the peoples of Western Europe who were the
creators of representative governments that individualism and
egalitarianism which have been an essential part of the underpinning
of democracy in the West have not generally been present in the
1Asian tradition. Most of the leaders of India and Pakistan have
refused to agree to this assumption. Radhakaraal Mukherjee in his
Democracies of the East speaks of the democratic tradition of the
former time-honoured system of the majlis and panchayat in the East.
He maintains that the communal-democratic system of politics based
on Islam is a no less remarkable phenomenon of political evolution
2than the development of Athenian and Roman republics. Sydney D.
Bailey detected a *good deal in indigenous democracy* in the region
which was favourable to the development of parliamentary institutions.
He points out how in the Asian countries the villages had been
traditionally managed by representative councils. The adoption of
the parliamentary system in the former British colonial territories
in Asia has been described by Bailey *as a momentous act of faith*
3by the political leaders of those countries. The politically 
conscious minority of Asian countries had first-hand experience 
with the embryonic parliamentary system which had been in the
. - ; —  — —  - * pp76=li,
1* R. Emerson, Representative Government in Southeast Asia./see also
Prom Empire to Nation, pp.272-92.
2. R.IC. Mukherjee, Democracies of the East»pp. 174— 6.
5. S.D. Bailey, Parliamentary Government in Southern Asia, p.9.
1  'lJ.fj
process of development* In particular, the lawyers, who were
always predominant in the nationalist movements, had studied and
come to respect some of its main principles. Whatever defects
1the system seemed to have, it had no real rivals. In India and
Pakistan, indeed there were in some circles strongly-held views
that it might be better to avoid British forms if possible. It
was argued that institutions cannot be easily transplanted from
one country to another, and that Asians should devise constitutional
forms appropriate to the Asian tradition. But under the guidance
of the largely Westernised elite, the constitution-makers have
turned to Western Europe and the United States to furnish the
experience on which they might draw. The G-andhians in India and 
purists
Xslamict^ in Pakistan did call for a# ©aridhiian and aviTslamiC'i 
constitution respectively but they could not pose a serious 
challenge. Theirs were the voices crying in the wilderness.
Pakistan tried hard to incorporate into a Western constitution 
the elusive concept of the Islamic state. _ But after years of 
fruitless discussion about the proposed constitutional provisions, 
no agreement could be reached about the precise way in which an 
Islamic democratic state 'differed from a Western democratic state# 
Some concessions v/ere, of oourse, given to the protagonists of
these ideas in the respective constitutions. In India, the 
directive principles included provisions regarding the setting up of 
village panchayats, promotion of cottage industries, prohibition 
on aloohol, and a ban on cow slaughter which were concessions to 
traditional Hindu attitudes. The 1956 Pakistan Constitution went 
furthest in this respect, Pakistan was described as an Islamic 
Republic.1 The directive principles included the clauses about 
preventing prostitution, gambling, drinking and the elimination
1. S.I). Bailey, Parliamentary Groyernfa&Ktin Southern Asia, pp.9-10*
°f riba (usury). There were provisions regarding !the promotion
of Muslim unity and international peace* and 1 promotion of Islamic
principles*. It was stated that, *Steps shall be taken to enable
the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively to order
their lives in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah.*
Article 193 read: *Ho lav; shall be enacted which is repugnant
to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and
Sunnah •••• and existing law shall be brought into conformity
with such Injunctions*. The head of state must be a Muslim and
Articles 197 and 198 instructed the President to establish an
Islamic Research Institute and to appoint a Commission to make
recommendations for bringing existing law into conformity with the
injunctions of Islam. These provisions were never carried out#
Apkrttfrbm these provisions, India - and, until 1953, Pakistan -
adopted parliamentary systems of the British type, and derived
so many sections from the written constitutions of America, Prance,
Ireland,and Canada. Sir Ivor Jennings remarks: fIt is unlikely that
for some time to come any of the Asian countries of the Commonwealth
will evolve new political forms. Though their potential may be
great their present capacity for innovation in any field of
1culture is small.* It may be added that most Western countries 
have not shown any great capacity for formal constitutional 
innovation, being mainly content to ring the changes between 
parliamentary and presidential forms, both in many ways inheritances 
of British constitutional experience, with occasional odd 
amalgamations of the two as in de Gaulle*s Prance. American-type 
federalism seems to have been a real innovation, but that was 
nearly two hundred years ago.
Bet us now turn to examine the constitution-making
1. Sir I. Jennings, The Commonwealth in Asia, p.57*
processes in four countries: America and Prance', representing the 
old democracies in the West, Turkey, representing the Middle East, 
and Japan, representing Asia? to see how far their constitutions
reflected the indigenous tradition, and how far they did borrow 
from their colonial masters (as in the case of America), in the 
case of France, came under the influence of British and American 
constitutional theories or in the case of Turkey and Japan, borrowed 
from the constitutions of Western Europe*
America
The Constitution of the United States of America (1787) 
is the oldest written national constitution in the world* The 
history of the American Revolution and of the establishment of the 
American Constitution have provided a model for those who believe 
in the abilities of men to govern themselves and to create their 
own institutions in the light of their own experience. Theirs was 
the first deliberately designed constitution for a large political 
system. The framers did not go out of their way to invent political 
forms. Some of them were students of Vattel, Montesquieu, and there 
was the supposed influence of other continental writers, such as 
Rousseau, or even of English thinkers, such as Burke, Harrington, 
Locke, and Blackstone. They drew upon European sources: such sources 
were the common law, the principles of Magna Carta and the Bill of 
i4ights. In the main, this monumental heritage had passed to America 
far back in colonial days, and at the time when the national 
constitution took shape, v/as already deeply embedded in the 
constitutions, laws, and usages of the states* The thirteen British 
colonies that were to form the nucleus of the new United States all
18
enjoyed some form of representative institutions* The new 
instrument grew out of the political life of Americans themselves 
in the colonial and revolutionary periods* John Dickinson 
expressed this very succinctly in the course of the dehates, when 
he said: Experience must he our only guide* Reason may mislead 
us*r The father of the constitution hoasted, America *reared 
the fabrics of government which have no model on the face of the 
globe* They formed the design of a great confederacy, which it is 
incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate*f"
By 1787 not all Americans v/ere willing publicly to 
admit that the models they should seek to follow were those of 
the country whose rule they had but lately thrown off* Hamilton, 
it is true, declared roundly that he believed the British
3government to form fthe best model the world ever produced**
John Dickinson extolled the virtues of limited monarchy, and
4Madison those of the House of Lords* But James Wilson believed 
that British Government could not supply the Americans with a 
model, since the social structure of the country provided it with 
no basis and *the whole genius of the people1 opposed it* And 
Charles Pinkney while admitting that he too thought the British 
Constitution fthe best constitution in existence*, declared that 
it was one that would not and could not be introduced into America 
(for many centuries*1 But despite the warning from Elbridge 
Gerry that * maxims taken from the British constitution were often 
fallacious* when applied to the American situation, which was 
1 extremely different*, the members of the convention continued to 
argue about the details of the proposed new constitution, largely
1* M. Parrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States* 
p*204*
2. -M* Beloff (ed*), The Federalist, p.66; J. Madison*
3* M* Farrand (ed*), The Record.s of the Federal Convention of 1787* 
vol*i, p*299*
4* Ibid* 9 pp*92, 288-9*
5* Ibid.* p*153*
6. Ibid.* p*398,
7• Ibid*, p*50*
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by analogy with that of Britain* Indeed, save for the small
republics of the Netherland and Switzerland, there was nowhere
else to look. fThe people of the colonies1, declared Edmund
Burke, fare descendants of Englishmen*** They are therefore not
only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to Englishideas,
1and on English principles*1 The founding fathers, the practical 
politicans, knew how Minitely difficult a business government is, 
desired no bold experiments* They preferred so far as circumstances 
permitted, to walk in the old paths, to follow methods which 
experience had tasted. Accordingly they started from the system 
on which their own colonial governments, and afterwards their 
state governments, had been conducted. The British Constitution 
became a model for the new national government. They created an 
executive-the President-on the model of the state Governor, and of j
i
the British Crown. They created a legislature of two houses - |
Congress - on the model of the two houses of their state legislatures, j
and of the British Parliament. And following the precedent of the j
British judges (irremovable by the Crown and Parliament combined) I
they created a judiciary appointed for life, and irremovable save
by impeachment* As James Bryce remarked! rThe American Constitution
is no exception to the rule that everything which has power to ]
win the obedience and respect of men must have its roots deep in
the past, and that the more slowly every institution has grown,
so much the more enduring is it likely to prove* There is little
2
in that Constitution that is absolutely new#*
Besides the borrowed institutions and procedures, there 
was of course much in the constitution which was pure and ingenuous 
innovation* This was true especially of many of the federal provisions
1* E. Burke, "Speech on Conciliation with America,!t 22 March 1775,
in Max Beloff (ed.), The Debate on the American Revolution, p.206.
2. J. Bryce, The American Commonwealth* vol.i, p.35*
governing relations among states and between them and the central 
government* But perhaps the most important constitutional 
novelty of the American founding fathers was Article V, which sets 
forth the procedure for amending the constitution* Artivle V 
provided the solution to the most perplexing of all constitutional 
problems, the problem of combining stability with adaptibility, 
permanence with flexibility. Unwritten constitutions do not face 
this problem. It is peculiar to written ones, especially when 
they are new. Both permanence and flexibility were further 
buttressed by another, more famous innovation of the founding 
fathers, Ehe rights of the courts to pronounce legislative acts 
void, because contrary to the constitution1, which Hamilton 
explained in no.lxxviii of the Federalist Papers.^
France
The English Revolution of VffgQ established the 
sovereignty of parliament as the central operative principle of 
British government. The American Revolution of 1776, created 
in the written constitution of the federal government, the backbone 
of the American democratic system. The French Revolution of 1789 
declared that no form of public authority is legitimate, unless it 
Emanates expressly from the nation1, i.e., the people. There 
was the influence of Rousseau*s theories as expressed in the new 
nationalism. There was the political individualism of the 
physiocrat^©* The nationalism which the French Revolution engendered 
led everywhere to a serious intensification of political struggles* 
Wars which had hitherto been dynastic, almost private affairs, now 
became the struggle of great masses rising to the new nationalist
1* M. Beloff, The Federalist? p.397.
battileries* France set the example of written constitutions in
Europe. All Continental European ideas of liberty, of popular
sovereignty, of the republican form of government are either
directly derived therefrom or owe France a heavy debt* France has
herself certainly been influenced by England: but where British
influence has extended to the Sest of Europe, the impact has on the
whole been indirectly from Britain, directly from France. France
served as the world*s chief laboratory for political experiment.
The people tried one form of government after another, one
constitution after another - only to find themselves disillusioned.
It has often been said that, since 1789, France has changed her
constitution on an average every twelve1 years. It was a commonplace
saying in England that Frenchmen had neither political sense nor
sagacity, and that they did not deserve a stabilized government
because they were too philandering in their political fidelity to
give any form of government a fair chance.
The French Revolution was an essentially middle class
protest against the whole structure of the ancien regime in France,
with its framework of political despotism, its gross economic
inequalities, its texture of privileged social classes. The
Revolution asserted that the essence of the democratic ideal is
the 'sovereignty of the people1, with its three-fold slogan of
'liberty, equality and fraternity.* In August 1789, the famous;
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen was formulated.
Several authorities have offered impressive evidence that it was in
1fact modelled on its American counterpart. The Declaration was a 
denial of the arbitrary power and a protest against the abuses of 
the ancien regime. In September 1791, a written constitution was
1* See H.E. Bourne, "American Constitutional Precedents in the French 
National Assembly", American Historical Review, April 1903, 
pp.466-86; J.H. Robinson, "The French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man of 1789", Fo 1 itl;eal:r’~S,clen.ce Quarterly. December 1899, 
pp.653-62; C. Brinton, "Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen", Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol.v, pp.49-51*
drawn up. The Declaration formed the Preamble of the Constitution 
of 1791 and express^# recognised in subsequent documents,.including 
the present Constitution of the Pifth Republic* The National Assembly 
which drafted the first Constitution of Prance (1791) was actually 
nothing but the so-called Third Estate of the Estates General 
(etats generaux), a quasi-legislature of medieval origin. The 
constitution was a curious mixture of monarchical and republican 
principles. An attempt was made to apply the principles of 
national sovereignty and of the separation of powers. Prench 
constituent bodies, the long line of which includes primarily the 
National Constituent Assembly of 1789 - 1791, the Convention of 
1793, the National Assembly of 1848, the Bordeaux Assembly of 1871, 
and the two Constituent Assemblies of 1945“1946, are all alike, and 
differ from American constitutional conventions, in that they have 
served as basic governmental institutions of the country at the 
same time that they have been engaged in drafting a constitution for 
the future government of the nation.
Since the Revolution of 1789 that overthrew the Monarchy 
(the ancien regime)and proclaimed a Republic, Prance has had sixteen 
different constitutions that have created many forms of government.
The Revolution led to a Constitutional Monarchy(l789-9Jt), whicha
became a Republic (1792-95), which in turn gave place to the 
Directorate and the Consulate (1799), with Napoleon as the Pirst 
Consul. In 1804, Prance was transformed into an * Empire*, and 
Napoleon became the 'Emperor*, governing by proclamations and 
executive orders. In 1814, the Empire was brought down by an alliance 
of most of the major countries of Europe, and the Bourbon Icings were 
restored. A 'constitutional charter1 of 1814 was notable chiefly 
for attempting to transplant into Prance the cabinet or parliamentary 
system of government on the model of Britain. The king was left with
more powers and parliament was more restricted; but ministers 
wore supposed to be responsible. The franchise was extended but
it was still very restricted. The Bourbon kings gave way after the 
Revolution of 1830 to the July Monarchy, the Orleanist branch of
the Bourbon dynasty that ruled until 1848. The Revolution of 1848
again discarded the Monarchy in favour of a new Republic (the
Second) based on universal male suffrage. This time the
constitution showed, unmistajbly, the influence of America. Powers
conferred upon the President were quite comparable with those in
the United States; and while ministers were provided for, their
status was left so vague that no one could tell whether or not
they were to be regarded as responsible. Certainly the tendency
was to swing away from the English cabinet system in the direction
of the presidential system prevailing in the United States, The
nation might not want a king, but it must have a strong executive -
one that would supply the active leadership in which kings often
failed. The President, Louis Napoleon,abolished the Republic in
1851 to introduce the 1 Second Empire', in which he governed (as
Napoleon III), as his uncle had done, by:, executive proclamations,
although he did seek popular support through plebiscites.
The defeat of Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian 
War &1870) spanned another crisis and a new republican constitution 
(the Third Republic) was introduced in 1875. The constitution 
drafters in 1875 had been inspired both by French royalist tradition 
and by the etample of the British parliamentary monarchy; they 
had designed their makeshift constitution to serve as the framework 
for a restored monarchy in France. The structure proved flexible 
enough, however, to adapt itself to republican needs; and so 
France unintentionally furnished the world with history's first 
example of the parliamentary republic - a combination of republicanism 
and parliamentarism which gave to France the longest-lived
governmental system in the period after the Old Regime* The
essence of the parliamentary system lay in the dominant role
of the Chamber of Deputies? which could overthrow or replace
the executive organ (the cabinet) at will* In contrast to the
so-called presidential form of government? there was no attempt
at a clear-cut separation of powers? with the executive and
legislative branches both stemming directly from the people and
kept in equilibrium by a series of checks and balances* At most?
there was a separation of functions between the executive and
legislative* The seat of national sovereignty? the source of
executive authority? lay in the Chamber of Deputies alone. Between
1875 and 1940? practice altered certain aspects of the government*s f
i
operation. The most significant change was a relative v/eakening of J
the executive organ in favour of the legislature* The executive*s j
chief weapon against the legislature - the right to dissolve the I
Chamber and to order new elections fell into complete disuse. The -j
decay of dissolution and the multi-party system did much to produce j
that famous French phenomenon? cabinet instability. During the j
sixty-five-year life of the Third Republic? Finance had a sequence *
of 102 cabinets? which scarcely made for executive authority or
strength. It was calculated that from 1875 to 1920? governments !
lasted an average of less than ten months each; but that from 1920 J
1
to 1940? the speed of rotation just about doubled* Once the 
Republic got under way? no party ever approached a clear majority 
in the Chamber; a coalition from two to a half-dozen groups was 
always necessary in order to form a cabinet? and the life of such •
a coalition was at the mercy of each component group* The parties 
themselves were fluid and ill-disciplined? which added to the
1* See 0. Wright? The Reshaping of French Democracy* pp.8-9•
structural instability of cabinets* The Third Republic collapsed 
when Prance was overrun by the Nazi armies at the beginning of 
World War II (1940)* The unoccupied part of Prance was then 
ruled by the so-called fVichy Regime1(1940-1944), in which all 
powers were concentrated in one man, Marshal Retain, who was 
granted broad authority by the constitutional convention that met 
on July 10, 1940, in the wake of the Prench defeat* A great part 
of the two years since liberation had been spent in the effort to 
establish a new governmental system which would correct the weakness 
of the pre-war regime and would start Prance on the road to stability 
and prosperity. After General de Gaulle's triumphal return to 
Paris, the government of Prance was essentially a dictatorship by 
consent* The provisional Pourth Republic began its career as a 
presidential or even an authoritarian regime rather than a 
parliamentary one. This fourteen-month experiment serving as the 
immediate background for the constitutional debates, could hardly 
fail to exert a direct,influence - either positive or negative - 
on the permanent structure of the Pourth Republic. The Constitution 
of the Pourth Republic was approved by the people in a special 
referendum in October 1946. It lasted for 12 years and was 
radically overhauled in the summer of 1958* In September 1958, 
the French voted overwhelmingly in favour of a new republican 
constitution - the Fifth Republic - in which substantial powers 
are invested in the President.
The Prench since the Revolution of 1789 have not agreed 
on the political system they want. They have alternated between a 
Monarchy, a Republic, and an Empire, in which broad powers are 
delegated to one man. It has experimented with many forms of 
government, but none of them developed the respect and deference 
that the British pay to their parliamentary system and their monarch.
The Prench system of the Third and of the Pourth Republic
provide obvious examples of the problems which arise when a too- 
powerful legislature? torn by a multi-party system, results in an 
unstable executive incapable of providing consistent and effective 
leadership. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic is designed to 
correct this imbalance. The constitution has been variously 
described as 1tailor#made for General de Gaulle1, 1quasi-
1Monarchical1? 1quasi-presidential1? Unworkable1, and Ephemeral.1
It is a hybrid? an attempt to combine two constitutional
principles - a half-way house between France's traditional
parliamentary regime and a presidential system, the possibility
of whose peaceful co-existence has yet to be proved after several
years of experience. The drafting of the Constitution of the
Fifth Republic was the responsibility? not of parliament but of
the government and v/as done in private. A small ministerial
committee presided over by General de Gaulle drew up a first
draft which was approved by the cabinet and then submitted to a
consultative committee, mainly composed of members of parliament?
/
and to the Conseil d!Ft^t, before being finally approved by the 
cabinet. The constitution passed into law by resorting directly 
to a popular referendum in September 1958, without a vote on the 
part of parliament as such. The head of state and the head of 
government remain in theorydistinct * The Prime Minister appoints 
and dismisses his colleagues and is, responsible to parliament 
(in practice to the National Assembly only). The two houses of 
parliament are democratically elected. The judiciary is independent* 
The Prime Minister has both procedural and constitutional means of 
dominating the assembly* and parliament's role is considerably 
reduced. Presidential power is greatly enhanced. To ensure more
1. The quotations are from X). Pickles, The Fifth French Republic,
p . 2 6,
governmental stability than the parliamentary system had
provided under either the Third or Fourth Republic the head of
state should be a representative of the nation rather than of
parliament - not an impartial figure head (unlike the Presidents
of the Third and Fourth Republics) but *a national arbiter far 
f^om . x
removed/political struggles1 (de Gaulle*s phrase) •'
In many ways, the Fifth Republic is certainly decidedly
different from its two predecessors. In many ways, it is new and
original, and it makes a fresh attempt to solving one of Frarjce’s
greatest problems: how to combine democracy with authority, to
guarantee the vast freedom to which Frenchmen are accustomed while
giving them orderly, responsible and stable government. The future
alone will decide whether the Fifth Republic has succeeded in doing
this* According to a qualified observer, the de Gaulle regime
represents a new victory for Bonapartism - direct communion and
communication between a national hero and the nation at the expense
2
of the nation’s representatives* The instability of the voters 
who shift their allegiances all over the political chessboard from 
election to election and of the party system which reflects £hGe 
voters* views highlight both the necessity of creating an independent 
executive and the dilemmas which faces it*
Turkey
Turkey, unlike the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, never 
fell under direct European rule; she nevertheless experienced 
many of the same processes as they did* Between 1826 and 1876 
many changes were accomplished and there was real progress in
1* Quoted in S*H. Hoffmann, uThe French Constitution of 1958: 1* 
The Final Text and its Prospects,’* American Political Science 
Review, June 1959, p.541*
2* Ibid*, p*348.
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passing from a despotic to a limited monarchy, Liberal and
democratic ideas* chiefly of British and.French origin, deeply
affected important groups of Turkish intellectuals# In
December 1876, an Ottoman Constitution (known as Midhat
Constitution) was proclaimed largely modelled on the Belgian
Constitution of 1831# Unlike the Belgian Constitution, however,
it was not passed by a constituent assembly, but promulgated by
the sovereign power - Midhat Pasha, the Grand Vezir, Bernard
Lewis observed that the constitution combined 1 the advantages
of being liberal, monarchical, and written in French, But the
Ottoman Empire was not Belgium', and the (Belgian) constitution
Adapted into Turkish, was inevitably irrelevant, unrelated to
1Turkish conditions, and ultimately unworkable#1 The experiment 
did not last long* In February 1878, Sultan Abdul Hamid dissolved 
the chamber, and for the next thirty years Turkey was ruled by an 
all-pervasive autocracy. But the spirit of constitutionalism was 
not dead. In 1908, the Young Turk Revolution restored the 
constitutional regime# The second Turkish constitutional regime 
lasted longer than the first, but it too ended in failure. In the 
new parliamentary and administrative apparatus that followed the 
Revolution, new methods of government were devised and put to the 
test. It was the most important step in the country's development 
into a Western state. Ideologically, absolutism was permanently 
buried* The ordinary people, though not yet an active participant, 
made his first appearance in the political arena at this time* In 
the previous constitution, the Sultan had retained his theoretical 
status as the source from which all power flowed. In 1908, he 
submitted himself to the supreme authority of the constitution#
1. B, Lev/is, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p#356*
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In 1876, parliament had sworn allegiance to him; in 1908 he swore
allegiance to parliament. The principle of government by lav/ grew
into an intrinsic part of Turkish political thought. Whether
representative of the people or not, parliament was incarnated as
a symbol of legitimacy on which all political power rested* But
the new experiment like the previous one had degenerated into a kind
of military oligarchy of the Young Turk leaders, which ended only
with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War*
. During the years of defeat and occupation things looked
very bleak indeed* Then, with the military and diplomatic victories
of the Kemalists, a new phase began in Turkey1s political evolution*
In 1923,. Turkey became a republic, and in April 1924-, an entirely
new constitution was accepted by the G-r^nd National Assembly* The
Turkish Constitution of 1924 was the first truly liberal constitution
to be adopted by a Middle Eastern country, it represented the
formal break with Islam and the adoption of the Western principles of
the secular state. The state once dynastic, multi-national and
religious, was rebuilt upon nationalistic, secular and republican
lines. The assumption of legislative authority curtailing the
absolute power of the ruler clashed with historic Islamic concepts*
It is this factor, more than any other aspect of natibnalism, that
began the disintegration of Islamic political system* Instead of
nationalism being the servant of Islam and providing It with a new
and vigorous political form, Islam has increasingly become the
servant of nationalism. Ataturk1s purpose was to liberate and to
1elevate Islam from its position of being a tool of politics* The 
office of the Caliphate was abolished, the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs (Seriat) v/as disbanded, the historic office of Sheikh of
1. See lord Kinross, Ataturks The Rebirth of a Nation* pp.384-5*
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Islam (Seyh-ul~Islam) ceased to exist, and all religious schools 
were transferred to the secular arm® The religious courts (Serial) 
which still administered the lav/s relating to family and personal 
matters, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance, were closed,
1and, a Civil Code based on that of the Swiss model was formulated* 
Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution stated that Islam was the religion 
of the Turkish state - a formula retained with appropriate modifications 
since the first Ottoman Constitution of 1876. In April 1928, this 
clause was deleted from the constitution. In doing Turkey
did not completely abandon Islam, but attempted to Nationalise* it 
in the same way that English Reformation 'nationalised1 the medieval 
Catholic heritage by creating a separate Church of England. Indeed, 
this historic precedent was cited by apologists of the Turkish
2Revolution in explanation of the place of Islam in the new Turkey*
1. lord Kinross, Ataturks The Rebirth of a Nation, pp.335-6; lev/is,
on. cit., pp.253-9, 260.
2. This lead has not been followed in the Arab World. The Arab
states (such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Afghanistan) are still 
formally Islam, with Islam as the state religion. Shariah 
has continued, to have a place in the national legal system and 
Islamic institutions play an influential role* Yet in most of 
the Arab World Islam is steadily losing power as a political 
form and increasingly serves as the facade behind which the 
forces of nationalism operate. Abdul Rasser is a good example 
of this. While Islam is mentioned in his Philosophy of Revolution, 
it plays a much less important and specific role in Egyptian 
politics. Although Islam is thus increasingly subservient to 
nationalism, in many specific situations it still exerts 
important political pressures. Islam may have ceased to be a 
decisive influence in shaping the form of the state, but it is 
certainly not politically dead among the masses. Even in secular 
Turkey political leaders at all levels have found it expedient 
to maintain an identifiable Islamic loyalty in their appeal for 
the village vote# See J.S. Badeau, "Islam and the Modern Middle 
East," Foreign Affairs, October 1959, pp.66-9.
In these respects, the Turkish Constitution was the most
revolutionary constitution of the Muslim Middle East. Until its
drastic modification in 1961, it was subjected to only few and
minor amendments* Like other constitutions later adopted by most
Middle Eastern countries, the Turkish Constitution was copied
almost verbatim from Western European models chiefly the French
and the Belgian. But unlike most other fundamental laws of the
Middle East, it was carefully adjusted to avoid placing too much
power in the executive branch of the government and concentrating
real authority in the National Assembly. This v/as perhaps due to
Ataturk*s realisation that, in order to safeguard the permanence
of the nationalist state, which was created primarily by the formal
transfer of sovereignty from the Caliph to the nation, the nationally
elected assembly must be made the repository of all authority and
power (Articles 4, 6 and 7). The President of the republic was 1 
elected from among the members of the indirectly 
' / elected unicameral legislature - the Grand National Assembly. The
President chose a Premier v/ho formed a cabinet whose membership v/as
subject to the approval of the Assembly. Cabinet ministers v/ere
selected from deputies in the Assembly and v/ere collectively as
well as individually responsible for the conduct of the government*
The constitutional framework had strong similarities to that of the
Fourth Republic of France. The President could be restricted to a
ceremonial figurehead, the real executive power resting with the
Prime Minister and his cabinet.
Ataturk, through the six principles, known as rKemalismf - 
republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatlsme, secularism and 
revolutionalism - clearly hoped to create a new political network*
The regime of Ataturk, failing in its two experiments with a 
tolerated opposition, had ended as the personal autocracy of the 
head of state. The Turkish system, though Western in form, v/as
Eastern in practice. It may be argued that Ataturk and his
Revolution provided the prototype of the subsequent take-over
by the military junta in other Muslim countries in the Middle East.
In May I960, Turkey shifted into a continuing military
situation. Soon after taking the reins of power the military-,-
government assured the country of its dedication to democracy.
General Oemal Gursel, the head of the provisional government,
declared that the purpose and the aim of his administration was
to. bring the country with all speed** to a fair, clean and solid 
1democracy. The 1961 constitution-rnakers looked to the West
for models, as had their predecessors. Eeatures were taken over,
almost verbatim in several cases from the American, French, German,
2and Italian Constitutions. The new constitution, which v/as drafted 
by a group of Istanbul University Professors, was approved by the 
Constituent Assembly in May 1961, and accepted by a popular 
referendum in July 1961. The primary task of the constitution- 
makers was to reduce the possibility of an unlimited parliamentarism 
which had paved the way to a party dictatorship. To accomplish 
this, differences between the chambers in the new bicameral 
legislature were provided both in method of election and in 
length of terms of office, with the hope of avoiding domination 
by the same party in both chambers. The constitution emphasises 
fundamental rights. It establishes a constitutional court, seeks 
to protect the independence of the judiciary, the civil service and 
the universities. Finally, proportional representation in national 
elections replaces the majority system to protect against the 
pressures of a single party in a landslide. Although a civilian
1. N. Eren, Turkey Today - and Tomorrow, p.38.
2. W.E. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961, p.65; Eren,
op. cit*, p*31*
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a?- constitution was restored, the sentiment persists
among younger military officers that Turkey is not politically
mature enough for parliamentary politics, and that only an
authoritarian regime under the military regivnecan accomplish the
1
task of national development * The Turkish experiment with 
Western political institutions appears to prove the contention 
that Western institutions, as introduced in the Middle East, were 
doomed to failure any way, precisely because they were imposed 
from above and were not the product of grassroots democracy*
Japan
Like the American Constitution of 1787, the Japanese 
Constitution of 1889 was not a sharp break with the past* Discussion 
of constitutional progress had begun as far back as 1867; and 
immediately following the Restoration, Meiji statesmen began the 
task of drafting projects of a constitution. There is one very 
marked contrast between the political history of Japan in the first 
twenty years after the Restoration and that of Britain and America.
In those countries, it was parliament which produced politicali
parties, but in Japan it was political parties which produced 
2
parliament* The opposition parties pressed upon the government 
the adoption of political forms which most nearly resembled those 
of English origin, and they freely invoked the support of English 
andgAmcrican theory. Unlike the current experiment in democracy, 
which, in the main, was initiated and encouraged from above by the 
occupation, the earlier attempt was essentially an indigenous 
movement. Japan was the first Asiatic country to adopt a constitutional
1. D.A* Rustow, "Turkeys The Modernity of Tradition", in L.W. Pye
and S. Verba ( e d s * Political Culture and Political Development, 
p•187•
2* O.B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan» p.368.
form of government. Japanese constitution-makers paid careful
attention to Prussian political theory and turned to Prussian
advisers for guidance in drawing up the document which became
the Constitution of 1889. Emissaries were even sent to America
but they rejected the American model as unworkable. The German
Constitution offered a suitable pattern for adaption to Japanese
needs. As Sansom points out, the government for their part v/as
interested in examining 1 the practical-working of the systems of
government in use in the leading countries of the West, in order
1to ascertain which was most appropriate to the needs of Japan.1 
More than twenty German advisers and experts Wei’s said to be
2employed in connection with the drafting of the constitution.
The constitution was drafted secretly and was handed down from
above (granted by the Emperor as a fgift* to the people) and not
arrived at through free discussion in a constituent assembly.
This secret procedure was said to have been suggested by Harvard-
educated Kaneko Kentaro (one of the three men most intimately
involved in the drafting work), who had discovered that the
deliberations of the American constitutional forms had been in 
3secret.
Japan has traditionally been a theocratic-patriarchal 
state in which the Emperor occupied the position of Bather God.
The Meiji Constitution accurately reflected the Japanese view 
when it declared that fthe Emperor is sacred and inviolable1 and 
that 1 the Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself 
the rights of sovereignty* (Articles 3 and 4). The framers of the 
constitution appeared to have envisaged not only the identification
1. Sansom, op. cit., p.380.
2* N. Ike, The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan, ppll7-f
3. H.S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics; p.41. See also 
C, Yanaga, Japan since Perryt.G.M. Beckmann, The Making of the 
Meiji Constitution,pp.82-3. ~(pp.l70«*l) ,
n.
of the Emperor with the- state, hut also his deification. Article
1 provided that the Empire of Japan 1 shall be reigned over and
governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal*1 In
other words, the customs of the people are stronger than
constitutions and political theories. The constitution was
essentially a document embodying both spirit and substance that
were distinctly Japanese in character but neatly put up in a
Western garb - a compromise between feudal-based authoritarian
1
tradition on one side and Western experience on the other*
It was in effect for a period of 56 years and about 5 months. A 
Japanese observer concluded that only three Articles in the 
Japanese document viz.* 1, 31, and 71, might be regarded as wholly
p
original*" The remaining Articles were copied from various foreign 
sources*
The constitution invested supreme political power in 
the person of the Emperor* It provided for a bicameral system of 
legislature in which the upper house was definitely aristocratic 
and intended as a check against the lower house. The authority 
of the Diet v/as circumscribed and the electorate was kept small 
by high property qualifications. While the separation of powers 
was carried out in form, the executive branch of the government 
was more powerful than the legislature. The doctrine of judicial 
review was not adopted, and the Privy Council rather than the 
Supreme Court was entrusted with the function of passing on the 
constitutionality of lav/s and administrative actions.
The Japanese Constitution of 1946 bears on almost every 
page the unmistakable imprint of its essentially Anglo-Saxon 
origin. Whereas the constitutions of Prussia and other German states
1. K. Colegrove, "The Japanese Constitution,tf American Political
Science Review, December, 1937, p.1049* See also Beckmann, 
op.cit., p.95*
2. H.S. Quig>y, op.cit., p.44; P.M.A. Linebarger, D. Chu, and A.W*
Burks, Far Eastern Governments and Politics, pp.364-5*
of the early 1880* s v/ere the models used by Meiji statesmen,
American and British principles are dominant in the present
constitution. The new constitution is technically a revolutionary
document in that the Meiji Constitution had been issued by the
Japanese Emperor on his own divine authority whereas the new
constitution is issued by the Japanese people beginning v/ith the
quite un-Japanese phrase, 1 Nihon Kokumin Wa...’ (’We, the
constitution had beenissued by a recognisedly 
Japanese people.*.1). In other words, the former/1heaven-descended1
king and the new one by a reluctantly democratic people under the
orders of a foreign occupation. The Preamble states that ’sovereign
power resides with the people*. The constitution provides for
Japan a curious amalgam of the American and British concepts of
government. The Emperor has been stripped of all power, theoretical
as well as actual, and left simply as ’the symbol of the state and
of the unity of the people,’ A cabinet on the Westminster model
has been established. The Diet, with both houses popularly elected,
is declared ’the highest organ of state power and,*, the sole law-
making organ of the State* (Article 4l)• The upper house is clearly
subordinated to the lower. The cabinet is expressly responsible
to the Diet. Article 66 clearly demonstrates the subordination of
the executive power to legislative authority. The lack of a strong
continuing executive is obviously borrowed from the Third French
Republic and is in marked contrast to the older Japanese system.
Some v/ent so far as to favour the complete abandonment of the
new constitution on the grounds that it was not a Japanese product
but a Western device imposed on the Japanese people during a period
of occupation when they had no choice, but these were apparently a 
1minority. Internal evidence clearly indicates that the new 
constitution v/as a product, in the main of Occidents.!, not Japanese
1. H. Zink, Modern Governments9 p.728,
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draftsmen#’*' It is quite apparent not only from the concepts
embodied in the document but from the Preamble, which has been
couched in a language highly suggestive of the Preamble to the
Constitution of the United States, the Declaration of Independence,
and the Atlantic Charter. The Bill of Eights and the doctrine of
judicial review of constitutionality through a new Supreme Court
constitute innovations of peculiarly American nature. One writer
described it as a 1 textbook constitution', having little relevance
to the traditional and dominant political aspirations or practices
of Japan, hopelessly unsuited to the political ideals or experience
of the vast majority of the population. 'A hollow but elaborate
facade modelled after an idealized version of Anglo-American
political institutions was hastily patched together,1 The result
was 'an enormous gap between political fact and constitutional 
a
fiction.' The Japanese people may or may not live up to its
specifications, but at all events it set their feet on a political
pathway which they had never trod.
From this analysis of the constitution-making processes
of different countries it becomes clear that whether democracy is
imposed from above or fashioned from below, the people have to pass
through many trials and conflicts before any kind of workable
democracy is attained. We can conclude with K.M. Maciver thus:
'Democracy is a form of government that is never completely achieved...*
iL J3
Democracy grows into/being. There may be centuries of growth before
5
we can says "Now this state is a democracy#1"
X# H.S. Quigley, "Japan's Constitution*:1890 and 1947", American 
Political Science Review. October 1947, p.874* See also H.S. 
Quigley and J.E. Turner, The New Japans Government and Politics.
p.118.
2. R.E. Ward, "The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution",
American Political Science Review, December 1956, p.1001.
3. Ibid., p.1010.
4* Ibid #
5. R.M. Maciver, The Web of Government, p.175*
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CHAPTER II 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCUSSIONS , 1919-1935-
The Eirst World War had a remarkable effect on the
attitude of both the rulers and the ruled. In India there was
a great quickening of political consciousness. The agitation
of the Indian National Congress and the Home Rule movement led
by Tilak and Mrs, Besant created considerable enthusiasm among
the Indian masses. These various reasons led to a significant
change in British policy and outlook in 1917. On August 20,
1917? the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, made a
historic announcement in the House of Commons. He declared:
1 The policy of His Majestey's Government, with which the
Government of India are in complete accord, is that of increasing
association of Indians in every branch of the administration
and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with
a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government
1in India as an integral part of the British Empire.1 Montagu 
came over to India, had a direct contact with the Indian leaders, 
and in conjunction with Chelmsford, the Viceroy, a joint report 
known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was published in 1918. In 
the words of the report? 1 The announcement marks the end of one 
epoch, and the beginning of a new one. Hitherto... we have ruled 
India by a system of absolute government, but have given her people
1, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5s., vol.xevii, col.1695*
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an increasing share in the administration of the country and
increasing opportunities of influencing and criticising the 
1Government,’
Long "before the publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford
Report and the jpe forms of 1919, a powerful combination of
intellectuals and politicians in England, known as the Round 
2
Table, had been considering the desirability of including 
India in a possible federation of the British Empire, Lionel 
Curtis, ’the Prophet’ of the group, tells us how his thinking 
was influenced by William Morris, a prominent Indian civil 
servant, while on their visit to Canada in 1909. Morris’ idea 
of ’self-government’ as ’the only.intelligible goal of British 
policy in India’ attracted him, Curtis wrote: ’So far ^ £s I 
had thought of self-government as a Western institution, which 
v/as and would always remain peculiar to the peoples of Europe ,,, 
It was from that moment that I first began to think of ’’the 
Government of each by each, and of all by all” not merely as a 
principle of western life, but rather of all human life, as the 
goal to which all human societies must tend I began to think
of the British Commonwealth as the greatest instrument ever 
devised for enabling that principle to be realized .*. And it
is for that reason that I have ceased to speak of the British
Empire ’ A study group of the Round Table, which met
regularly once a fortnight in London during the autumn of 1915, 
was attended by Curtis, R. Coupland, Sir William Luke and others. 
The group agreed that the attitude taken by Indians in the war 
had proved that the country was riper than had been supposed for
1. M/CR, p.6.
2. The prominent members of the Round Table were: L.S. Amery, R.
Cecil, V. Chirol, R, Coupland, L. Curtis, P. Kerr, W. Morris,
Lord Milner, and P. Luncan. A quarterly The Round Table 
was started with P. Kerr as editor in 1910.
3. L. Curtis, Lyarchy, pp.41-2.
40
1
further constitutional reforms* The only conceivable goal?
it was recognised, was self-government, and self-government
meant the responsible government for India within the Commonwealth
2on the dominion model* It was obvious that India could not
advance by one step to full responsible government and that her
progress toward it must be by gradual stages* It was realised
that■any further, advance on the lines of the Morley-Minto reforms
wou^-d give the electorate power to paralyse government at every
turn, but not the power and the responsibility of conducting
3government for themselves. The essence of the problem was,
therefore, to find a method of introducing true responsible
government^in a limited and manageable field of administration,
which could be contracted or extended in accordance with the
practical results attained without imperilling the structure
of government itself. This method was suggested in a memorandum
prepared for the group by Sir William Duke, a member of the
4Executive Council in Bengal. The word ’dyarchy* v/as used for the
first time by Curtis in his Letter to Mr. Bhupendranath B a s u , a
5member of the Indian legislative council, on April 6, 1917* The
word was coined by Sir William Meyer, a member of Viceroy’s 
6
council. Curtis himself wrote: ’.*• the principle of dyarchy was 
evolved by much anxious thought and inquiry brought to bear on a 
great problem by a large number of people possessed of a knowledge 
and experience My own part in the matter was to build a
continuous channel in which information drawn from a large number of
1* L. Curtis, Dyarchy» pp.xx-xxi.
2. Ibid *, p.xxii.
3* Ibid.9 pp.xxii-xxiii.
4* See ’The Duke Memorandum’ in ibid., pp„l-37, of* E. Montagu, •
Ani Indian Diary, p.377. *... I think he {DukeJ invented ’’Dyarchy”,
5* Curtis, op*cit., p.105*
6* Ibid.9 pp.xxxii, 105*
41
1sources could collect®* Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy, asked
for copies of the draft scheme and they were sent to him in India 
2in June 1916, Montagu had also occasions to discuss privately
3
with Curtis the merits of the scheme. Montagu, however, claimed
that their scheme had an independent and spontaneous development
before.he had seen Curtis.4 When the Government of India Bill,
1919? was debated in the British Parliament, Colonel Yate stated
in the House of Commons: 1[Mr. Montagu] ... came across a man named
Curtis. It was from this gentleman that he obtained the idea of 
5the diarchy,1 Lord Ampthill said in the House of Lords: ’ but
for the chance visit to India of a globe-trotting doctrinaire, 
with a positive mania for constitution-mongering, nobody .in the 
world would ever have thought of so peculiar a notion as that of the 
"Dyarchy".*^
To all concerned, 1 responsible government1 meant the y
7British parliamentary system. But Montagu suggested the word
1 self-government1 to the cabinet in ..his memorandum soon after he
8assumed office as Secretary of State in July 19.17, On 21 I
August, 1917, Montagu wrote to Chelmsford: !It was a strange *;j
discussion, I had hoped that the word "self-government” would
be used, because it appeared in everyone of your communications j
and because I thought it was a pity to boggle at a word so current ;i
in Indian discussion. The Cabinet in its wisdom preferred the *
words "responsible Government" to "self-Government". It requires
a better educated man than myself to know the difference, but if .7
it lies anywhere, "responsible Government" I should have thohght? *
a" . ;
pledges more than "self-Government".1 It has been disclosed by his v
1, Curtis, op.,cit., p.xx.
2• Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill, 1919, vol. ii, 
Minutes of Evidence, p.512.
3. Montagu, An Indian Diary, pp.76, 101, 141, 164, 236, 246,
4® Ibid., p .89 ®
5® Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5s. vol.122, col.448.
6. Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5s, vol.xxxviii, col,118.
7. W.H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in India, p.52,
8. The Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, vol.iii, p.167®
9. S.D. Waley, Edwin Montagu, p.135®
biographer that Curzon had himself inserted the words ’responsible 
1
government*1 He expressed ’astonishment and dismay1 when he
found that he had committed himself to, the very form of government
2in India against which, not long ago, he had warned Morley.
Curzon ’seemed to be tossing painfully on a sea of indecision’
3
and his attitude was ’extremely difficult to understand’. In 
substituting the words ’responsible government’ for ’self-
government’, Curzon wanted to make it ’rather safer and certainly
. ' 4nearer’ to his own point of view* Later on Curzon wrote that
the enlarged legislative councils proposed by the Government of
India would constitute k revolution' and would ’probably lead by
stages of increasing speed to the ultimate disruption o£ the
Empire.’^
The primary purpose of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was 
to justify the assumption ’that the obstacles which British states­
manship had hitherto regarded as prohibiting a parliamentary system
6in India could somehow or other be overcome*’ Montagu himself
emphasised that *the reasons which make self-government impossible
in this country now are not really distrust or unfitness or lack
of ability or want of character’ but what was renuired &as ’a growth
of those conventions and customs and habits of representative
government, without the acquisition of which democracy cannot
stand ... It is this use of power which they must be taught, which
7they must learn by experience and which we cannot risk*' The reprt
believed profoundly that the time had come to soften ’if not overcome’
1*. Ronaldshay, op* cit *, pp.167-8* ~ ~~
2* Ibid*, p*169-
3. Ibid *, p .166.
4® Ibid*, p.168.
5* Waley, op, cit. , p.173*
6. R. Coupland, The Indian Problem» 1833-1935? p*54*
7® Montagu, op. cit *, pp*136, 134*
’the habits of generations’, and ^ to call forth capacity and self- 
reliance in the place of helplessness; nationhood in place of caste
is dominated by a complete belief in the necessity of applying to
India the traditions of British democracy, ignoring the fact that
India is divided by race, sect, and religion in a manner which has
no parallel in those countries, mainly British, in which parliamentary
democracy has been effectively worked. The idea that men shohld,
like the average Indian peasant, remain satisfied with material
interests and good government was repudiated by Montagu, who was
anxiously to complete their humanity by stirring them to demand
2
dhntroliiofnth;eir destinies through the ballot-box.’ The report
itself laid emphasis on certain pre-requisites to be fulfilled to
make it'a success in the Indian context,. The authors of the report
especially pointed out the basically undemocratic character of the
Hindu caste system, and linking caste with communal interests, they
stated in plain terms that so long as such sectional interests were
paramount, ’any form of self-government to which India can attain
3must be limited and unreal at best.’ The communal question and
Hindu-Muslim antagonism in particular, they confessed, was the
4
’difficulty that outweigh$s all others.’ They did not offer any
hope that it be easily overcome. ’To our minds so 'long as the two
communities entertain anything like their present views as to the
separateness of their interests, we are bound to regard religious
hostilities as still a very serious possibility. The Hindus and
Muhammadans of India have certainly not yet achieved unity of purpose
5
or community of interest.* Though they considered the system of 
separate electorates as ’a very serious hindrance to the development
h  M/CR, p.120.
2. A.B. Keith, A Constitutional History of India, 1600-1935, p.244.
3. M/CR, p.125•
4° Ibid., p.126•
5 * Ibid., p .127
or communal feeling.’
1 Here is what A.B. Keith says: ’It
4  4
iof the self-governing p r i n c i p l e s t i l l  they were unable to change 
the system and it was retained for the Muslims and even extended 
to the Sikhso
The scheme, which became known as dyarchy, v/as given
effect by an Act of 1919. The Act envisaged a devolution of power
from English to Indian hands in the transferred field at the
provincial level. The transferred departments, such as education,
local government, agriculture, fisheries, public healthy were now
placed under ministers, who were elected members of the
legislatures and responsible to those legislatures. The Governor
and his Executive Council were to be in charge of the reserved
subjects like law and order, land revenue, finance, etc. The
enlarged provincial legislatures now contained a majority of
elected members. Even at the central legislature there was a
large elected element although the administration was still in the
hands of the Viceroy and his Councillors who continued to be
responsible to the Secretary of State. A bi-cameral legislature
consisting of the legislative Assembly and the Council of State
with increased powers was established. The principle of direct
election was introduced. Franchise v/as extended by considerably
lowering the property qualifications and women v/ere given the right
to vote in all the provinces. The total male electorate for the
general constituencies for the provincial legislatures was 7,414,000
2and for the legislative Assembly 984,000. There v/ere separate 
lists of provincial and central subjects and allocation of distinct 
sources of revenue.
The reform proposals of 1919 were received <juite well at the 
beginning, though the Home Rulers, Tilak and Mrs. Besant, dismissed
1. M/CR, p.188.
2. Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee (1924), p.53.
them as 'entirely unacceptable' and 'unworthy to be offered by
1
England or to be accepted by India., '
Congress at its annual session at Amritsar in December
1919 passed a resolution offering support in working the reforms,
so as to secure the early establishment of full responsible 
2
government* Gandhi, who had recently emerged to the Indian
political scene, was in favour of working the feforms. He declared:
'The Reforms Act ... is an earnest of the intention of the British
people to do justice, to India . Our duty therefore is not to
subject the Reforms to carping criticism, but to settle down
quietly to work so as to make them a thorough success...1 But
between May 1919 and May 1920, 'the political atmosphere of India had
undergone a complete change' due to some unfortunate events, such
as the unpopular Rowlatt Bill, the tragedy of Jallianwalla Bagh, the
Turkish Treaty and the hostile attitude of the British civil
4servants towards the reforms* All these events 'played their 
part in spoiling the ground for the delicate seeds of partial
5
responsible government*'
The non-co-operation movement led by G-andhi 'diverted for
three years the main stream of political activity' and resulted 'in
the abstention from any participation in the reforms of a number of
6leaders of Indian opinion*' The Congress decision to boycott the 
dyarchy experiment reflected the negligible interest of the Congress 
in experience in administration at the provincial or local level.
Even a section of the Congress known as Swarajists who contested the
elections from 1923 onwards and formed the largest single party in
most of the legislatures*, refused to form ministries and continued
1. Quoted in B.R. Nanda, The Wehrus: Motilal and Jawaharlal, p,147*
2. IAR, 1919, vol.i, p.l*
3« M. Gandhi, Young India, 1919-1922, vol.I, pp.84-5*
4* 'Kerala Putra* (K.M. Panikkar), The Working of Dyarchy in India,
1919-1928, p.29*
5* Morris-Jones, op. cit., p*55.
6. Report of the Reforms Enqmiry Committee (1924), p.2.
their efforts to bring the constitutional experiment to a 
breakdown.
In Bengal and C„P. (where the Swarajists had.an absolute
majority) they resorted to a policy of wrecking the constitution
from within. There were votes of no-confidence in the ministries,
their salaries were refused. As a result, the emergency powers
of the Governors had to be invoked and this led to a temporary
breakdown of the system of dyarchy during the years 1924-30. The
Governors had an exceptionally difficult task to select ministers
who could command a majority of the elected members of the 
1legislatures* Consequently, the ministers were selected from
groups whose hold on the legislatures were precarious and v/ere
kept in power with the votes of the official and nominebed members.
The parties within the legislatures had mostly been fluid groups,
'with kaleidoscopic changes of nomenclature, composition and
leadership, have not often been anything but communal lines, and
their- communal character has tended to become more rather than
2less pronounced.1 Parties appeared as alternatives to the 
Congress. The Liberals with their faith in the virtues of 
political education contested the elections for the reformed 
legislatures under the political label of National Liberal Federation 
and subsequently formed ministries in several provinces during
1920-24 period. They tried their utmost to make the dyarchical 
reforms workable. They were the most distinguished and forceful 
ministers of the whole dyarchy period and set the pattern of local
government in the following years through their programmes of
3 , .development and legislation. In Madras the non-Brahmin Justice
Party was formed with the main object of fighting the old-established
1. ISC, vol.i, p.211.
2. Ibid., p .209.
3. H. Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India,
Pakistan and Burgia, p . 130.
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predominancy of Brahmins in the political life. Congress was
identified with Brahmin domination and the Brahmin monopoloy of
public office. The Justice Party was able to form a ministry and
made use of its power to secure favourable treatment for non-
Brahmins in the matter of appointments to the government services
and to the local bodies. In the Punjab'Fazl-i-Husain*s Unionist
Party came to be identified with the landed gentry as against urban
interests. The Unionist Party was a predominantly Muslim group
with the sprinkling of Hindu and Sikh members, Fazl-i-Husain
followed a wise policy of prescribing fixed percentages on a
population basis for the three communities in the public services
and in educational institutions. He was also responsible for
launching a programme of rural development and local self-
government, These attempts by the liberals and, others to provide an
alternative to the Congress foundered partly because these moderate
ifien were wholeheartedly supported by neither British officialdom
nor by the traditionalist, conservative landlords and partly
because they failed to create a solid following. When the Swarajists
decided to contest the elections, between them and the landlords,
the Liberals, in Chintamanirs words, found themselves !in the
unenviable position of the proberbial earthen pot between two brass 
1vessels.1
On the British side, the provisions of the Act were not 
strictly adhered to. As Professor Morris-Jones points out: 1 The 
intention of the reforms may have been to make Governors mere 
constitutional heads in relation to the transferred half, but in most 
cases thfesposition was not established,1 Governors treated Ministers
1. Sir C.Y. Chintamani and M.R. Masani, India1s Constitution at Work, 
p o 7.
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as advisors whose advice need not he taken* Moreover, any hope
of Ministers developing a system of joint responsibility was
discouraged by the evident preference of most Governors for
dealing with Ministers separately* Again? the division of
subjects v/as such that Ministers found it necessary at several
points to carry the reserved half with them if they were to
proceed with their „schemes.' ^  Coupland wrote that in Madras?
the Governor (Lord Willingdon) decided to ignore the provisions
of the Act and to treat his Executive Council and ministers
collectively as a unitary cabinet* This policy necessarily
blurred the distinction between ministers who were responsible
2to the legislature and Executive Councillors who were not*
So far we have concentrated mainly on the negative aspects
of dyarchy. But it has its positive aspects too. 'The reforms'?
in Dr. Spear's judgement? 'proved to be a solid and substantial
achievement »•* and worked well enough to make further advance
3 at the beginning.of 1921 in the eight Governors' ;* provinces 
inevitable•' Dyarchy was introduced/and was in force until'1937?
though with varying success. Eour general elections were held-in
1920? 1925? 1926 and 1929-30. During the period 93 persons had
4
experience as ministers and 121 as Executive Councillors. In
essentials the old system had been one of absolute government?
administered by a trained bureaucracy* The introduction of dyarchy
had a definite effect in diminishing the driving power of the
members of the superior services who realised that the old possibilities
5
of high office and power were vanishing* It was estimated that by 
1924?- 345 British officials resigned before the expiration of their 
terms of ser v i c e *^  Those, who could not reconcile themselves to the 
new .conditions,had departed* Those who remained in office had to
1." Morris-Jones? op. cit» ? p.57.
2. Coupland? op * cit *, p.69 f*n*
3* P. Spear? India? p.356.
4* A. Appadorai? Dyarchy in Practice, p.72.
5* Keith? op. cit * ? p.287.
work with their political heads towards popular government* In 
a sense? dyarchy was really a bridge from authoritarian to popular 
government* The members of the services? broadly speaking? loyally 
co-operated with the ministers in working the reforms* There were? 
however? several ministers?who in their evidence before the Muddiman 
Committee? complained that the permanent officials did not whole­
heartedly co-operate with them* A large number of evidence suggests
that the members of the permanent services did not hesitate to carry
1out the policy which had been decided upon by the ministers.
The critical attitude of the provincial legislatures was equally 
in evidence in respect of the acts of the executive? and was j
expressed through the motion of reduction of the annual budget? 1
the resolution, the motion of adjournment, and the question* In ]
Madras? during the first four years 753 motions for reduction were j
discussed out of a total of 3? 393 motions admitted for discussion. i
In one province during the first three councils? the total number i
of resolutions received in the reserved departments was 3801? as i
compared with 1346 in the transferred departments* The resolutions -
discussed in all councils? dealt with important questions of public 
policy like the separation of executive from the judiciary? 1 !
encouragement of temperance? the grievances of railway passenger^? 1
etc. Adjournment motions told the same story, ' In one province? •
average questions asked stood at 3,000 per year. Most of the "
questions dealt with the action of the police? the treatment of political: 
prisoners? communal riots? and the alleged indifference of misconduct 1
of officers. Besides? there were elected Standing Committees in 
the legislature which were in close touch with the administration and f-
influenced the decision of the executive by the expression of views :
1. Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee (1924)? pp*28-31*
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1
represented in the legislature. ’Kerala P u t ^ a 1, who watched the
working of the system from close quarters, wrote;. 'In the scheme
of political education, social legislation, liberalization of local
government, and closer relations between the people 'and the
administration, the work of the Reformed Constitution merits warm 
2approval.'
The Swarajists, in sp&te of their obstructionist tactics,
tended everywhere in varying degrees»,to be transformed into a
constitutional opposition, and 'not infrequently played a useful j
3part as keen and vigilant critics.' In the central legislature, i
4 1
they took a prominent part in the ordinary business of the House. ,|
Some of the prominent members of the party monopolised considerable j
~ - 5  ' I
portions of the supplementary questions. They had served on Select
Committees and co-operated with the government in the passage of
6important legislation. As one writer observes; 'By bringing the
Congress into the legislatures, even for the avowed purpose of
wrecking them, the Swarajists helped to acquaint the country with
the mechanism, the procedures and the traditions of parliamentary
government ... It created precedents which helped the Congress to
contest the elections and to accept office in 1937; it facilitated
the installation of & fully-fledged representative government at the
7centre in 1946.' The Simon Commission was impressed by the 
r orderly conduct' of the business of the legislatures# 'Vie were 
much struck,' observed the commission, 'by the good attendance of 
members din the Chamber, by the high level of courteous speech, and
by the respect shown to the Chair. The public gallaries were well
filled, and the proceedings were obviously followed with much
1. Appadorai, op. cit. , pp.82-3; 'Kerala Puttfa', op. cit., pp.61-2.
2. 'Kerala Putsfa* , op. cit. , p.ii.
5* ISC, vol.i, p.209.
4# Indian in 1923-24 9 pp.281-2.
5# "The Swarajists", by 'a Student of Politics', Indian Review.July, 
1924, p.431#
6. P. Sitaramayya, The, History of the Indian National Congress, 1885- .
1935, vol.i, p. 280; 'Kerala Put^ra1 , op. cit. , p. 108.
7. Wanda, op. cit., pp.341-2.
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interest . There has been much good debating, and the G-overnment
has been exposed to considerable challenge and comment from its
opponents among the elected members. ... It is much to the
credit of many of India's public men that they should so rapidly
have adapted themselves to these new methods...’^* The commission
concluded by saying that on the whole the legislatures had
achieved a ’very general measure of success' and 'they have worked
better certainly than many anticipated at their inception, though
not entirely in the manner in which the authors of dyarchy 
2
intended,'
The Act of 1919 provided for an inquiry into the
possibilities of further constitutional advance in India every
ten years. In November 1927? the British G-overnment announced
the appointment of an Indian Statutory Commission under the
chairmanship of Sir John Simon. Early in 1928, when the Simon
Commission was only at the beginning of its labours, the Indian
leaders organised an All-Parties Conference at Delhi to draft
a constitution for India. This conference appointed a small
committee under the chairmanship of Motilal Nehru. The report
of the committee - the Nehru Report as it came to be known -
envisaged a parliamentary form of government, joint electorates
3and some complicated formula for the protection of minorities.
The Nehru Committee had to find an answer to one of the most
vexed questions of Indian politics: the position of the minorities,
and especially of the Muslim minority, in a free and democratic 
India. The committee frankly confessed that they .-dould not be 
original. 'We have been content to follow models which have been 
tried and tested in other parts of the world and which even the 
framers of the Montagu-Chelmsford constitution professed to follow.'
1. ISC, ,vol.i, pp.216, 219.
2“, Ibid., pp.219-20.
3- Bor Muslim reaction to the report see chapter ii.
4. All-Parties Conference: Supplementary Report of the Committee
""(1928), p.8.
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The committee also expressed the hope that once India had been
freed from foreign control, political parties would be formed on
political and economic rather than religious alignments* ^  The
constitution was framed on the basis of Dominion Status, which
was ’not viewed as a remote stage of our evolution but as the
2next immediate step,1 The left-wing within the Congress
including, Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose demanded
complete.independence as a goal* The constitution was dominated
by the tradition of unitary government established by British rule*
Though the authors of the report anticipated an ultimate union
of British India and Princely States, they spoke of federation
3
as a possibility only. There is little evidence to show that the
report had received serious consideration in official circles. The
British Parliament could never accept a position, said the Viceroy,
Lord Irwin on January 28, 1929? which would reduce it ’to being a
, 4mere registrar of the decisions of other persons.1
The political sentiment which was most widespread among all
educated Indians was the expression of a demand for equality with
Europeans and a resentment against any suspicion of differential
treatment. Indians were impatient of the British ’doctrine of
gradualness.1 This can be illustrated by the comments of Motilal
Nehru in the central legislature. Nehru declared: ’We say we are
absolutely fit for self-government, as fit as you are yourself in
your own island. This is what we say. Here we are occupying that
position and you tell us as you would tell school boys: be good
5boys and you will be promoted to a higher form.1 The Simon 
Commission (1930) pointed out: ’Political thought in British India 
to-day is derived from Europe. The keen intelligence of the
1* All-Parties Conference: Report of Committee (1928), p.49*
2. Ibid *, p.l.
3. Ibid., pp.62-3.
4. Speeches by Lord Irwin, vol.i, p.538.
5* Legislative Assembly Debates, 1925? vol.vi, pt.ii, p.865.
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educated Indian has "been stimulated by the study of Western
institutions! It is remarkable how the theories and phrases of
political science as expounded in England and America have been
adopted and absorbed. But the sudden impact of ideas drawn from
the experience and conditions of other peoples in -other climates
is bound to have a disturbing e f f e c t . ’ ^  Instead of professing
theirt fai£h| in. parliamentary, government in India? -. £he commission
ratheri expressed, a p r o f o u n d t d o u b t ; on, £he : sui^a^l^-i^yf of the,,
parliamentary, pystpni. in India. . „ The, commission, observed: t ’It ,
was-iniany case, a difficult,and delicate,operation.to transplant ,
to, l n d i a ;.foripS: p f ( goypr n m e n t i yrhich are. nativp. to British, soil, and
what , was; needed, was that, the new,, institutions^,should, have, time to.
take root and to grow naturally. The British parliamentary system
has developed in accordance with the day-to-day needs of the
people, and has been fitted like a well-worn garment to the
figure of the wearer, but it does not follow that it will suit
everybody.,. British parliamentarism in India.is a translations
and in even the best translations the essential meaning is apt
to be lost. We have, ourselves in attending debates in the Assembly
and the provincial councils been more Impressed with their
difference from than their resemblance to the Parliament we know.
While the principles and practice of the British parliamentary system
are accepted by educated Indians as the best example of democracy
in action, they are being applied in a country where the conditions
2
and the mental habit of the people are very d i f f e r e n t . ’
Paradoxically enough, the commission proposed the British parliamentary 
system at the provincial level ’We propose that in future the 
progress of these great areas [_the provinces"] should be entrusted 
to a unitary government responsible to legislatures elected on an 
extended franchise. Within the general plan there will be a scope
1. I S C , -.vol.i, p . 406.
2. ISC, vol.ii, p p . 6-7*
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for variation according to provincial needs and circumstances*
Each of the provinces «,# will be able to evolve by a process
of growth and development, the form of executive and legislative
machinery most suited to it* The essence of the plan is to
afford to Indians the opportunity of judging by experiment in
the provincial sphere how far the British system of parliamentary
government is fitted to their needs and to the natural genius of the
people,1"* The authors of the report were cautious so far as the
centre was concerned, - 'We do not think, however, that the British
parliamentary system, with an Executive representing,a single party
and depending from day to day on the vote of a majority of directly
elected representatives, is likely to be the model according to
which responsible government at the Centre for India will be
evolved. Parliamentary government of this type is not the only
form which responsibility may assume. It takes different forms in
different places and circumstances, and the British system cannot be
transplanted at will and adopted ready made... We think that Indians
have been apt to be led astray by keeping the British Parliament too
closely in view • °. We consider that the precedent for the Central
2Government in India must be sought for elsewhere.1 The distinguishing
feature of the British system is that the 'Government is liable to be
brought to an end at any moment by the vote of the legislature,1 This
arrangement has been the result of a long constitutional development*
It is intimately bound up with the growth of an organised and stable
party system, and depends for its success on the cohesion of elected
representatives and their intimate and continuous contact with the 
3
electorate,
1 . I S C , ,vo 1 , ii , p . 1 7 »
2, I b i d ., pp.17-8.
3* I b i d ., p.146*
The Monfeau-Chelrasford Report had only alluded
to the possibility of federation and the Nehru Report had
not gone much further. The Simon Report, on the other hand,
assumed that federation was the only practicable form of
government for India and urged,that the constitutional
machine should be immediately adjusted to fit into a future 
1
federation* As to the inclusion of Princely States, in a
federation of all-India, the report was as cautious as its
predecessor• It only recommended a consultative 'Council
for G-reat India' representing the two parts of India. Other
steps towards unity, it said, were 'as yet too distant and
2too dim to be entered upon and described.'
The summoning of the Round Table Conference in
London.in 1930-32 to discuss the future constitution of 
India indicated that henceforth the political future of India 
was no longer to be decided by the British Parliament alone,
and that India must have an equal voice in its decision. The
British parliamentary system was accepted as the system of 
government, in the provinces and at the centre, by the great 
majority of delegates at the conference. But the Conservative 
section of the British delegates suggested that at the centre at any 
rate some other system might be contemplated. -Lord Peel remarked: 
'British Parliamentarians though we be, we have not thought that our 
Parliamentary methods should be transferred wholesale from
1° ISC, .,pp.l3-4.
2° Ibid., pp.205-6.
Westminster to Delhi. We have suggested that we might well
consider for India the Swiss or American Parliamentary models
and that devolution o^authority from this country to India is
not incompatible with a separate legislature and executive on
the Swiss or American plan. We were anxious that the Central
Legislature should he so composed that the tie with the Provinces
should be firmly impressed on their constitution, and that while
making laws for all-India they were acting as the agents and
1interpreters of Provinces and of States.1 It evolked n.a response# 
At the first session of the Round Table Conference the 
ideal of an all-India federation involving the union of British 
India and Princely States apparently had become a practical
■0LVI
proposition* There was/unanimous agreement of all parties,
including the Indian Princes, on the issue of federation# While
the general principle of federation was accepted, it appeared that
there would be grave difficulty in arranging the details, for each
great interest was determined to secure the maximum of concessions
as the price of co-operation. Most of the discussions at the next
two sessions circled round the two difficult subjects: the federal
structure and minority safeguards. Ihe Princes were prepared for
federation provided the federal government should be responsible
2
to the federal legislature with temporary reservations. It was 
felt that by such an attitude it would be possible to secure in 
framing the constitution a much stronger position for the states 
than mere numbers would give them and that at. the same time they 
would be able in non-federalimatters to secure freedom from 
intervention by the Crown except on definite and agreed grounds,
1. Indian Hound Table Conference» 12th Nov# 1930-19th Jan. 1931, 
Proceedings, p.447.
Ibid., pp.32-39t
and they would expect to have an effective voice in matters of
1
common concern which they could not secure otherwise# On the
British side the scheme was 'favoured in order to provide an
element of pure conservatism in order to combat any dangerous
2elements of democracy contributed by British India*1 Gradually
it became clear that a number of dates would find it difficult
to co-operate unless the political and financial inducements
were pitched at a high figure.
The divergence between Hindu and Muslim opinion as to the
character of the federation was reflected in their disagreements
at to residuary powers# The Hindus wanted them to go to the
centre, the Muslims as strong advocates of a large measure of
provincial autonomy wanted them to go to the provinces. The Muslims
and other minorities made it clear that they would not acquiesce
in any constitution which did not contain adequate safeguards for
their communal rights, particularly with regard to the system of
representation. Dr. Ambedkar on behalf of the Depressed Classes
advanced a new claim that they should be represented separately
from the Hindu community at large# Gandhi, who represented the
Congress at the second session as the solitary representative,
tabled the Congress scheme for a settlement which was in the main
3a reproduction of the scheme of the Nehru Report# Gandhi
challenged the representative character of the spokesmen of the
minurities since the non-Congress Indian delegates had not been
4chosen by the people but nominated by the government.
1. Keith, op. cit*. p]6.296.
2. Ibid., p.474.
3. See Indian Round Table Conference (Second Session)^ 7th Sept.1931-
lst Dec. 1931* Proceedings, Appendix i, pp.64-5.
4* Indian Round Table Conference (Second Session), 7th Sept.1931*™
1st Dec. 1931, Proceedings of Federal Structure Committee and 
Minorities Committee, p*530.
But this claim was denied by the Muslims, by the Depressed Glasses,
and by many Hindus themselves. Over the vexed question of communal
representation there was deadlock. The work of constitution-making,
Gandhi urged, must go on without it and he suggested that the
communal dispute might be settled by a judicial tribunal after the
constitution had been completed.'*' The British Government settled
the question of representation by the Communal Award of 1932, which
accorded separate electorates for Muslims, Europeans, Sikhs, Indian
Christians and Anglo-Indians. The Depressed Classes also got
separate representation but the award had to be changed so far as
the Depressed Classes were concerned due to the resistance of Gandhi
and other Hindu leaders°
As a sequel to the conference, the British Parliament
passed a Government of India Act in August 1935. This measure was
most vehemently opposed by the right wing of the Conservative Party,
2
led by Winston Churchill as a 1 short sighted1 and a *wrongful Act.1
It was equally denounced by the younger Congress leaders, led by
3Jawaharlal Nehru as a * slave Constitution1 and a 'new charter of 
bondage.1^  The Muslim League, though critical of the federal part 
of the Act, decided that 1 the Provincial Scheme of the Constitution' 
be utilized for what it is worth.*
The two main features of the Act of 1935 were that, in the 
first place, it conceded self-government to the provinces which were 
to be administered by ministers responsible to elected assemblies on 
the British parliamentary models in the second place, it introduced 
the federal system. The old tradition of unitary government v/as
1. Proceedings of Federal Structure Committee and Minorities Committee,
p.530.
2. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5s. vol.302, col.1923.
3. J. Nehru, The Unity of India, p.61.
4. IAR, 1936, vol.ii, p.225®
5. Sir M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai Speeches and Documents on
the Indian Constitution* vol.i, p.385®
abandoned in favour of a federal form of constitution under which 
the provinces would enjoy a large measure of autonomy. This was a 
great departure from the previous sjsbem of government of which the 
hall marks had been unity and centralisation.
There were differences within the Congress leadership
whether to contest the elections or not. Eventually the Congress
contested the elections 'not to co-operate in any viay with the
Act but to combat it and to end it.1 It obtained clear majorities
in five of the eleven provinces and in the three other provinces it
2emerged as the largest party. After much wrangling Congress
governments were established in eight provinces in July 1937. Once
in power, Congress soon began to show signs of enjoying it and
forgot the main issue of national independence by becoming in
3Nehru's words, involved 'in petty reformist activities.* Apart 
from various social and economic reforms, valuable experience in 
administration was acquired by many Congress politicians, men who 
assumed total responsibility in free India. These eight ministries 
continued in office till October 1939* The outbreak of the Second 
World War brought the brief partnership between the Congress and 
the 'imperialist firm'^ (Nehru's phrase) to a sudden end.
The federal portion of the Act was not brought into 
operation due to the refusal of the Princes to accede to the new 
federation. But the Princes alone were not to be blamed. As one 
writer puts its *... it is sad to reflect that in the clash of 
politics, the struggle for power, the wrangle for ascendency, and 
the scramble for gains on the part of political organisations, 
politicians and the Princes, the scheme of federation, became a
tragic casualty.,. But the final death-blow was given to it by
the outhreak of the second World War which did not give time
1to its sponsers to stage even a decent burial.1
1. V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, p.57.
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CHAPTER III
MUSLIM POLITICAL IDEAS
At the very beginning of the process of constitutional
development in India, Syed Ahmed Khan, the Muslim leader
and founder of Aligarh (1S7J?) as an institution of higher
education for the Muslim community, was sceptical about
the suitability of representative institutions in India
1as she was peopled with different nations’* As late as
1883, he expressed his doubts in a speech delivered in the
legislative council * He said (the original speech was in
Urdu): *... in borrowing from England the system of
representative institutions, it is of the greatest importance
to remember those socio-political matters in which India is
distinguishable from England•••In a country like India,
where caste distinctions still flourish, where there is no
fusion of the various races, where religious distindbtons^ire
still violent, where education in its modern sense has not
made an equal or proportionate progress among all the sections
of;the population, I am convinced*.* the system of election,
pure and simple, cannot be safely adopted. The larger
community would totally override the interests of the smaller 
2community....1 The whole speech was an eloquent plea against 
the conception of Indian nationality, and indicated the wide 
gulf that persisted between the Hindu and Muslim leaders in
1* Sir Syed Ahmed Khan on the Present State of Indian Politics,p.1Q»
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2. Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor- 
General of India* 1883, vol.xxii, pp.19-20*
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political ideas. The Muslims under the leadership of Syed
Ahmed Khan and his successors kept aloof from the Congress,
which they dismissed as a predominantly Hindu organisation,
and chartered their own separate way in the shape of the
JMuslim League (1906). The recognition of the principle of
separate electorates under the Morley-Minto reforms and the
Lucknow Pact of 1916 established their separate identity in
Indian politics* From the very beginning the League had
refrained from placing before itself any model either on the
lines of Western institutions or otherwise for the future
constitution of India* While at the annual session of the
League held at Lucknow in March 1913? it instead of adopting
the Congress model of colonial self-government, adopted in
its place the formula, 1 the attainment under the aegis of
the British Crown of a system of self-government suitable to 
2India1• Muhammad Shafi, the President of the session, 
remarked; rThe adoption of the alternative proposal put 
forward by some of our friends that the League should set up 
colonial form of government in India as its ultimate goal is, 
in my opinion, inadmissable as well as politically unsound*
The political conditions, internal and external, prevailing 
in the British Colonies have no analogy whatsoever with those 
obtaining in India...Then, largely owing to the efforts of 
M.A. Jinnah, a rising Bombay barrister, there was a period of 
Congress-League co-operation. For the next few years the 
League held its sessions along with the Congress simultaneously 
and at the same place. This spirit of co-existence resulted in
1* Nevertheless^some prominent Muslims joined the Congress and 
even held the highest offices in its organisation*
2* Pioneer, March 24, 1913*
3* Ibid.
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the signing of the famous Lucknow Pact of 1916, whereby the
Congi*ess conceded the principle of separate electorates and
reserved seats for Muslims. The Muslims were to have one-
third of the elected seats in the central legislature, and
they were to enjoy a weighted representation in the six
provinces where they constituted a minority, in return for a
lower ratio of seats to population in their majority provinces,
1
Bengal and the Punjab. The authors of the scheme had devised
a form of government by which the people, through their
representatives in the legislative councils, would be enabled
to control the actions of the nominated and irremovable 
2executive* Though the scheme of 1916 was a substantial advance
on the existing position some Muslims might still have felt
what Morley had felt about the Act of 1909.
The Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, which were given
effect by an Act of 1919, introduced the parliamentary system
in the provinces though in a limited form. The Muslim delegates,
such as Jinnah, Yakub Hasan,and the Aga Khan, who appeared before
the Joint Select Committee on the bill in 1919, accepted it in
principle. They even pressed for the system of dyarchy to be
3simultaneously introduced in the central government. Jinnah
said: these reforms have got to be worked, and we want
. 4to make these reforms a success.1 As regards the disappearance
of separate communal electorates Jinnah remarked that, *Nothing
5will please me more than when that day comes.1 Moderate Muslims 
entered into the dyarchy legislatures and became ministers. But 
two prominent Muslim leaders, A.K. Faxl-ul-Huq, who served as
1. For the full text of the Congress-League scheme see D.
Chakrabarty and C. Bhattacharyya , Congress in Evolution.
Appendix iii, pp.189-93 •
2. M/CR, p.131.
3* Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill, 1919, 
vol.ii, Minutes of Evidence, pp.208-30, 487-96.
4. Ibid., p.216.
5. Ibid., p.225.
Minister for Education in Bengal in 1924, and A.K. Ghuznavi,
Minister for Public Works, Local Self-Government and
Agriculture in the same province in 1924 and 1927, attacked
the whole idea of a Western political system. Fazl-ul-Huq
wrote: 'My experience of the last few years of the political
development in India has convinced me that the declaration
of the Imperial Government in Parliament in August 1917 was a
great mistake. Representative Institutions have been thrust
upon India, although there can be no doubt that representative
institutions, as they are known'in the West, are utterly
unsuited to Indian conditions.«• You can no more expect
representative institutions in their proper form to flourish
in India than you can expect hot-house flowers to blossom in
1the icy cold of the North.1 He regarded the introduction pf
representative institutions in India as 'inexpedient and
inadvisable* for two reasons: first, 'Oriental ideas of kingship
are fundamentally different from those that prevail in the
West.' The Oriental peoples had long been accustomed to strong
one-man rule whose authority was absolute; and second, the
incessant communal strife and the wide cleavage amongst
different creeds and classes had created a political atmosphere
in which the growth of self-governing institutions had become
2an impossibility. He suggested that the ancient village 
self-government system if it could develop peacefully might have
•z
been'congenial to the genius and spirit of the people.1 A.K. 
Ghuznavi wrote: democratic Government has hitherto flourished 
where there is homogeneity in religious beliefs and in social
1. Reforms Enquiry Committee. 1924, Views of Local Governments,
on the Working of the Reforms, dated 1924, pp.150-1.
2. Ibid., p.151.
3» Reforms Enquiry Committee, 1924, Appendix 5, Written Evidence, 
p.207.
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customs and where there is absence of any pronounced racial
1rivalries. These conditions are wanting in India at present.1
The Khilafat' Committee and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind 
(both, founded in 1919), two of the most powerful organisations 
of Indian Muslims at that time, had refused to have anything to 
do with the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. The Khilafat movement 
had a two-fold objectives first, to preserve the Khilafat, and 
second, to maintain the territorial integrity of the Oibtoman 
Empire. The pan-Islamic movement which had its beginning 
towards the end of the 19th century in other Muslim countries 
had its effect on Indian Muslims*“ The movement was naturally 
anti-British and emphasised the solidarity of the Islamic 
world against Western encroachments on Muslim states. The 
annulment of the partition of Bengal (l91l), the British role 
in the Italo-Turkish War (l91l)'and the Balkan Wars (1912-13)* 
and subsequently the First World War and the fate of the Turkish , 
Khilafat had weaned the Indian Muslims away from the loyalist 
policy of Syed Ahmed Khan and his successors. Turkey, which 
■represented a visible and enduring reminder of the temporal 
greatness of Islam1s achievements,1 was threatened with 
extinction; the sheet-anchor of their faith in the future was 
being destroyed. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote: 1 {jThe Muslims^ searched 
for their national roots elsewhere. To some extent they found them 
in the Afghan and Mughal periods of India, but this was not 
quite enough to fill the vacuum.... This search for cultural 
roots led IndiauMoslems (that is, some of them of the middle 
class***) to Islamic history, and to the periods when Islam was
1. Reforms Enquiry Committee, 1924, Appendix 5, Written Evidence,
p.210.
2* For a general history of pan-Islamism and its impact on
international politics see L« Stoddard, The New V/orld of Islam* 
3* The Memoirs of Aga Khan, p.153.
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a conquering and creative force in Baghdad, Spain,
Constantinople, central Asia, and elsewhere..• The Mughal 
Emperors in India recognised no Khalifa or spiritual superiors 
outside India* It was only after the complete collapse of the 
Mughal power early in the nineteenth century that the name of
the Turkish Sultan began to be mentioned in Indian mosques.
1This practice was confirmed after the Mutiny.1 I.H.-Qureshi 
remarked: fHaving lost their own freedom, they (Indian Muslims) 
had found consolation in the freedom of other Muslims*1 Whatever 
might have been the popular attitude, the Muslim intelligentsia, 
was more concerned about dismemberment of a Muslim state than 
the theological difficulties that might arise from the
3
disappearance of the Khilafat. Syed Ahmed Khan, who was 
opposed to any allegiance to the Turkish Khalifa* expressed 
this feeling in his statement to Sir Theodore Morison. He 
said: *When there were many Muslim kingdoms we did not feel 
.much grief when one of them was destroyed; now that so few are 
left, we feel the loss of even a small one* If Turkey is 
conquered that will be a great grief, for she is the last of the 
great powers left to Islam. We are afraid that we shall become 
like the Jews, a people without a country of our own.1^  Under 
the leadership of the Ali brothers, Mohamed Ali and Shaukat 
Ali, the Muslims took the stand that the freedom of the Jazirat- 
ul-Arab, which included Arabia, Palestine, Iraq, Syria and 
Turkey proper, from non-Muslim control, and the maintenance of the 
requisite degree of the temporal power of the Khilafat to guard
1* J. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p.346. See also I.H.
Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, 
pp.271-2.
2* I.H. Qureshi1snIntinduction”in A History of the Freedom 
Movement, vol.i, pp.49-50.
3* Qureshi, The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, 
p.272.
4* Sir Theodore Morison, f,Muhammadan Movements,11 in Sir John 
Cumming (ed.^, Political India, 1832-1932, pp.93-6.
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Islam's borders and for enforcing Islamic discipline within 
them had always been two of the principal religious obligations 
of the Muslims of the world• Therefore, Muslim loyalty to 
Britain was conditional on Britain's respecting every religious
I
obligation of law? Muslim* The weekly Comrade was founded in
1911 to 'prepare the Musalmans to make their proper contribution
to territorial patriotism without abating a jot of the fervour
of their extra-territorial sympathies, which are the quintessence 
2
of Islam.' The two other weeklies appeared at this time. One
was Abul Kalara Azad's Al-Hllal and the other was Zafar Ali Khan's
Zamindar* Bor Azad, there was no conflict between Islam and
3sympathy for Islamic countries and Indian nationalism* During
the 1914-18 war they were interned for their pro-Turkish
sentiments and their presses were confiscated. On the
initiative of the Ali brothers a religious body, Anjuman
4Khuddam-i-Kabah .was founded in 1913 ♦ whose real aim was to— — ——     $
unite the Muslims in their determination to save the holy 
shrines of Islam against non-Muslim aggression and to make all 
sacrifices to achieve that purpose. Dr. M*A. Ansari led a 
medical mission to Turkey for the treatment of injured soldiers* 
Shaukat Ali urged the Muslims to organise volunteers to fight 
for Turkey. The British Premier, Lloyd George's pledge in
5January 1913 not to deprive Turkey of its possessions was broken* 
As a result of the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, imposed on 
Turkey in 1920, she was deprived of part of her homelands*
The Treaty of Sevres inflamed the Muslim sentiment in India to 
an unprecedented degree. The India Khilafat delegation, led
1. Af Maulana
' *   *     IW I■!**■*   I ■  m u  iiiwN r iniii   * mrfffliw    nin   m m  n 11*    .......    inmi
Mohamed Ali, p.388.
2. Mohamed Ali, My life; A Fragment, p.46.
3* Nehru, op.cit*, p.351.
4* Dr. S. Moinul Haq, "The Khilafat Movement", in A History of the
Freedom Movement, vol.iii, pt.i, p.209;i Mohamed Ali, op.cit*,
pp.67-8.
5* On January 5, 1918, Lloyd George stated: 'Nor are we fighting*.,
to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned
lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish 
in race.' The Times* January 7, 1918.
68
by Mohamed Ali,could not influence the Allies in Paris, though
the Government of India protested strongly against the harsh
provisions imposed upon Turkey by the Treaty of Sevres, and
Mohamed Ali returned to India empty-handed* The Hindus under the
leadership of Gandhi seized this opportxmity to forge an alliance
with the pan-lslamic leaders of the Khilafat Committee and
organised a non-co-operation movement against the British# Gandhi
espoused the cause of the Khilafat and the Muslims joined the
movement for the liberation of the country# Thus began the brief
honeymoon between the two communities. The slogan of 1Islam in
danger* was raised* Around 1912 Shibli Homani, a distinguished
educationist, had observed; 'For the last thirty years, efforts
have been made to uplift the Muslims in the name of nationhood,
but the failure of these efforts is only too obvious. The followers
of the Prophet do not respond to the call of nationhood. Appeal
to them in the name of religion and you will see what a splendid
1response you get.1 The response was forthcoming when the Khilafat
leaders, lilce Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali, Zafar Ali Khan and Azad,
urged the Muslim masses to leave India which had become a Par-ul-Haral>
(an infidel land) because the Government of India had trampled the
law of Islam under foot.^ Many Muslims joined the hi,1 rat (migration)
movement and moved in the direction of Afghanistan. The numbers
officially calculated at 18,000 for August 1920. The total numbers 
estimated between 500,000 and 2,000,000*^ This proved to be a
futile enterprise when the Afghan government refused entry to these
migrants.
1. A.H. Albiruni, Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India.
pp#126-7.
2* Bee A. Husain, FazI-i-Husain; A Political Biography, p*105*
3. India in 1920, p.52.
4. P.S# Briggs, ”The Indian Hi,1 rat of 1920", Moslem World# April
1930, p.165*
69
The Moplah uprising was a movement of an entirely 
different character* It is true that the Moplahs, poor 
Muslim peasants of mixed Indo-Arab origin along the Malabar 
coast of South India, had often rebelled in the past and that 
they had other grievances besides the Khilafat issue# But the 
evidence now clearly shows that the Khilafat and non-co-operation 
movements, were responsible for inflaming the minds of the 
Moplahs with a vain hope of Swaraj and eternal bliss. 1 Their 
intention was, absurd though it may seem, to subvert: the
British Government and to substitute a Khalifate Government
1by force of arms.* The Khilafat leaders called upon Muslim
personnel to desert from the army because it was 1 religiously
forbidden1 to fight against fellow Muslims in other countries
and even suggested the possibility of the establishment of an
2Indian republic. The Indian Muslims were resigning from 
government posts, quitting colleges and courts and filling 
jails for the institution of Khilafat, while the Turlcs 
themselves were engaged in dismantling it. And, paradoxically 
enough, all these sacrifices were made to impose a Grumbling 
institution of a by-gone age on the unwilling Turks who were 
working towards the establishment of republican institutions.
The Turksaunder their new leader Mustapha Kemal Pasha., abolished 
the Sultanate in 1922; the title of Khalifa was conferred upon 
Abdul Majid, a member of the old imperial family, but stripped 
of temporal power. Although this was a severe blow to the Muslims 
of India, who always contended that the Khalifa must be a 
powerful monarch and the protector of the sanctuaries of Islam^ 
$hey met the rebuff in good spirit. The All-India Khilafat
1. J.J* Banninga, •The Moplah Rebellion of 1921,1 Moslem World
October 1923, p.3S0.
2. Syed Rais Ahmad Jafri (ed.), Selections from Mohammad Al^s
Comrade, p. 119; I.A«,R, 1922, vol.i, p.173*
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Conference and the J ami a t-u1-UIama-±-HInd held their sessions
at G-aya (Bihar) in December 1922 along with the Congress, and
they declared their approval of the new Khalifa hy asserting
.1that his election was fmore in accordance with the Shariat#1
No mention was made of the new Khalifa1 s having "been given
spiritual hut not temporal power at the Khilafat conference#
At the Jamiat session, the question was discussed hut opinion
was sharply divided# There was a pious request that Turkey
would *keep intact the real prestige and power of the Khalifa as
2
enjoined hy the Shariat.>* Muslim apprehensions for the future
of Islam were fset at rest hy the Treaty of Lausanne tl923l,
which gave Turkey better terms of peace than had one time
been anticipated, and the abolition of"the Khilafat C1924) by
3Mustapha Kemal Pasha gave the movement its quietus.1 The
Khilafat movement^, it is true, was completely romantic and
out of touch with the actualities but this pan-Islamic spirit
had also a great deal to do with the formulation of the Pakistan
4ideology and with the birth of Pakistan itself# With the 
collapse of non-co-operation, and the Khilafat movement, Hindu- 
Muslim relations deteriorated rapidly. There was disagreement 
on policy both in the Congress and among Muslim leaders.
There was a split within the ranks of the Muslim 
leadership immediately after the appointment of the Simon 
Commission in 1927# One group, led by Muhammad Shafi, one of the 
most influential leaders of the Punjab, was in favour of 
co-operating with the commission# They were critical over the 
all-British commission but they distrusted the Hindus and were
1923, vol. i, p.923*
2• Ibid#, p.941*
3. ISC, vol.i, p.252#
4* Sharif al-Mujahid, "Pan-Islamism11, in A History of the 
Breedom Movement, vol.iii, pt.1, p.117.
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convinced that the Muslims as a minority community had more
to gain hy co-operating with the British# Shafi's main support
came from the Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province and
Bengal. Another group was composed of two factions, the
Khilafat group, which followed' the Ali brothers, and the
Jinnah group# The Khilafat group had declined in strength
after the abolition of the Khilafat in 1924, but Jihhah had
a large following, especially in Bombay, Madras, and other
provinces in which the Muslims were in a minority# At a
meeting held at Delhi in March 1927 of about thirty prominent
Muslim leaders under the presidency of Jinnah, it was agreed
to accept joint electorates with reservation of seats under
certain conditions# This offer, which came to be known as
the 'Delhi Proposals,1 demanded that Sind should be a separate
province, reforms should be introduced in the North-West
Frontier Province and Baluchistan, in the Punjab and Bengal
representation should be in accordance with population, and
in the central legislature Muslim representation should not
be less than one-third#'*'
These divisions were reflected in a split in the
Muslim League at the annual session in December 1927. The
group, led by Jinnah, met at Calcutta under the presidency
of Mahomed Yakub, Deputy President of the Legislative Assembly.
Besides Jinnah, Ali Iraarn, Azad, Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali and
2afar Ali Khan, were the distinguished participants. They
approved the 'Delhi Proposals' and a resolution to boycott
2the Simon Commission was adopted# The other groups met 
at Lahore under the presidentship of Muhammad Shafi and decided
1. IQS, 1927, vol. i, pp.33-4.
2# IQR, 1927, vol. ii, pp.443-8.
1Z
to co-operate with the commission. This session was
attended by the prominent Punjab Khllafatists including
Dr. Muhammad Alam, Chaudhri Afzal Haq. Hasrat Mohani, Iqbal,
and Zafrullah Khan were also present. The Shafi group
dissociated themselves from the so-called 'Delhi Proposals'.
The usual resolutions? in favour of the separation of Sind
from Bombay, and the introduction of constitutional reforms
1in the Frontier Province were adopted.
The efforts of the Nehru Committee in 1928 to close
the communal breach seemed, in fact, to have widened it. Its
recommendations on the question of the position of Muslims in
a self-governing India were that the constitution should
include a declaration of rights; the North-West Frontier
Province and Baluchistan should acquire the same status as
others provinces, and Sind should be separated from Bombay;
the Muslims should have reservation of seats only at the
centre and in the provinces where they were in a minority in
strict proportion to their population, with the right to contest
additional seats; no weightage should be allowed; the principle
of separate electorates should be given up and that the system
of communal representation should be re-examined after ten 
2years. It did not lay sufficient emphasis upon federation#
A small group of Congress Muslim leaders like 
Ansari and Azad accepted the communal provisions of the new 
scheme. Among the critics of the report were not only leaders 
like Muhammad Shafi and Zulfikar Ali Khan in the Punjab and 
A.K. Ghuznavi in Bengal, but also like Mohamed Ali and Shaukat
1. IQR, 1927, vol. ii, pp.452-8, The Punjab Khilafatists were
not happy over the resolution adopted in favour of co­
operating with the commission and they did not join the
session on the second day.
2. All-Parties Conference; Report of Committee (1928), pp.89-90,
101-3, 123-4, 162, 166; Supplementary Report of the Committee,
pp.50-1.
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Ali, the- ■QQrl4-pfeajb'e—3rea4ege and Mahomed Yakub w&e was one of
1Jinnah1s followers, Jinnah himself refused to join the chorus
of disapproval and made an effort to bring about a really
satisfactory compromise* With a few of his followers he
attended the All-Parties Conference held at Calcutta in
December 1928 and moved a series of amendments. While moving
his amendments on behalf of the Muslim League,1 Jinnah said
that no country had succeeded in either wresting a democratic
constitution from the domination of another nation or
establishing representative institutions internally without
guaranteeing the security of minorities whenever such problems 
2arose. The main terms of Jinnah1s amendments were: firstly,
that Muslims should be given one-third representation in the
central legislature; secondly, that the Punjab and Bengal should
have Muslim representation on a population basis for ten years,
subject to the revision of this principle after that period, and,
thirdly, that residuary powers should be vested in the provincial
3legislatures and not at the centre. But Jinnah*s amendments
were rejected by the Congress. After this snubb Jinnah and his
followers withdrew and the conference became practically a Hindu
body. The rejection of Jinnah1s demands has been described as
a turning point in his career, away from nationalism towards
Muslim separatism. fThis,r he was reported to have told a
4
friend, fis the parting of the ways.1 Many of the Muslim 
members of the central and provincial legislatures issued a 
manifesto condemning the 1 communal* parts of the Nehru Report 
and included among the signatories even members of the Congress
!• See IQRt 1928, vol.ii, pp.404-26.
2. M.H. Saiyid, Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study, p.419.
3. Ibid., p.418.
4. H. Bolitho, Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan, p.95.
74
Party itself*1 Rajendra Prasad admitted that, fThis marked
the defection of an influential section of the Muslims from
the Congress and had a very adverse effect on Indian affairs in 
2
later years**
As the rift between the Hindus and Muslims widened,
Shafi and a few other leaders started a movement to reunite the 
Muslims on a common platform# The Aga Khan was asked to act as 
a mediator and he presided over an All-Parties Muslim Conference 
which was held at Delhi on December 31, 1928 - January 1, 1929#
It was a representative gathering of the most prominent and 
influential Muslim leaders in India* The distinguished absentees 
were Jinnah and his followers and the Congress Muslims# The 
manifesto adopted at this meeting provided the Muslims with 
their ^ode-book*, which demanded a federal form of government 
with complete provincial autonomy, and residuary powers vested 
in the constituent states; separate electorates and weightage; 
the enjoyment of a majority position in the provinces where they 
constituted a majority of the population; one-third Muslim 
representation in the central legislature; due representation in 
the central and provincial cabinets, in the civil services and 
on all statutory self-governing bodies; safeguards for protection 
and promotion of Muslim education, religion and personal law; 
the separation of Sind from Bombay* and the extension of the
4reforms to the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan*
Jinnah subsequently took part in a series of informal 
discussions at Delhi and agreed to accept the conference 
resolution* In March 1929, Jinnah drafted his famous 1 fourteen
1* J# Coatman, Years of Destiny* p*215*
2* R* Prasad, Autobiography, p.288*
3• The MemoirsCof Aga Khan, p♦210.
4* For the text of the resolution see I§)R, 1928, vol# ii,pp• 415-6•
1points* , accommodating the various points of view* He even
tried to reunite the two rival sections of the league but his
attempt failed. The Shafi group insisted on the Delhi
conference resolution, and Jinnah and his adherents on the
1 fourteen points1. There was an active minority, led by
Azad, who believed that the Nehru Report should be approved,
subject to some modifications. When the Jinnah section of the
League met on March 1929, in his absence, ani&ptaohothoa^pyoveeihe,
report was then submitted and, amid loud protests, was declared
to be adopted. Jinnah arrived while the pandemonium was at its
2
height and adjourned the meeting sine die. Consequently a 
small section mainly the Congress Muslims broke away from the 
Jinnah League and organised the All-India Nationalist Muslim 
Party in July 1929* The Muslims were hopelessly divided in the 
year 1929 and for quite sometime thereafter. The Delhi 
conference represented the right-wing,, the group that pressed 
for the adoption of all Muslim demands and refused to make any 
concessions to the Hindus. The Khilafat Committee was almost 
eclipsed.
The Muslim representatives at the three sessions of 
the Round Table Conference called by the British Government in 
1930-2, to consider further reforms, demanded the same sort of 
safeguards as formulated in the All-Parties Muslim Conference at 
Delhi in 1929. In this there was fundamental agreement between 
Muslims as diverse as the Aga IChan, Jinnah, Mohamed Ali or Shafi* 
While there was a general agreement of all parties on the issue 
of federation, but there were differences with regard to the 
details. The contest between the advocates of a strong central
government and the adherents of state1s rights and provincial ]
autonomy, so familiar in the history of the formations of other j
federations, had been fought over strenuously in the debate of |
the Federal Structure Committee. As for the Muslim League and 
other Muslim groups, they had always been opposed to a strong 
centre. They evisaged that participation of the Princely States 
in a federation would ensure a centre which would be limited to the
'!
minimum number of subjects, the residuary powers being retained j
by the federating units. The Muslims had attached great 
importance to the need of a genuine federation. Their objective ;j
was the transformation of the Indian provinces, now existing or I
to be created, into political units as autonomous as the American j
1 '•or the Australian states or the cantons of Switzerland. Apart
from the question of federal structure, the communal distribution of j
1
seats in the federal and provincial legislatures was the most 
difficult problem that came before the conference. The Muslims j
insisted on separate electorates with weighted representation :
in the central legislature and in the minority provinces, and >
non-interference with the Muslim majority in Bengal and the I
2 1Punjab. But on these issues no new solution was put forward.
Gandhi might have been expected to make a useful contribution to
the solution of the communal problem but the effect of his
intervention seemed to have exacerbated rather than helped to
smooth over the difficulties. One authority states that at one
stage*Gandhi agreed to concede practically all of them ^Muslim
demands]}, on condition that the Moslems would abandon the other
1. See Dr. Shafa’at Ahmad Khan, ’’Muslims in the New India,”
Asiatic Review. January 1932, p.10*
2. Indian Hound Table Conference.(second Session), 7th Sept. 1931-lsfr
Dec.l931p Proceedings, pp.153-65, 175-81, 314-5, 329-31, 334-8,
356; Proceedings of Federal Structure Committee and Minorities 
Committee; Indian Round Table Conference (Third Session), 17th 
Nov. 1932-24th Pec. 1932, pp.193-4.
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ijiinority groups and vote against giving them separate
1representation.1 His offer was rejected. The Muslims and
other minority communities - the Sikhs, the Depressed Classes,
the Indian Christians, the Europeans and the Anglo-Indians -
held a separate meeting and drafted a long list of demands
2
which came to be known as the Minorities Pact.1 The failure
to reach agreement on the communal representation among the
communities themselves led the British Government to announce
the 1 Communal Award* on April 1932. Separate electorates were
retained for the Muslims. The weightage was conceded to the
Muslims in the provinces ih which they were in a minority as well
as to the Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab. The award had conceded
the essential demands of Muslim spokesmen but did not concede
3their maximum demands.
3?or several years the Muslim minority hoped to preserve 
their identity with the aid of federal arrangements. The Muslims 
appeared satisfied with those embodied in the Government of India ' * 
Act, 1935* The system of separate electorates and weightage 
granted a generation earlier, continued* Sind was separated from 
Bombay so that there would be four Muslim-majority provinces out 
of a total of Eleven. At the centre Muslims were alloted one- 
third of the seats.
The Muslim League did not fare very well at the elections
1. W.R. Smith, Nationalism and Reform in India. p*406.
2* The pact, inter alia> included separate electorates, representat 
in the ministries, religious, educational and cultural liberty, 
civic and service rights. See Indian Round Table Conference 
(Second Session^, 7th Sept. 1931-lst Dec. 1931* Proceedings, 
Appendix iii, pp.68-70.
3. The Muslims contended that they had not been fairly treated. The , 
principle that no majority should be reduced to the position of 
a minority or even to that of equality, was departed from in the; 
case of Bengal. Weightage enjoyed by the Muslims in the provinces 
where they were a-minority had been reduced in all cases# Joint 
Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform. (Session 
1932-33), vol. iiC, Minutes of Evidence, p.1477.
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held under the 1935 Act# Out of a total of 487 Muslim seats 
it captured only 108* Out of the total of 1585 seats in the 
provincial assemblies Congress won 705* In five provinces, Madras, 
"fche United Provinces, the Central Provinces, Bihar and Orissa - 
it obtained clear majorities, and in three other provinces - Bombay, 
Assam and the North-West Frontier Province - it emerged as the 
largest party* But the Congress won only 26 of the Muslim seats 
mostly in the North-West Frontier Province. The greater number 
of Muslim seats had been won by Muslims who did not belong to
the Congress Party. In the Punjab the Unionist Party led by
»
Sikander Hyat Khan had obtained a clear majority - 95 seats out 
1of 175* As a result, Congress ministries took office in seven 
provinces in July 1937* The Unionist Party assumed office in the 
Punjab, and coalition ministries v/ere formed in Assam, Bengal 
and Sind. But after two years and four months of Congress rule 
(1937-39) the situation had undergone a dramatic change. Several 
Congress governments were accused by the Muslims of adopting a 
policy prejudicial to the community. Reports were issued
2regarding the ill-treatment alleged to be meted out to Muslims. 
There was supposed to be discrimination against Muslims in 
appointments to the public services; Hindi was encouraged at the 
expense of Urdu, in the Schools and on all public occasions, cow 
slaughter was prohibited; fBande Mataram1 was introduced as a
1. See Return Showing the Results of Flections in India, 1937.
2. Muslim grievances against Congress governments were listed in 
three reports:
(a) Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council
of the All-India Muslim League to enquire into Muslim Grievancesy— —— _—pj 1-— 1 —■  .........  ^ -pp p-H—.—1—[-[-ppp-|-irim r mffffmTWT§*itiiiniff.nMiT.i«iri«rtfim»Tii .r.i.ifM flmni 11 «.mr hn'irfifrM~wf'pBi.«Mwmin»iiiiHMn.Bpni h i.----m r •nTrrrmrinrirrrii'MMirnriHtirrrnni! ■ ! * ■ > iitwhiHi—wni~iTTTrT
in Congress Provinces (Pirpur Report).
tWijmi riiw..'   .1 n.n.ii, ■*>■*!■ tgaWlwWi'»«igr«>i. u.WiWitW1 iTh.  ii. iii.Mmijiffr WfTmm. r
(b) Report of the Enquiry Committee- appointed by the Working
Committee of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to enquire 
into some Gri evances "~of~Mu Report).
(c) Muslim Suff^ri^i^s"~under Congress Rule," published"by~ 
Fazl-ul-Huq.
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national anthem, and perhaps the most important reason for
Muslims* alarm was the refusal by the Congress to form a
coalition with the Muslim League, especially in the United
Provinces# The Congress was successful, without having to
rely upon League support and demanded a price for co-operation
which would have virtually lead to ‘the extinction of the League
as a separate organisation of Muslims? this, therefore, was
1unacceptable to the League# These issues were enough to 
wound the sentiments of Muslims# Death had suddenly claimed 
many Muslim leaders of all-India stature, leaving behind
2Jinnah almost without a rival on the Indian political scene* 
Jinnah, the complete politician, indifferent to Islamic 
theology, quickly seized the opportunity and exploited the 
situation very skilfully by rousing the Muslim masses with the 
cry of *Islam in danger* *r He set about reorganising the Muslim 
League and started a *mass-contact* campaign. The Congress 
attempt to influence the Muslim masses after the elections of 
1957 did not meet with any success# The annual membership 
subscription of the Muslim League was reduced to two annas 
(about 2d.) in order to attract more Muslim masses. Within 
a short period over 170 new branches of the League had been 
established, 90 of them in the United Provinces and 40 in the 
Punjab* Approximately 100,000 new members were said to have
1. The main Congress terms were that the League group in the United 
Provinces assembly should cease to function as a separate group, 
the League members should join Congress and its members should be 
subjected to the control and discipline of the Congress, the Leagued 
Parliamentary Board should be dissolved and the League should refrain 
from contesting by-elections. See Pioneer. July 50,1937* According 
to Azad, Nehru*s fondness for abstract theory was responsible for 
the breakdown of negotiations between the Congress and the League 
as he refused to take more than one Leaguer into the Ministry* 
Maulana Abul Kalara Azad, India Winlts Freedom, pp. 160-1. Choudhry 
Khaliquzzaman refers to the Congress offer as the * death warrant* of 
the League# Choudhry Khaliiquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan* p.161.
2* Aimal Khan d.1927; Mohamed Ali d.1931; $he Haja of
Mahmudabad d*19315 Shafi d*1932; Ali Imam d*1932;Fazl-i-Husain 
d.19365 Shaukat Ali d.1937; Ansari d.1936; Iqbal d.1938*
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1been enlisted in the United Provinces alone* Between January
1933 and September 1942 the League won forty-six out of fifty-
six by-elections in Muslim constituences for the central and
2provincial legislatures* Even the Premiers of the Punjab
(Sikander Hyat Khan) and Bengal (Fazl-ul-Huq) accepted the
overall authority of Jinnah and the League though they retained
their party identity. The League was enormously strengthened,
so Jinnah now claimed that the League alone represented the
entire Muslim community of India and must be recognised as the
only qualified body to speak on their behalf, a*nd— th8rt-4h:e-
Cang-re-s«^ou-3rd-~s-peak^on-«their-behaPf-, and that the Congress
should speak only on behalf of the Hindus*
Jinnah*s attitude towards the parliamentary form of
government had undergone a complete change after 1938 in view of
its apparent unsuitability for a divided society. In 1906, Jinnah
did not join the famous Muslim deputation and refused to be a
member of the Muslim League till 1913• He joined the League in
the autumn of 1913 on the solemn assurance *that loyalty to the
Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at no
time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national
3cause to which his life was dedicated.1 He also remained as a
member of the Congress till 1920 when he resigned on the issue of
non-co-operation. He along with all other moderates, who believed
in constitutional methods, remained outside the movement. Neither
Gandhi1s emphasis on austerity as symbolised by khaddar (home-spun
cloth) nor his advoacy of non-violent non-co-operation as a political
4
weapon appealed to them. As Jawaharlal Nehru rightly observed:
1* R# Coupland, Indian Politics* 1936-1942, p.183*
2* Ibid., Appendix vi, p.333*
3* Sarojini Naidu, ”A Pen Portrait”, in Mohomed Ali Jinnah, an
Ambassador of Unity: His Speeches and Writings, 1912-1917, p*ll*
4. K.A. Abbas, "Jinnah - the Enigma of India”, Asia, August 1940,p*43$
* *.. temperamentally he [jinnah^ did not fit in at all with
the new Congress* He felt completely out of his element in the
Khadi-clad crowd demanding speeches in Hindustani. The enthusiasm
1
of the people outside struck him as moh-hysteria.1 In 1925?
speaking in the central legislature, Jinnah said: *... I am a
nationalist first, a nationalist second and a nationalist last...
I once more appeal to this House, whether you are a Mussalman or
a Hindu, for Godfs sake do not import the discussion of communal
matters into this House and degrade this Assembly which we
2desire should become a real national Parliament.1 A democratic
system of parliamentary government, how, he held, based on the
concept of a homogeneous nation and the method of counting heads,
3was totally unsuited for heterogeneous countries like India.
When the Congress ministries resigned, the League observed a
day of. deliverance and thanksgiving throughout the country. In
September 1939, the Working Committee of the Muslim League
declared its apposition to any •Federal objective1 because the
4subcontinent" was inhabited by ‘various nationalities.1 This 
was the course mainly followed after the First World War in the 
rise of the succession states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and more recently of Israel where federalism as a solution was 
rejected. Dicey*s two conditions for the formation of a 
federation seemed to have not fulfilled in the case of India.
He lays down two conditions: the first condition is a sense of 
nationality among the units federating and the second is that 
there must exist a ‘very peculiar state of sentiment among the 
inhabitants of the countries which it is proposed to unite. They
L. J • Nehru, An Autobiography, pp.67-8.
2. Legislative Assembly Debates, 1925, vol. v, pt.iii, p.2478.
3. Jamll-'ud-Din Ahmad (ed.T.Some Recent Speeches and Writings of
Mr. Jinnah, vol.i, pp.128-9*
4* lAR, 1939, vol.ii, p.351.
5. A.W. Macmahon;- (ed.), Federalism: Mature and Emergent, p.9*
1
must desire union and must not desire unity*1
In March 1940, at a Lahore session, the Muslim League
adopted a resolution declaring that 1 the areas in which the
Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western
and eastern zones of India, should he grouped to constitute
"independent states" in which the constituent units shall he
2autonomous and sovereign.1 There was/.ambiguity about the
precise meaning of this resolution,' and few observers believed
that the Muslim League actually wanted the partition of India.
In reply to Raja Maheshwar Dayal, the Secretary of the Hindu
Mahfsabha. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman stated in October 1942: *The
Muslim League resolution aims at having two States within
Indian geography but you want to create a Pakistan State outside
India. $e want partition of administration within India; you
on the other hand propose partition of the geography of India.
3I would never agree to it*1 Indeed, nowhere in the resolution
is 1 Pakistan1 even mentioned. The subsequent story revealed the
widening of the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims. There were,
of course, some plans by various author* who did not advocate
complete separation with India but wanted a loose federation
or simply a confederation* In April 1946, Azad proposed that tte
Muslim fear of Hindu domination would be mitigated if the
Congress met this fear by granting full autonomy to the provincial
units and vesting residuary powers in the provinces* The formula
provided for two lists of central subjects, compulsory and optional.
Any provincial unit, if it so desired, could administer all the
4optional subjects except a minimum delegated to the centre.
1* A.V.*Licey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitutloi
2. IAR, 1940, vol.i, p.312. p.!37<
3. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit *» p.286.
4* Azad, op.cit. p.144. Other schemes were drawn up by the following 
authors: Sikander Hyat Khan, Outlinesof a'Scheme of Indian Federation; 
Syed Abdul Latif, (i) The Muslim Problem in India; TilT Th^
Future of India; (iii) A Federation of Cultural Zones for India;
'A Punjabif (Muhammad Shah NawajThan)»"Confe'fl'er acy'~o7"^ndiaT
This was also the attraction of the Cabinet Mission plan of 
1946. But these schemes gained favour neither v/ith the Congress 
nor with the League. So in 1947, when independence came, it 
was partition and not federation which occured, and two new 
states, India and Pakistan, were created.
But what occured between 1937 and 1940 was not the 
evolution of a new political concept. For many years, Muslim 
thinkers had been evolving schemes for a separate Muslim polity. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the famous pan-Islamist, 
Jamal-ud-Din Afghani,was reported to have dreamt of a Muslim
1
republic embracing Central Asia, Afghanistan and West India.
In 1921, the pan-Islamist and Khilafat leader, Hasrat Mohanij,
advocated *an Indian Republic on the lines of the United States
of America1 on a federal basis. Mohani pointed out that in spite
of the existing Hindu-Muslim unity there still persisted serious
misunderstanding and suspicion between the two communities. The
Hindus had a lurking suspicion that with the Muslim invasion of
2
India the Indian Muslims would help their co-religionists. On 
the other hand, the Muslims feared that on the achievement of 
self-government the Hindus would acquire greater political pov/er 
and would-use their numerical superiority to crush the Muslims.
So long as the country was not freed from British rule the 
Muslims would be under double subjection: British and Hindu. 
After independence was achieved the Mrislims would have only the 
Hindu majority to fear. But this latter possibility could be 
negatived if an Indian Republic was organised on a federal basis 
similar to that of the United States of America, ffor, while the 
Mussalmans as a whole are in a minority in India, yet nature has
1. - A History of the Freedom Movement, vol.i, pp.48-9.
2. cf* Mohamed Ali, Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana
Mohamed Ali, p.358. !The Muslims are suspected in some,Hindu 
quarters of desiring to invite their co-religionists abroad 
to subvert the Swaraj Government and re-establish Muslim &uleff
8 4
provided a compensation; the Mussalmans are not in a minority
in all the provinces. In some provinces.• are more numberous
than the Hindus. In the "United States of India*1 the Hindu
majority... will not be allowed to overstep the limits of
1
moderation against the Mussalmans*. this interesting solution
of the Hindu-Muslim problem was characterised by a Panjabi
Hindu leader, Lajpat Raidas *a clear partition of India into a
2Muslim India and a non-Muslim India.* This suggestion was
presumably put up before the All-Parties Conference in 1928.
As the Nehru Report noted; *The Muslims being in a minority
in India as a whole fear that the majority may harass them, and
to meet this difficulty they have made a novel suggestion ■*«. that
they should at least dominate in some parts of India.* The Aga
Khan went further. At the Calcutta meeting of the All-Parties
Conference in the same year he advocated independence for each
Indian province which would be *akin to that of Bavaria in the
former German confederation, rather than that of American State
4or Swiss Canton.* At the first Round Table Conference Mohamed 
Ali emphasised the fact that if there were provinces in which the 
Hindus were in a majority there were also provinces in which the 
Muslims were in a majority. *That gives us our safeguard, for we 
demand hostages as we have willingly given hostages to Hindus in 
the other Provinces where they form huge majorities. Shafi said;
*To my mind the Federal India of the future with the Central 
Government in the hands of the majority community^ and the Provincial
1. IAR, 1922, vol.i, pp.405-4*
2. Saiyid., op.cit♦, p*30. Bajpat Rai had suggested the partition of
India as early ^as 1924. Savarkar, the President of the Hindu 
Mahasabha, had frequently referred to the Hindus and Muslims as 
two nations, see R.~ Symonds, The Making of Pakistan, p.59.
Qureshi, op.cit., p.284 f.n.; B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or the 
Partition of India, p.268.
5* All-Parties Conference: Report of Committee (1928), pp.28-9*
4. All Parties Confererence, Supplementary Report of the Committee
p.10; P. Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National '
Congress. vol. i, p.334*
5* Indian Round Table Conference (First Session), 12th Nov.1930- 
19th Jan. 1931# P fo4*’
Governments in six out of the ei&ht Governors* Provinces 
in the hands of the same community, the four Provinces in 
which the majority community will be in a minority and the 
minority community will be in a majority will in itself 
constitute a guarantee of good treatment b$ both the 
communities.** Mohamed Ali also claimed that a community
2with *more than 70 millions cannot easily be called a minority.*
Back in 1930, Iqbal, the poet-philosopher, had apparently
advocated a Muslim state in North-West India. In his
presidential address at the annual session of the Muslim
League in 1930, Iqbal said: *1 would like to see the Punjab,
North-West Frontier Province, Sind, Baluchistan amalgamated
into a single state. Self-government within the British
Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a
consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to
be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West 
3India.* The principle of European democracy could not be
applied to India without recognising the existence of communal
groups. *The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India
is, therefore, perfectly justified.*^ Iqbal, however, was not
very clear whether he was contemplating a separate sovereign
Muslim state or he was just thinking of the consolidation of the
Muslim North-West into one political unit as part of an all-
India federation. But the remainder of his speech seemed to
confirm the latter view. * To my mind a unitary form of government
5is simply unthinkable in a self-governing India.* So he
1. Indian Round Table Conference. 12th Nov.l930-19th Jan.1931, 
Proceedings of Sub-Committees, vol.iii, Sub-Committee No.iii 
(Minorities), pp.51^2.
3* Ibid., p.161. In 1924, Mohamed Ali in a speech at Aligarh said:
*If the Hindu-Muslim-problem is not settled, India will be^  
divided into Hindu India and Muslim India*. Khaliquzzaman, 
op.cit... p.238*
3* IAR. 1930, vol.ii, p.338.
4. Ibid*, p.337*
5* Ibid., p.339*
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suggested that *in view of India*s infinite variety in
climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems the
creation of autonomous states "based on the unity of language,
race, history, religion and Identity of economic interests,
is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional
1structure in India*1 Residuary powers must be left entirely 
to self-governing states, the central government would exercise
only those powers which were to be given by the free consent
2 - ' of states* Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, who was a close observer of
events in the Muslim League, states; 'The clarion call of
Allama Iqbal in the 1930 session of the Muslim League at
Allahabad had failed to attract the attention even of the
intellectual classes,.much less of the masses, because the
Muslim League had not considered it worthwhile even to take
notice of it in its proceedings by drafting any appropriate 
3resolution*1 In his letters written during the period from
May 1936 to November 1937 Iqbal argued for *a separate federation
4of Muslim provinces** He wrote; *•*# the enforcement and
development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country
5without a'free Muslim state or states*1 While in his book 
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam he dreamt of 
Islamic Republics comprehending all the faithful* 'For the 
present every Moslem nation must sink into her own deeper self, 
temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are j 
strong and powerful to form a living family of republics**
Almost a decade was to pass before Jinnah admitted that he had 
finally been converted to Iqbal's conclusions as a result of
1' I M >  1930, vol.ii, p.338-9.
2* rbia., p.339.
3« Khaliquzzaman, op*oit♦, p.196.
4* Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, p*24*
5* Ibid*, p.IB.
6. Sir MohammedIqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in 
Islam, p*223*
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careful examination and study of the constitutional problems 
1facing India. In 1935, Rahmat Ali, an Indian Muslim student
studying at Cambridge, England,invented the name of fFakistan*.
Rahmat Ali*s idea was to have a 1 separate, sovereign* Pakistan
2composed of five Muslim provinces in the North-West India. The
proposal was circulated to the members of the Round Table
Conference but was never officially put forth. The Muslim
delegates, who appeared before the Joint Select Committee in
1933, dismissed the idea as *a student*s scheme1, * chimerical
and impracticable.1
We can broadly divide Muslim leadership into four
schools of thought. The leaders like Jinnah and .Iqbal appeared
on the political horizon as nationalist Muslims; they were
Indians first and Muslims afterwards. However, they ended their
political careers as Muslim nationalists &nd staunch supporters
4of Muslim nationalism. The pan-Islamists, like Mohamed Ali,
Shaukat Ali, Hasrat Mohani, Azad Sobhani, and Shafi Daoodi, were
not prepared to lose the identity of the Muslim community in,the
nascent Indian nation. They belonged (in Mohamed Ali*s words)
*to two circles of equal size, but which are not concentric.
One is India, and the other is the Muslim world.1 They were not
5Nationalists but supernationalists.* The Congress Muslims,
1. Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah. p.6.
2. See C. Rahmat Ali, Pakistan.
3* Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (Session 
1932-33), vol.iiS, Minutes of Evidence, p.1496.
4* See, for example, Iqbal*s collection of poems Bang-i-Dara which 
displayed his Indian patriotism. The Aga Khan and Shafi had 
all along advocated the individuality of the Muslim community 
and co-operated with the British for the safeguarding of Muslim 
interests.
5* Indian Round Table Conference (First Session), 12th Nov.1930- 
19th Jan. 1931• Proceedings, p.103. Mohamed Ali wrote,(Comrade;
March 29,1913, p.246) *We have never ceased to regret the strained 
relations of the different communities of India, but we have not been 
insincere enough on that account to endeavour to conceal our misgiv­
ings about an unconditional surrender of the individuality of the 
Moslem community. It is political co-operation that we have always 
advocated and not political Nirvana of the Moslem community, cf.
Azad Sobhani (15^ , 1928,vol.ii,p.404) *The doctrine of nationalism as
(f.n.5 cont*d on following page) 1
8 8
led by Azad (a pan-Islamist in his earlier days), Ansari 
a M  fimal Khan, had been in favour of political collaboration 
with the Hindus and became staunch supporters of Indian nationalism. 
Azad remained quite popular with certain-segments of Muslim 
society, such as that represented by the Deoband school and the 
Jamlat-uI-Ulama-i-Hind, but became decidedly unpopular with the 
greater section of the Muslim community. While Muslims under 
the leadership of Jinnah demanded rindependent states1 in the 
Worth-Western and Eastern Zones of India in 1940 on the basis 
of two-nation theory, Azad in his presidential address to the 
Ramgarh session of the Congress in the same year, reiterated his 
pride in being an India*. *1 am a part of the indivisible 
unity that is Indian nationality*, declared Azad, *1 am 
indespensable to this noble edifice and without me this splendid 
structure of India is incomplete. I am an essential element
1which has gone to build India. I can never surrender this claim.1 
Finally, some sections of the ulama, represented by Jamiat-ul- 
Ulama-i-Hind and Jamaat-i-Islami, were opposed to Muslim 
separatism based on nationalistic idea. Besides,theye were 
pro-nationalist (Indian nationalism) and pro-Congress groups
as  -J
such/the $he Momins, $he Ahrars, ^he Red shirts and the All-
India Shia Conference.1 *Most of these groups were founded in
the early ’forties. The Muslims who owed allegiance to factions
outside the league certainly ran into several millions but were
not formidable enough in any way to challenge the League’s
2established position.
1AR, 1940, vol.i, p.299.
2. See Lt.-Colonel C.B. Birdwood, A Continent Experiments, p.84.
cont'd from previous page) 
at present going on in India should not be followed by the 
Mussulmans. The Prophet had made the whole world for them and it 
had been ordained that they should love the whole world and rule 
over it. Their angle of vision should not be confined to India, 
Persia, Arabia or to any particular country.1
The whole purpose behind the establishment of Pakistan
was to create a homeland for the Indian Muslims. Now the
question automatically arises: Why did the religious
fundamentalists like Maulana Abul Ala Maududi and his
movement Jamaa t-i-1slami oppose the creation of Pakistan?
In view of Maududi*s central role in the controversy over an
Islamic constitution for Pakistan some consideration of his
pre-partition political ideas is required* The Jamaat-i-
Isiami was founded in 1941 by Maududi, an Islamic scholar of
repute, and a powerful writer and publicist. The objective
of the movement was the establishment of the Islamic state* ’The
ultimate goal of Islam is a world state in which the claims of
racial and national prejudices would be dismantled and all
mankind incorporated in a cultural and political system, with
equal rights and equal opportunities for all... In their spirit
and in their aims Islam and nationalism are diametrically
1opposed to each other*1 Maududi feared that Pakistan, when
established, would be governed by Westernised leaders who
wanted to establish a nation state on the Western models that
is, an irreligious and secular state, rather than a state based
2on Islamic idealogy. As Callard puts it, ’The background of 
the men who organised the campaign £for Pakistan]} was not 
theology and Islamic law but politics and the common law, not
3
Beoband but Cambridge and the Inns of Court.1 He regarded a 
state based on .nationalism as ’Kufr’ and all those who took part 
in its government were fsinners.So he pleaded that the Muslims 
should struggle for the propagation and adoption of an Islamic
1. S.A.A.Maudoodi, Nationalism and India, p. 10.
2. K.B* Sayeed, ’’The Jamaht-i-Islami Movement in Pakistan” P&ciftc 
A-PPftmr,March 1957, p.60.
3* K. Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, pi200.
4* Report of the Court of Innuiry constituted under Punjab Act II 
of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953. p.245*
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ideological concept in the whole of India and if they did this
it was very likely that within a few years the whole of India
1would become Dar-ul-Islam or Muslim homeland.
His intention during the period 1941-47 was to train
and produce an honest and pious group of workers who would not
only be inspired by Islamic fervour but also be capable of
2organising or managing the affairs of a modern state. The
constitution of the Jamaat-i-Islami of undivided India clearly
laid down that a mere Muslim name* or birth in a Muslim family
did not automatically qualify a man to become a member of this
movement. To be admitted to the membership he had to observe
all the practices of Islam and to refrain from drawing his
income from sources condemned by Islam, such as interest,
selling of liquor, dancing, music, bribery, etc* If he were a
member of any constituent assembly he should resign his
membership, and if he were connected with any un-Islamic
government, in the capacity of governor, minister or judge, he
3should sever his connections with it. Its organisation and 
membership afforded remarkable par^ allelfcs with that of the 
Communist Party. Many times the potential leaders were observed
4and kept on probation before full membership was granted to them.
Maududi wanted to erect intact the ideal social system of an
early Islam, and had an enormous influence over the religiously-
minded Muslims in the universities of India in the early'forties,
who considered him to be the outstanding interpreter of modern 
5Islam. His influence over the thinking of middle-class Muslims
fi
had increased during the years preceding partition.
1. Sayeed, op.cit., pp.61-2.
2. Ibid., p.62.
3 * Ibid.
4. Ibid., p*63.
5. W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, pp.149-50.
6. L* Binder, Relgion and Politics in Pakistan, p.94*
9The Islamic polity envisaged by Maududi has its
constitution.and laws conferred by God, the traditional canon
of Islam* Sovereignty belongs to God* will include its
amir (supreme head), its advisory council, and judiciary*
The amir will be elected and will exercise full authority in
all respects and command complete obedience so long as he
follow's the Shariah* The amir may be criticised, sued in a
court of law and even deposed. He will consult an advisory
council, which may or may not be elected. The decisions of
the council will not b© binding on the amir. No one is
eligible to any office if he seeks that office. There can be
no party divisions in the Islamic advisory council. The
1judiciary will be independent of the executive. Maududi did
not like the word ’theocracy* to be attached to his system of
government* He evolved a new concept *theo-democracy*, meaning
’divine democratic government* because under it Muslims have been
given a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of
God. In the Islamic state all administrative matters and other
questions which are not settled by the Quran and Sunnah will be
decided upon by the consensus of those of sound judgement and
2learning in the Shariah* He added: 1 There lb no difference
between the sovereignty of the British and the sovereignty of a
democratic form of Government*. *Prom the Muslim standpoint,
both forms of government are equally rebellious, impious,
%
traitorous and wicked** An Islamic state will be an ideological 
state and those who do not believe in its idealogy will be known 
as zimmis or non-Muslim citizens. They are not entitled to have 
any hand in shaping the fundamental policy of the state. Specific
1* Maududi, Political Theory of Islam* pp.34-7.
2. Ibid*, p20*
3. J.W. Sweetman, "Viewpoints in Pakistan 1", Muslim World*
April 1957, p.113.
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1rights and privileges have heen accorded to them in the Shariah*
Women must remain behind purdah (seclusion), which keeps them
from becoming !hell on this earth1 and 'storm centres of that
satanic liberty which woman is seeking and which is threatening
to demolish the entire structure of human civilization*1
In this direction Iqbal gave a new interpretation to Islamic
political theory. 'The republican form of government1, he
observed, 'is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit
of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new
3formes that are set free in the world of Islam.1 Iqbal did 
not have the peculiar problems of Pakistan before him, but what 
he stated about i.jma (consensus of opinion) had a direct bearing 
on the problems* Iqbal said, '..* the pressure of new world- 
forces and the political experience of European nations are 
impressing on the mind of modezvi Islam the value and possibilities, 
of the idea of I.jma. The growth of republican spirit, and the 
gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands 
constitute a great step in advance. The transfer of the power 
of Ijtihad from individual representatives of schools to a 
Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of the growth of 
opposing sects, is the only possible form I,jma can take in 
modern times, will secure contributions to legal discussion 
from laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs.
In this way alone we can stir into activity the dormant spirit
. 4of life in our legal system and give it an evolutionary outlook.1 
The incorporation of a provision for separate ecclesiastical 
committee of ulama having power to supervise the legislative
1. Maududi, Political Theory of Islam, pp.27-8.
2. W.C. Smith, op.cit., p.149*
3* Iqbal, op.cit., p.220.
4* Ibid., p.241*
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activity of the Majlis in the Persian constitution of 1906,
1had been condemned by Iqbal as a 'dangerous arrangement*1
might help and guide free discussion on questions
relating to law. But the remedy lay in reforming 'the
present system of legal education in Mohammedan countries, to
extend its sphere, and to combine it with an intelligent study
2
of modern jurisprudence*1 The claim of the present generation
of Muslim liberals to re-interpret the fundamental legal
principles, in the light of their own experience and the
altered conditions of modern life was, therefore, perfectly 
3justified*
4A section of the Deoband leadership, through its 
public platform « The Jamiat~ul»Ulama~i~Hindaf. had become 
convinced that men like Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan were 
incapable of building up an Islamic state in Pakistan** The 
ulama concluded that Pakistan would be a secular state on the
5Western model and would not be different from Ataturk's Turkey.
In 1940, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, the head of the Deoband 
Academy, in his presidential address at the twelfth session of 
the Jamiat^ul-Ulama-i-Hind at Jaunpur (the United Provinces), 
remarked: 'These days the Pakistan movement is very popular 
among the (Muslim) masses. If it means the establishment in the 
Muslim majority provinces of an Islamic state based on the 
Prophetic traditions and the commandments of Islam, viz. "frudud,» 
lf®iga$"* and others, then it is really a very noble cause and no
1* Iqbal, op. cit.,pp.243-4.
2 * Ibid♦, p.244•
3* Ibid*, p.234.
4* Deoband is a small town in the district of Saharanpour in the
United Provinces where a leading Muslim theological institution 
was established in 1867.
5* Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and fee Demand for 
Pakistan* p.118.
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Muslim will have any' objection to it* But the fact is that,
under the present circumstances, nobody can imagine the possibility
1of such a venture.1 Of course, there were leaders, who, from
the League platform, gave the impression that in Pakistan a sort
of Islamic state based on the principles of the Quran and the
Sunnah, would be established (for example, on November 9, 1945p
Nawab Ismail Khan told his audience at Allahabad that the
objective of the Muslim League was to establish a state based
on the Shariah and the political philosophy of Islam)* The
utterances of responsible League leaders impressed a large
number of ulama of different schools and a small section of the
Deobandi ulama led by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Osmani supported
the demand for Pakistan* Osmani organised in 1946 Jamiat-ul-
Ulama-±-Islam to counteract the activities of Jamiat-ul-Ulama-
i-Hind and came over to Pakistan after its creation. Even
Mandudi, for long an opponent of Muslim nationalism and the
idea of separation, came to Pakistan, which he rationalised as
the would-be laboratory for practical experiments in the
2religio-political philosophy of Islam.
Jinnah seemed very clear about the problem in so far
as the future constitution of Pakistan was concerned. There
were some casual references in his various statements and
speeches to Islam, the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet,
but he never dreamt of making Pakistan a theocratic or a
3religious state. Before partition, in an interview v/ith 
Reuter’s correspondent in New Belhi Jinnah was reported to have 
said that Pakistan would' be a modern democratic state, with
1. Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for
Pakistan, p*119«
2. Ibid*, pp.!19f.n., 102r*3f*ns.
3. See Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, vol.i,
p.344, and vol.ii, pp.224, 325-8; Speeches^Quaid-i-Azam 
Mahomed Ali Jinnah as Governor-General of Pakistan. 1947-1948,
pp.8-9,58,65*
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sovereignty resting in the people, and the members of the new
state would have equal rights of citizenship irrespective of
1their religion, caste or creed# Jinnah's concept of the new 
state was enumerated in his inaugural speech, as incoming Governor” 
General, to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August^11, 1947* 
He stated; 1... work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no 
matter to what community he belongs no matter what is his 
colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of 
this State with equal rights, privileges and oblations.#. We 
should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these 
angularities of the majority and minority communities#., will 
vanish... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that 
has nothing to do with the business of the State... We are starting 
with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal 
citizens of one State... that in course of time Hindus would cease 
to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the 
religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each
2 findividual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State'.
In his broadcast talk to the people of the United States of America 
in February 194B, he stressed the same themes *1 do not know what 
the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, but I am 
sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential 
principles of Islam.. In any case Pakistan is not going to be a 
d-Keocratic State - to be ruled by priests with a divine mission.
We have many non-Muslims- Hindus, Christians and Parsis - but they 
are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges 
as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the
!♦ Beport of the Court of Inquirjg^ %fP6.p.201. 
2* CAPP, vol.i, pp.19-20. ‘~
1
affairs of Pakistan.1
And so, it appears, that the founder of Pakistan 
envisaged a modern secular state: hut his successors have 
never succeeded in defining exactly how far the principles 
of democracy, how far the principles of Islam ought to he the 
foundation of political organisation*
I# Speeches-CSuaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah as Governor-General 
of Pakistan, 1947-1948, p*65.
CHAPTER IV 9 7
THE POLITICAL IDEAS OP M.K. GANDHI , SUBIfAS CHANDRA ,BOSE,
M.N. ROY JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN,
M.K. Gandhi %
G a n d h i 1s philosophy was largely drawn Prom Western 
thinkers - Tolstoy, Thoreau, Ruskin and Kropotkin. A recent
01
study discovers his links with the English liberal tradition, 
garvodaya being comparable with T.H. Green's concept of the 
common good and his emphasis on duties rather than rights being 
somewhat reminiscent of Bradley's observations on 'My Station 
and its D u t i e s . ’ The main springs of his thinking were also 
linked with Hindu philosophical tradition.
Gandhi did not share his liberal predecessors' 
enthusiasm for parliamentary institutions. His comparison of
2
the British Parliament to 'a sterile w o m a n 1 and ’a prostitute',
clearly shows that I n d i a ’s political forms would not be a slavish
imitation of the West. Gandhi's ultimate socio-political Ideal
was the non-violent stateless society. His Hind S w a r a n 9 written
In 1908, contained the basic ideals on which the future constitution
of India would be based.
'That state will be the best which is governed the
least,' declared Gandhi, and 'society based on non-violence can
only consist of groups settled in villages in which voluntary
co-operation is the condition of dignified and peaceful existence ,..
The nearest approach to civilisation based upon non-
3violence is the erstwhile village republic of I n d i a . 1 His
1. B.S. Sharma, Gandhi as a Political T h i n k e r .
2. M.K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home R u l e , p . 22.
3. S.No Agarwal, Gandhian Constitution for Free I n d i a , p p . 39?53.
model for free India was a federation of village republics, 
Panchayat Ra;j. Gandhi's ideas about the future pattern of 
political organisation are to be found in Gandhian .Constitution 
for Eree India. The village republics shall be basic units of 
Swaraj Government enjoying maximum autonomy in social, economic 
and political affairs. The villages are to be linked with the 
t a l u k a , district, province and national panchayat by a system of 
indirect elections except at the village level.. Every village 
shall elect its panchayat and president or s a r p a n c h . About twenty 
villages shall be grouped in a taluka p a n c h a y a t , consisting of the 
elected presidents of the villages. A district panchayat shall 
be constituted from the presidents of the taluka p a n c h a y a t s , these 
in turn shall form the provincial pa n c h a y a t . The provincial 
panchayat shall be the legislature of the province and shall be 
unicameral. The chief executive of the province shall be known 
as president who will be elected by the provincial panchayat.
There shall be a council of ministers who though responsible to 
the legislature shall not be appointed from amongst the members 
of the provincial p a n c h a y a t .
The ministers shall be sleeted on a non-communal and 
non-party basis. The presidents of the provincial panchayats 
shall constitute the all-India panchayat which shall be the 
central or national legislature and shall be unicameral. The 
head of state shall be the president of the national p a n c h a y a t . 
With regard to the council of ministers it shall be exactly the 
same as in the case of provincial p a n c h a y a t . The term of each 
of these bodies shall ordinarily be three years. There will be 
complete separation of executive and legislative functions both 
at the provincial and central level. The functions of the higher
bodies will be mainly advisory and c o -ordinative* Defence, 
planning, communications, currency, international trade and 
foreign affairs shall be vested in the national p a n c h a y a t , and 
residuary powers shall lie with the units. =That means all-India 
panchayat shall be a voluntary federation of the provinces and 
states, with the largest measure of local autonomy for the 
federating units and reducing of the functions of the state.
In this Gandhian Constitution the judicial system shall be re­
organised so as to keep in line with the decentralised form 
of government. The primary and basic unit of judicial system 
shall necessarily be the village panchayat which shall enjoy 
extensive civil and criminal powers in judicial matters, there 
shall also be district courts, high courts and the supreme 
court to deal with the special cases.'1'
The.state was to be non-violent, so Gandhi believed 
that armed defence was not necessary against foreign aggression.
'A truly non-violent nation would rather smilingly die to a man
2
than meekly submit to the insolent i n v a d e r . * But many aspects
of politics were not given adequate treatment, as for example,
foreign affairs, the role of the public services and the machinery
of law enforcement.
Gandhi stood against centralising tendencies in modern
states. 'Centralization as a system1 , wrote Gandhi in 1942, 'is
3
inconsistent with non-violent structure of society.* 'I suggest,' 
he remarked in 1939, 'that, if India is to evolve along non­
violent lines, it will have to decentralize many things.
Centralization can not be sustained and defended without adequate 
. 4
force.' He was against industrialisation and factory system.
5
Machinery 'must not be allowed to displace necessary human labour.'
1. This account is based on S.N. Agarwal's Gandhian Constitution 
for free I n d i a , chapters vi-x.
2* I b i d ., p . 110.
3. N .K. Bose, Selections from G a n d h i , p . 73.
4. I b i d ., p.72.
5» I b i d ., p . 66.
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11 Simple tools and instruments' would be enough. -
Small-scale village industry allows little opportunity
for fraud and speculation. Gandhi insisted that decentralisation
of industry 'preserves the purity and compactness of domestic
life, artistry and creative talent as well as the people's sense
2of freedom, ownership and dignity.' Gandhi, however, was not 
opposed to every form of centralisation. He did not object to 
the centralisation and nationalisation of heavy industries,
5
provided they formed only a minor part of national activity.
'The heavy machinery for Work of public utility which cannot be
undertaken by human labour has its inevitable place, but all
that would be owned by the state and used entirely for the benefit
4of the people.' He regarded a highly centralised and powerful
state as the greatest enemy of individual freedom and therefore
looked upon an increase in the power of the state with the
greatest concern, because it is destructive of human individuality
5which lies at the root of all progress. Yet he held that 'there
are certain things which cannot be done without political power,1
even' though there are 'numerous other things which do not at
all depend upon political power.' A nation is truly democratic,
he said, when it 'runs its affairs smoothly and effectively
6
without much State interference.' The non-violent society will 
not be pyramidal in structure as the modern state, it will be a 
highly decentralised society in which the coercive authority of 
the central government would be reduced to the minimum and every 
individual will have developed a high level of non-violence and 
self-control. 'The ideally non-violent state will be an ordered
1. N.K. Bose, Selections from Gandhi, p.67.
2. Joan V. Bondurant, Conquest of Violencei The Gandhian Philosophy
of Conflict, p.182.
3. Gandhi, Towards Mon-violent Socialism, p.21.
4. D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma, vol.iv, p.34.
5. Bose, op. cit. , p.27*
6. G.N. Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, p.341.
1anarchy* ' TMy idea of village swaraj•is,1 he wrote, ’that it 
is a complete republic, independent of its neighbours for its
vital wants, and yet interdependent for many others in which
2
dependence is a necessity.1 In such a state every one is his
own ruler. 1 He rules himself in such a manner that he is never
a hindrance to his neighbour. In the ideal state, therefore,
there is no political power because there is no state.' He
believed that the state should exist to fulfil the needs of its'
, 4members, that 'the supreme consideration is man' and that when
the state ceases to perform services for its members which
fulfil their needs, then the individual has the duty to disobey
and to resist. His ideal type of self-governing village shall
have clean roads, temples and mosques, natural surroundings,
dharmashala, a school and a small dispensary and shall attain
self-sufficiency in food and clothing and should be capable yCoP-
defend/itself against robbers and wild animals. 'If all Indian
villages could come up to the ideal,' G-andhi emphasised, then
'India would be free from most of its worries.' India could
not accept western models. 'I do not believe in mechanization
7
of India. I think that rural reconstruction is possible.'
It is interesting to note that both Gandhi and poet 
Tagore had by different routes reached the same conclusion - 
that the future of India lay in her villages* The Sriniketan 
or the Institute of Rural Reconstruction was Tagore's contribution 
to this doctrine. Gandhi's was on a national scale. All his
political doctrine was coloured by his vision of India as an
1. Tendulkar, op. cit., vol*v, p.389.
2. Ibid., vol.vi, p.81.
3* Bose, op. cit *, p.41.
4* Tendulkar, op . cit. , vol.ii, p.212.
5. Bondurant, op.cit., p.171.
6. Tendulkar, op. cit. , vol.i, p.327.
7. Ibid., op. cit^., vol.iv, p.202*
integration of rehabilitated villages* Another Indian (excepting
Tagore and Gandhi) who thought on the same line was D.R. Das, a
prominent leader from Bengal* An Outline Scheme of Swara.i ..drafted
by C.R. Das^was presented to the Congress in early 1923 and urged
the creation, after independence was granted, of a highly decentralised
form of government, ’a maximum of local autonomy' and 'a
1
minimum of control by higher centres*1 The organ of administration
would be the p a n c h a y a t , organised into village, town, district,
2provincial and all-India unites of government. According to Dr.
Radhakamal Mukherjee, Indian type of decentralised democracy
will not only be 'more adaptive and life-giving than the imitation
of Western political methods, but will also be a distinctively
3Eastern contribution to the political history of man.1
But none of these original ideas about the future pattern
of political organisation in India could find favour with the
large body of Western-educated Indians. They came into none of
the serious constitutional proposals put forward by Indians before
independence. The Nehru Report of 1928 envisaged for India
the British model of 'a Parliament ... and an executive
4responsible to that Parliament.' Gandhi did not put forward 
his indigenous model when he himself was present at the Round Table 
Conference in 1931* On the other hand, his reference to Ram 
Rajya aroused suspicion and fear among Muslims. The left-wing 
led by Jawaharlal Nehru was most concerned with the reconstruction 
of society on a socialistic basis. '... The failure of parliamentary 
democracy is not that it has gone too far, but that it did not 
go far enough ..♦ it did not provide for economic democracy.'^
______  j .   nir.iirr.nnT - rrT T. ' ' ___ i J. i _ . . I.. . i i _ ~ n_ ~T~ .
1. C.R. Das, Outline Scheme of Swaraj, p.3.
2® Ibid., pp.4-12.
3. RoK. Mukherjee, Democracies of the East, p.xxv.
4. All-Parties Conference; Report of Committee (l928), pp.101,161.
5. J. Nehru, An Autobiography, p.330.
The Congress attitude to political organisation was expressed 
in a demand for a Constituent Assembly to determine the future 
structure of government (1934) and the formation of a National 
Planning Committee (l93S) with Nehru as Chairman to co-ordinate 
the economic development of India.
Subhas Chandra Bose
Subhas Chandra Bose was a critic of Gandhian political
ideas and techniques. He believed that India's salvation would
not be achieved under Gandhi's leadership. Hence he wrote:
'The logic of history will, therefore, follow its inevitable
course. The political struggle and the social struggle will
have to be conducted simultaneously. The Party that will win
political freedom for India will be also the Party that will win
1social and economic freedom for the masses.1 In the 'thirties,
Bose was a left-winger within the Congress with more radical
and uncompromising views on social and economic issues. He said:
'That State on the advice of a planning commission, will have
to a^dopt a comprehensive scheme for gradually socialising our
entire agricultural and industrial system in both the spheres
2of production and appropriation.1 In May 1939? he formed his
party, the Forward Bloc. According to him, the solution of
India's problems required economic reforms on a socialistic basis
Since these reforms could not be put through under a democratic
form of government, India 'must have a political system - a
3State - of an authoritarian character.' He advocated 'a strong
Central Government with dictatorial powers for some years to
come ..• government by a strong party bound together by military 
4discipline.' While on another occasion he spoke of the efficacy
1. S.C. Bose, The Indian Struggle, 1920-1942, p.298.
2* I M ?  1938, vol.i, p. 341.
3. Bose, The Indian Struggle, 1935-1942, p.116.
4. S.G. Bose, The Indian Struggle, 1920-1942, p.312.
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of a strong dictator. India 'suffers from so many political
1ills that only a ruthless dictator can cure her.’ . Bose was
certain that Communism would not succeed in India for a number
of reasons- Conyunism is opposed to nationalism in any form.
Russia is no more Interested in provoking a world revolution.
He also felt that many of the economic ideas of Communism might
make a strong appeal .to Indians hut the Indian people could not
he expected to respond sympathetically to the anti-religious
and atheistic Communism because in India there is no positive
hostility against religion as such. Even among those who would
he disposed to accept the economic ideas of Communism there would
he great reluctance towards the adherence to the doctrine of
materialistic interpretation of history. In his opinion?
Communism has made no new contribution in the field of monetary
2theory hut has simply followed traditional economics.
There can he no denial of the fact that Bose had
emotional leaning towards the strong ways of the fascist dictators.
Bose had regarded Mussolini as ’a pan who really counts in the
3politics of modern Europe.’ He regarded Gandhi’s visit to Italy 
and his meeting with Mussolini in 1931 as an occasion of historic 
significance. He wrote: ’ ... the Mahatma rendered great public
service by his visit to Italy. The only regret is that he did
, 4
not stay there longer and did not cultivate more personal contacts.' 
Jawaharlal Nehru in The Discovery of India points out that in 
1938 when Bose was the President of the Indian Nation Congress?
’he did not approve of any' step being taken by the Congress which 
was anti-Japanese or anti-German or anti-Italian. And yet such 
was the feeling in the Congress and the country that he did not 
oppose this or many other manifestations of Cpngress sympathy
1. II. Toye? The Springing Tiger? p. 60.
2. Bose5 The Indian Struggle, 1920-1942. pp.314-5.
3* Ibid.5 p.231.
4- ibid.
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with .China and the victims of fascist and nazi aggression. We
passed many resolutions and organized many demonstrations of
which he did not approve during the period of his presidentship
ft
hut he submitted to them without protest because he reZLijztzed the
1strength of feeling behind them.f
Bose pointed to a new way for India, a middle way
which lay in the synthesis between Communism and fascism. He
2called the new synthesis 1Samyavada.'
Bose was never convinced of the Gandhian path of non­
violence to win freedom for India. He secretly escaped from India 
in January 1941 to seek the help of the Axis powers to fight against
the British. In 1942, Bose organised the Indian National Army
3(i.N.A.) of about thirty thousand men^ mostly recruited from
Indian prisoners of war captured by the Japanese during the
Second World War, to liberate India from British rule. This
was the army of ’free India', a Provisional Government’ that
claimed to be a national state under the presidency of Bose and
4was recognised by nine independent states. The Provisional
Government aimed at liberating India 'from the British yoke,
5through an armed struggle,! and the mission would be accomplished
when the freedom was won: the form of government would be decided
6by the Indian people themselves according to their own choice.
But his military adventure failed to achieve the objective.
M.N. Roy
M.N. Roy pas brought up in an orthodox Brahmin family. He 
was deeply influenced by the writings of Vivekananda and at the
1. J. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p.429.
2. Bose, The Indian Struggle, 1920-1942, pp.313-4.
3. A.J» Barker, The March on Delhi, p.252. An Indian writer puts the 
figure at 60,000. See C.S.Samra, "Subhas Chandra Bose: An Indian 
National Hero” in R.L. Park and I. Tinker (eds*)? Leadership and 
Political Institutions in India, p.81.
4. Majo Gen.A.C. Chatterji, India's Struggle for freedom, p.v.
5. Selected Speeches of Subhas Chandra Bose, p.217.
6* Ihld., p .156.
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same time he was attracted by the revolutionary movement, specially
by the writings of BrahmabandhaY Upadhyaya.^ In his earlier years
he became one of the leaders of the most daring group of political
anarchists* It was during his stay in Mexico that he Abandoned his
previous position as an anarchist and became a Marxist* In 1918,
he founded the Communist Party of Mexico* In 1919, he became a
■ 2member of the Communist International, and was actively associated
with the formation of the Communist Party of India at Tashkent
tov/ards the end of 1920.^ From 1920 until 1928 he was the doyen of
the Indian Communists and was in charge of the direction of
communist affairs in the Indian sub-continent, and it was under his
4
leadership that the communist movement in India was launched*
The experience of the nationalist movement made Roy doubtful
about its possibilities, its method as well as its 'spiritualist1
ideology. 'Marxism appeared to indicate a more realistic and
5effeetive'approach to the problems1 which had puzzled him* Writing
in 1926, he had advocated the formation of a People's Party
for India binding together the petty-bourgeoisie, the peasantry
and the proletariat as an alternative to the Congress. Its
programme was to include (a) complete independence, (b) the
establishment of a republican government, (c) radical agrarian 
* *6
reforms, and (d) advanced social legislation. He ridiculed the
7demand of a national government as 'fashionable but fraudulent1
because it would be controlled by the Indian capitalist class and
would be a fascist dictatorship through the instrumentality of its
party?the Congress. The slogan of national unity he regarded as
8mythical and a 'dangerous fiction*' In 1928, he severed his
1. "M.N* Roy: A. Short Biographical Note'' in S. Rgty (ed>) , M.N * Roy,
Philosopher-RevoIutionary, p.65*
2* M.N* Roy, "An Autobiographical Statement" in ibid., pp*3~4*
3* Muzaffar Ahmad, The Communist Party of India and its Formation
Abroad, pp.33?$B.
4* See David N . Druhe, Soviet Russia and Indian Communism, ch.ii*
5« Roy, Politics, Power and Parties, p.2*
6* Roy, The Future of Indian Politics, p*117.
7. -Roy, National Government or People's Government? ch.iv.
8* Ibid*, pp.54-5•
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relations with the Communist International for reasons of
disagreement regarding both the theory and practice of Communism*
He then joined the Congress, but left the organisation with the
outbreak of Second World War because of disagreement on the
question of co-operation with the war effort; as his advocacy of
support to the Allied Powers was incompatible with the Congress
1policy of anti-war activities*
Roy founded the Radical Democratic Party of India in 1940# 
In December 1944, Roy wrote and published A Draft Constitution of 
Free India in which he outlined the political structure of a 
radical' democratic state which would avoid the drawbacks of 
parliamentary democracy as well as the Soviet system. His draft 
was addressed to those who desired 'freedom and progress', and
he claimed that 'a large volume of popular opinion has been
« 2expressed* in favour of the draft. The pyramidal structure of
the state will be raised on the foundation of organised local 
democracies# The local democracies will be responsible for 
making individual citizens fully conscious of their sovereign 
rights and will train them for an intelligent use of the rights.
The People's Committees are to be the basic units of organised 
democracies. The Committees shall be organised in villages, 
towns and cities. The Committees will be elected each year by 
the adult population of both sexes of the respective localities; 
and the number of members who will constitute the People's 
Committees will be one-fiftieth of the total number of voters in 
the locality. The Committees have been endowed with wide powers 
and can exercise influence on similar Committees for larger areas* 
They will function as an electoral college to elect deputies of the 
Federal Assembly and the Provincial People's Council^. The 
Committees will have the right of recall of the Governor-General5
1. Roy, "An Autobiographical Statement" in S. Ray (ed.), M.N. Roy,
Philosopher-Revolutionary, p.4. ’
2. Roy, Constitution of Free Indias A Draft, p.5*
the provincial Governor and the representatives in the Provincial
People's Council and the Federal Assembly, if they fail lto act
according to the mandate1 of their constituents. They will have
the right of referendum on the legislative and executive measures
of the federal and provincial governments, and they can initiate
legislation to be considered by the Provincial People's Council
and the Federal Assembly#'1'
The 'Federal Union of India' shall consist of the British
Indian provinces delimited 'on the basis of linguistic and cultural
homogeneity* and the Princely States, with the right of secession
2of the constituent units from the Union. The central legislature
will consist of two chambers, the Federal Assembly and the' Council
of State. The Federal Assembly will be elected every four years
and will be composed of the deputies of the people of the federal
union and there shall be one deputy for every 500,000 population.
In the case of cities and towns with a larger population the
3proportion shall be one deputy for 250,000 population. The
general law-making powers have been vested in the Assembly. All
legislations enacted by the Assembly except defence, foreign affairs,
currency and communications are to be submitted for endorsement of
provincial legislatures. 'In cases of conflict between a federal
, 4
law and a provincial law, the former shall prevail.' The members 
of the Council of State will be appointed for six years by the 
provincial governments (the number of members being equal for all 
provinces). The Council will represent professional groups - 
engineers, economists, scientists, medical men, jurists, historians, 
civil servants and others engaged in the advancement of human 
knowledge in philosophy and the social sciences. This Council will
1. Roy, Constitution of Free India: A Draft, pp.14-5, 18.
2. Ibid., pp.16-7.
3. 'Ibid. , pp.18-9.
4- Ibid., pp.23-4.
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have the power of planning the development of society in all 
spheres and to guide and supervise the execution of the plans.
There shall be a 1 Planning Authority1? composed of experts in 
the state enterprises? industrial and agriculture? to be sub- 
ordinated to the Council.^- The Supreme People’s Council? the 
highest organ of state authority? will be composed of the
2Governor-General? the Council of State and the Federal Assembly.
The head of state will be known as Governor-General. The Governor” 
General will be elected directly for five years by all the people? 
men and women? who have attained the age of eighteen years. He 
will have the power to preside over all the joint sessions of both 
the chambers meeting as the Supreme People’s Council? and he can 
order dissolution of the Federal Assembly with the recommendation 
of the Prime Minister and the election of a new Assembly. The 
Governor-General has the right to dissolve the Assembly in his 
own discretion provided that a majority of the People’s Committees
3
in the Union will support dissolution. There shall be a council 
of ministers to carry on the government of the federal union. The 
Governor-General- will invite a member? known as the Prime Minister? 
to form the governments ke will select other members of the 
cabinet from the members of the Assembly. The Council of ministers 
shall in all matters be collectively responsible to the Supreme 
People’s Council and will remain in office so long as it will enjoy
A
^the latter’s confidence. The Supreme People’s Council will give
the final sanction to all legislative and executive measures of
3
the government.
The composition of the provincial governments will be the 
same as in the case of central government. The judiciary has been
1. Roy? Constitution of Free India - A Draft, pp.20-1? 31.
2• Ibid.? p. 17 •
3. Ibid.? pp.19? 22.
4. Ibid., p.25.
5. Ibid.? p .22.
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assigned the same role as in all democratic states#
Roy in his draft envisaged large-scale industries under
collective ownership and the promotion of the productivity of
labour through the introduction of modern mechanical means of
1production under state control* Certain features of his draft
might "be regarded as 1 innovations1 and were 1 repugnant to orthodox
2
constitutional theorists*1 It is difficult to see how far his
decentralised political structure can "be compatible with a ‘Planning
Authority1 and the Council of State, which are endowed with the
authority of planning the society in all fields#
In the last years of his life Roy became an exponent of
'Radical or New Humanism'* The Radical Democratic Party was
dissolved in 194-8; when it appeared that party politics was
incompatible with the philosophy of Radical Humanism* He had
himself, in October 194-7, described the shift in his outlook in
the preface to his Scientific Politics: 'Seven yeans ago, I still
spoke as an orthodox Marxist criticising deviations from, or faulty
understanding of the pure need# Nevertheless, the tendency to
look beyond Communism was already there in a germinal form# While
still speaking in terms of a class struggle, I laid emphasis on the
cohesive factor in social organisation# Already then I appreciated
Marxism as something greater than the ideology of a class# I
understood it as the positive outcome of earlier intellectual
efforts to evolve a philosophy which could harmonise the processes
of physical nature, social evolution and the will and emotions of 
» 3individual man1* In his lecture at the Indian Renaissance Institute, 
Dehradun, in May 194-8, he explained the reasons*, 'o*# 1 have never 
been an orthodox ‘Marxist# My attitude to Marxism was critical from 
the very beginning# XheJrexperience again, the attempt to solve the
1. Roy, Constitution of free India - A Draft, p#12#
2 # Ibid #, p # 9 °
3# Roy, Scientific Politics, p*viii»
Ill
problems of life with the help of Marxism, brought me to the
conclusion that Communism also was not a cure-all* I came to
the conclusion that until the intellectual, cultural, spiritual .;
atmosphere of .the country was changed;, it was not possible to bring
1
about a political and economic reconstruction of the country..,'
But Sibnarayan R$y, Joint-Editor, The Radical Humanist, sees no
basic change in Roy's philosophy* 'Roy was essentially a humanist
from the earliest period of his life of which we have any record
to the end of his days, and the philosophy which he evolved
during the last few years was the culmination of his life-long 
2pursuit,' However, Roy wanted to restate 'the Humanist,
libertarian, moralist spirit of Marxism' after freeing it from the
3fallacy of economic determinism,
Roy was deeply critical of Western democracies. His 
critique of parliamentary democracies is that they are not truly 
democratic. With the growth of the party system, the individual 
has completely disappeared from politics, either as a candidate 
for election or as voter. The idea of popular sovereignty has 
become ra constitutional f i c t i o n . T h e  majority of the people 
are 'driven like cattle to the polling stations to caste their 
votes.' The individual citizen is cut off from the business of 
government during the long periocT'*s between successive elections 
and possess few opportunities of controlling the decisions of 
government. Citizens receive no continuing education in the
5
exercise of their rights.
Politics has 'degenerated into a scramble for power1 between 
the parties. Here is his-most vehement criticism of the party systems 
'Though the party system is believed to be the essence of democracy?
1, Roy, Politics, Power and Parties, p»2,
2, S . Rffty '(e d.) , "op^ cit 77~pTB2.
3, Roy, New Humanism, p.18,
4 • Roy, Politics, Power and Parties, p . 67 <■
5. Ibid.,.p .33; S. Suri, "Prom Marxism to Radical Humanism; M.N. Roy's 
Political Evolution", in S. R&y (ed.), op.cit., pp.50-1,
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it has done more harm to democracy than anything else. It has
reduced democracy to demagogy. The most skilful demagogue is
the most successful democrat. In all p r o b a b i l i t y , those who
make the big promises may really want to do good things. But
engaged in the game of power, they must play it according to its
rules • «., Degraded to the formality of counting heads, democracy
does not bother about what is in the heads. If the heads are
empty of sense, the party getting the largest number of votes will
have the largest amount of ignorance as its s a n c t i o n * . ^  Party
politics, according to Roy, is a denial of democracy and the
surrender of popular sovereignty.
His goal was to transform democracy in its institutional
framework of legislatures and parties into a partyless democracy
in which the power would remain with the local republics, to be
wielded directly bytthe individual members of the small communities.
This 'decentralised structure* would make a more 'direct form of
2
Democracy a practical proposition.' The foundation of a
decentralised State will have been laid in local republics, which
will combine all functions of the St^te as they affect the local
life. National culture, national economy and national political
institutions will be cast on the pattern of the functions of these
local republics; power will remain with them, to be wielded
directly by the individual members of the local communities. Being
thDs reared upon a broad foundation of direct democracies, the State
3v/ill be really democratic.' Rousseau's influence on Roy is 
discernable here. R o u s s e a u ’s idea of democracy was cast in the 
mould of the city republics of ancient Greece, There democracy had 
been practised in small areas, inhabitated by not more than ten to
1. Roy, Politics, Power and P a r t i e s , p . 192.
2° I b i d . , pp.55-”6.
3. I b i d ., p.77.
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twenty thousand souls* In the eighteenth century Europe when
national states embraced large territories and vast populations,
direct democracy was evidently not possible* The solution of
the problem was found in the doctrine of representative government,
But this representative government and the party system gradually
led to the denial of democracy* In seeking a solution lo the
greatest problem of our time Hoy made use of the concept of
Rousseau in his decentralised democratic structure. But Roy was
aware that Rousseau1 s doctrine of a general will le^ td to the
totalitarian regime in France ^itself during the reign of
1
Robespierre, and subsequently^Russia and Germany*
Roy called for the replacement of politics of power by 
politics of freedom. In building any social or political 
organisation his primary consideration was the individual freedom,
A political organisation is to be judged by the actual measure of 
freedom it gives to the individual. He realised that 'A new world 
of freedom.will not result automatically from an economic reorganisa­
tion of society, Nor does freedom necessarily follow from the 
capture of political power by a party claiming to represent the 
oppressed and exploited classes ... By disregarding individual 
freedom on the pleas of taking the fullest advantage of technology, 
of efficiency and collective effort, planned economy defeats its 
own purpose Economic democracy is no more possible in the
absence of political democracy than the latter is in the absence
2of the former,1 He regarded human history as 1 the record of
3man's struggle for freedom1
Contrasted with his previous position in favour of large- 
scale industries and planning under state control, Roy in his later
1, Roy, Re&s<bn,‘ Romanticism and Revolution, vol,ii, pp.269-70.
^* R°y? New Humanism, p,39»
3, Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, vol.i, p.5*
years championed a 'co-operative economy' - a form of economy 
based on widespread decentralisation and a spirit and practice 
of co-operation. Produqtion and distribution are to be carried on 
with the sole purpose of serving human needs. The most effective 
instrument is to form consumers1 and primary producers’ co-operatives.” 
Thus alone the corrupting influences of vested interests can be 
eliminated.
Roy's 'New Humanism* was not to be confined to the
boundaries of any state. As he wrote: 'New Humanism is cosmopolitan.
A cosmopolitan commonwealth of spiritually free men will not be
limited by the boundaries of national States* - capitalist * fascist,
socialist, communist, or of any other kind, - which will gradually
disappear under the impact of the twentieth century Renaissance 
2of Man.' The contemporary crisis of modern civilisation could 
be resolved only by rA brotherhood of men attracted by the 
adventure of ideas, keenly conscious of the turge for freedom, fired 
with the vision of a free society of freemen, and motivated by the
will to remake the world, so as to restore the individual in his
3position of primacy and dignity.'
Almost ixx Gandhi an terms, Roy stated that 'Without moral men,
4there can be no moral society.' The conduct of public affairs,
therefore, should be in charge of 'spiritually free individuals'
5accountable 'to their respective conscience.1 His'emphasis upon
6 * 7
'spiritually emancipated moral men'; 'detached individuals',
reminds one of the Platonic conoept of 'philosopher-ruler'. In
order to bring about 'a philosophical revolution' and 'a mental
revolution'^ among the young intellectuals of India, he established
1. Roy, New Humanism, p.69.
2. Roy, Reason,. .Romanticism and Revolution, .vol.ii, p.310.
3. Ibid.
4. Roy, Politics, Power and Parties, p.41 *
5. Roy, Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, vol.ii, p.279.
6. Ibid., p.310.
7• Ibid., p.81.
8. Roy, Politics, Power and Parties, p.197.
the Indian Renaissance Institute? Lehradun? on the pattern of
PlatoTs Academy, As Roy himself observed: The future of
democracy in our country depends on people who are either outside
politics today? or who will have the courage and vision to step
out of the indecent scramble* They will have to act in a manner
which may not attract the ’’practical Politicians,n They may have
1to plough a lone furrow for some time o'
Jayaprakash Narayan
Jayaprakash Narayan began his political career as a
Marxist, While * he was studying in the United States of America
in 1922-1929? Jayaprakash came in close contact with some communist
students? avidly read the classics of Marxism and became a Marxist,
M.N, Royrs pungent writings exercised a profound influence on him.
The thrilling success of the great Lenin seemed to establish beyond
2doubt the supremacy of the Marxian way to revolution. This process
was reinforced by the mode of life in the U.S.A* Coming from the
lower middle class he hardly received any help from his family. He
had to work as an ordinary worker in field and factory to earn his
living and to bear the expenses of university education. The wide
study of communist literature persuaded him to believe that G-andhi
was against the social revolution and would at a moment of crisis
3hasten to uphold the system of exploitation and inequality. Thus 
it was as a Marxist that Jayaprakash returned to India in 1929 and came 
into close contact with Gandhi and Nehru and resumed his place in the 
nationalist movement. Towards the end of 1929 he differed with the 
Indian communists and their brand of Marxism because they were only 
following the policy laid down by the Third Communist International
1* Roy? Politics, Power and Parties? p«195.
2. J.P. Narayan? From Socialism to Sarvodaya? p.10. 
3• Ibid.? p .11.
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which by then had come completely under the leadership of Stalin.
In his opinion? the Comintern had been following since 1928 a
mistaken policy which had resulted in the division of the working
class and socialist movements throughout the world and in the
isolation of the communists from the nationalist movements in all
the colonial countries. This was contrary to Marxist theory
generally and specifically to the famouse colonial policy
enunciated by Lenin. The differences with the CPI thus marked
the beginning of his ideological alienation from Soviet Communism.^
2
In 1934- he? along with other non-Communist Marxists, formed the 
Congress Socialist Party so that the social policy of the Congress 
might become more definitely socialist and the fight for 
independence itself might be conducted in a more revolutionary 
manner. The decision to follow an independent line of activity 
did not mean, however, the lessening of faith in Marxism. Rather, 
the founders of the.CSP were convinced that they alone were 
applying Marxism correctly to the Indian situation and the 
Communists were wrong. A CSP-CPI alliance was formed in view of 
a change in communist tactics in India in 1934, following a new 
directive from the Comintern. According to the new line Congress 
was noU longer to be boycotted by the CPI but supported as an anti­
imperialist national front. The membership of the CSP was opened to 
the communists and some of them held important positions in the 
organisation. But the communists were infiltrating 'into the CSP 
with the ultimate objective of destroying it. Consequently, the 
idea of a united Socialist-Communist Party was abandoned, and in 
1940 the communists were expelled from the CSP. J a y a p r a k a s h 1s 
experiences with the CPI convinced him that there could*not be any
1. Narayan, Prom Socialism to Sar v o d a y a , p.13.
2. Achyut Patwardhan, Asholc Mehta, M.R. Masani andYUsuf Meherally.
unity with an rofficial’ Communist Party. , Certain events in
Russia particularly the trials of renowned Russian communist
leaders powerfully influenced his thinking. Communistss whei'ever
in power, had invariably established a dictatorship and the end
justified the means as the basis of political action. He saw in the
Soviet experiment not only a denial of ’formal* freedom, but also
denial of social justice, of equality and the growth of a new class
of bureaucratic rulers, of new forms of exploitation. All these
events and experiences prompted him to re-examine the basic
p o s t u l a t e s  of Marxism. But yet he did not completely abandon
Marxism. He designated his new philosophy as ’democratic socialism’.
1
This phase began as early as 1940, and continued till 1952. During
the years 1940-46, he thought in terms of a mass revolution and
was imprisoned several times for taking part in revolutionary
activities. He pleaded for the setting up of units of 'Revolutionary
2
G o v ernment’ with ’their own police and milit i a . ’ He had drawn his 
own picture of a socialist India where both economic and political 
democracy would prevail. ’In this democracy’ , he emphasised, ’man 
will neither be slave to capitalism nor to a party or the State.
Man will be f r ee', He pointed out that there could be 'no room 
"for dogmatism or fundamentalism in Marxist t hought’. The socialist 
movement, in India must evolve its own socialism in the light of 
Marxist thought, of contemporary world history, and objective?
4
conditions prevailing in India and its historical background.
He advocated the peaceful democratic method to achieve socialism 
because the violent method and dictatorship had been tried in Russia 
and ’it has led to something very different, i.e. to la: bureaucratic
1. Narayan, From Socialism to Sarvodaya, pp.15-9? 22; B. P r a s a d ’s
’’Introduction” in Narayan, Socialism, S a r v o d a y a .and D e m o c r a c y , 
pp.xi,^siv.
2. N a r a y a n Towards St r u g g l e , p . 21.
3. Narayan, Socialism, Sarvodaya. and Democracy, , pI4Q.
4* Ibid., p.41*
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State, in which democracy does not e xist1. ’I should like to take 
a lesson from h i s t o r y , 1 he said.1 In 1947 the CSP assumed its new 
name, the Socialist Party, and decided to break away from the Congress 
and function as an independent party so as to A c c u s t o m  the people 
to the idea that to be opposed to the Congress is not to be opposed 
to the nation, but rather to be opposed to certain policies and 
methods of government and to advocate alternative policies ... to
2
attempt by democratic methods to replace it as the party in p o w e r . 1
The-recent world events and happenings in India (particularly the
Hindu-Muslim riots and the assasination of Gandhi) convinced
Jayaprakash that * nothing but good means will enable us to reach
3
the goal of a good society, which is socialism1. 'The experience
of totalitaritarran countries', he observed, 'whether fascist or
communist, has shown that if the State is looked upon as the sole
agent of social reconstruction, we get nothing but a regimented
society in which the State is all-powerful and popular initiative
is extinct and the individual is made a cog in a vast unhuman
machine. Such a society is not.,the objective of our Party; nor
could a society of this nature ever be an intermediate stage in the
4
evolution of the democratic socialist society that is our a i m ' •
His Questioning and re-thinking was gradually bringing him nearer to 
Gandhi. Writing in 1951, he himself explained the shift in his 
outlook: 'For many years I have worshipped at the shrine of the 
goddess - Dialectical Materialism - which seemed to me intellectually 
more satisfying than any other philosophy. But while the main quest 
of philosophy remains unsatisfied, it has become patent to me that 
m a t e r i a l i s m . of any sort 3?obs man of the means to become truly human. 
In a material civilisation man has no rational incentive to be good.
1. Narayan, Socialism, Sarvodaya and D e m o c r a c y , p . 531.
2. I b i d . , p . 58.
3. I b i d ., p . 60
4. I b i d ., p .$1.
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It may be that in the kingdom of dialectical materialism fear
makes men conform and the Party takes the place.of God. But when that
God himself turns vicious, to he vicious becomes a universal code'.'*'
He found that the main concern of the democratic.socialists was with
the capture of power. Decentralisation, he believed, could not be
effected by handing down power from above to people, because
p e o p l e 1s capacity to govern themselves had been frustrated by the
party system and the concentration of power at the tope. The
2process must be started from the bottom. He wrote: 'The party
V.
system with the corroding and corrupting struggle for power inherent
in it, disturbed me more and more. I saw how parties backed by
finance, organisation and the means of propaganda could impose
themselves on the people; how people's rule became in effect
party rule; how party rule in turn became the rule of a caucus or
3
coterie; how democracy was reduced to mere casting of votes
In order to remove the defects of the party system he 'toyed for
some time with the idea of a co-operative, rather than a competitive
4system of parties.'. He gave up the idea because 'the experiment
could not succeed within the given framework of struggle for power
and the system o f  parliamentary democracy*• But still he believed
'that given the psychological climate for it, such a political
5
experiment might yet be made,1 The disillusionment with democratic 
socialism and parliamentary democracy led him to seek a better 
substitute and this he found in the Gandhian principle of rpeople's 
self-rule'. His final break with Marxism came in 1952. In 1954, he 
offered himself as a J e e v a n d a n i , that, is, to withdraw from party and 
power politics and to devote his life to the bhoodan and sarvodaya 
movement, two of the ke y  concepts in modern Indian political thought,^
1* - Narayan, Socialism, Sarvodaya and D e m o cracy;, p . 98.
2. Narayan, From Socialism to Sarvodaya. p*35*
3* I b i d ., pp . 34-5.
4o Ibid., p . 36.
5» I b i d .
6. Ho ’Tinker, India and P a k i s t a n , p . 57*
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In 1957, he formally resigned from the Praja.Socialist Party which
was born in 1952 out of the merger of the Socialist Party and the
K i s a n .Majdoor Praja Party, The process of travelling from Marxism
to democratic socialism and then to Sarvodaya reflected the changes
in the political thinking of Jayaprakash, Unless socialism was
transformed into S a r vodaya, the socialist goals of freedom, equality,
brotherhood and peace could not be attained, S a r v o d a y a ;means *a
society which would strive for the good of a l l 1 and would create and
develop forms of socialist living through the. voluntary endeavour of
the people rather than seek to establish"'socialism by the coercive
power of the state - lokniti (politics of the people).as distinct
from ra,jniti (politics of the state). He explained that he had
decided to"withdraw from party and power politics because politics
could not deliver the goods. This alternative to politics had
already been shwwn by ©hndhi. G-andhi proposed that the Congress
should withdraw from the field of politics and turn itself into
2
what he called a hok Sevak S a n g h .
like Roy, Jayaprakash is a pungent critic of parliamentary
democracy. In parliamentary democracy of the twentieth century, he
finds an 'inherent tendency towards centralism.1 ’At one extreme
of its political spectrum is the national state and at the other the
individual voter, with a blank in betwe e n . 1 The local bodies have
little self-government powers and no direct or indirect influence on
the national state, ’The issue of power in such state is decided not
by the fictitiousstpeoplen but by a balance betwean political parties
and such organized interests as industrialists and bankers and
powerful labour unions. The people represents a wholeness, while
3
the organised .interests are sectional,’ . He discards that political
- 1, Narayan, A Picture of Sarvodaya Social O r d e r , p,51*
2. Narayan, from Socialism to Sarvodaya, p p . 32-3,
3* Narayan, A Plea for Reconstruction of Indian P o l i t y , pp . 67-8.
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system which bases government on a sum,of individual voters. ’The
State cannot be an arithmatic sum,of individuals. The people, the
nation, the community can never be equated with the sum of
1
individual v o t e r s . ’ He recognises, however, that there has been
a substantial measure of local self-government in the mature
democracies , of the West, but still the central governmentjis all-
powerful, ’government and decision-making do remain the privilege
of the few. Except in Switzerland and perhaps the Scandinavian
countries. Western democracy is little more than government by 
2
consent•' He observes: the Western concept of democracy
as government by consent ... is not an adequate enough concept, and
that we should profit from the experience of the West and try to
move forward towards a more adequate democracy. The next step
beyond government by consent is p e o p l e ’s participation in government,
3
or a participating democracy.1 He regards parliamentary democracy
as ‘something foreign to India* and ‘implanted from outside*. In
India 90 per cent of the people do not understand this system at 
4all. By merely creating formal institutions, such as adult franchise, 
party system and parliament, parliamentary democracy cannot be 
developed in India. He says: ‘It is not only through the 
representative assemblies and elected governments that democracy 
works but in an equally true sense through the voluntary associations 
and actions of the citizens which they carry on and establish to deal
5
with their problems, promote their interests and manage their affairs.* 
He asks: *... could we not find something more Indian, something more 
suited to the soil, some system which the people themselves could 
understand, which had come out of their hearts, which would not be 
so foreign,to them? Are we wedded to this one system of parliamentary
1. . Narayn, A Plea for Reconstruction of .Indian P o l i t y , py63.
2. Narayan, Socialism, Sarvodaya and D e m o c r a c y , p p . 245-4.
5. I b i d .
4. Narayan, Towards a New S o c i e t y , pp.86-7.
5. Narayan, A Plea for Reconstruction of Indian Polity, p p . l 9 - X .
democracy so much so that even our minds must refuse to think of
an alternative?^
In his A Plea ..for Reconstruction .of Indian p o l i t y , a draft
published in 1959 for private circulation, Jayaprakash has given
serious thought to the problem of reshaping the Indian political
system and pleads for the replacement of the parliamentary system,
by a new kind of polity, more akin to I n d i a ’s tradition and
consistent ,with the true nature of man and community. This he calls
’communitarian’ and ’participating1 democracy. The issue before
India, he s&ys, ’is a much more comprehensive one, namely, that of
the nature ,of polity most suitable for us at this juncture. Further-,
it is also necessary to remember that polity, whatever Its nature,
does not function in a vacuum, but has to fit into the larger
social entity and subserve the larger social purpose.' In Marxian
terms, he describes his polity as the ’most sui t e d ’ for India and
'most rational and scientific' and ’would be in the line v/ith the
3
natural course of social evolution.' He acknowledges that he has
4
been ’influenced a great d e a l 1 by G-andhi's ideas and there is also
§
the influence of Hoy on the evolution of his thought, Jayaprakash,
of course, looks further than Gandhi in setting the village v/ithin
a broader framework. He likes to build up his ’communitarian society’
from what he terms the 'primary' or 'regional community’ ; an
association of neighbouring villages, communities or townships. The
internal administration of the primary or regional community shall
be autonomous. Regional communities will form a district community.
The district communities will federate together to form the
provincial community, and they in turn will come together to form
6
the national community. Jayaprakash, like his .predecessors,
Gandhi and Roy, has visualised a w.orld community, based on that
1. Narayan, Towards a New S o c i e t y , p.89.
2. -Narayan, A Plea for Reconstruction of Indian P o l i t y , p.iii.
3. I b i d ., pp.iii-iv.
4. I b i d ., p . i i i .
5. Narayan, Socialism, Sarvodaya and D e m o c r a c y , p . 240.
6. Narayan, A Plea for Reconstruction of,Indian Polity, pp.54-8.
’unity of s pirit1, as Tagore has called it, which makes the entire
human race one single nation, in spite of differences of colour,
1
creed or religion. -
The villagers will choose a council, the gram s a bha, for
their primary community ’by general agreement or by drawing l o t s ’ .
Contested elections along party lines are to be avoided. The
political structure will rise storey by storey from the foundation.
This council will send representatives to the district community,
and the district community in turn will send representatives to'the
national community. The village and nation are linked together
through these intermediary bodies* All adult members can participate
at the village level, and indirectly all are involved at theehigher
levels* This method of choosing representatives discards the
Western principle of ’one man, one vote'. The executive functions
at each level will be entrusted to small committees. The committees
will have a chairman and a secretary. There will be an over-all
supervisory and co-ordinating body, known as co-ordinating committee,
consisting of the representatives from each committee, and its
decision will be binding on all committees. Each community can
legislate in their own allotted spheres. There will be no post
of ministers, Chief Ministers or Prime Minister at the provincial
or national level. Government will be conducted by committees
assisted by paid preferably honorary civil servants. His solution
to the problem of bureaucracy is direct self-government of the
people, general control and direct supervision over the civil servants
2
to be exercised by the people and their elected governments..
Jayaprakash hopes to replace the centralisation of political 
power and authority by decentralisation and minimising the vast 
responsibilities of the central government in the economic and social
1. , Narayan, A Plea for Reconstruction of India P o l i t y , pp9§4*“See also
Narayan, Three Basic Problems .of Free India .--w
2. Narayan, A Plea for Reconstruction of Indian Polity, pp.§4-6H, 85-107.
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fields. '... As we proceed from the inner to the outer circles
of communal life and organisation, there is less and less to do
for the outer community; so that, when we reach the circle of
the National Community it has only a few matters to attend to,
such as defence, foreign relations, currency, interprovincial
co-ordination and legislation.1 At present the Indian planning
1 does not.begin with the village and the region and go upwards,
2
but from the centre, going downwards.1 This process is to be
reversed. 1 Planning would begin from the primary community and
there3£'rom ^an outwards. In our scheme of things the regional
plan, i.e., the plan of the regional community, would be the
pivotal plan. This would mean that the regional plan - and not
the village plan, which would be too small for the purpose - would
be the unit out of which the whole national plan have to be 
3constructed*. Gandhi was generally against industrialisation,
whereas Jayaprakash tries to make a balance of agriculture and
industry in his planning, which he terms 'agro-industrial'.. The
4
full use of science and technology will be made.
Like Gandhi and Roy, Jayaprakash also believes in the urgent 
necessity to bring morality back into politics. 'The problem of
5
democracy', he says, 'is basically, and above all, a moral p r o b l e m * *'
Rut Jayaprakash emphasises more the sociological aspect of re-creating
the human community rather than its political aspect. 'The problem
of present day civilization is social integration. Man is alone and
bored, he is "organization man", he is man ordered about and
manipulated by forces beyond his ken and control - irrespective of
whether it is "democracy" or dictatorship. The problem is to put
man,in touch with man, so that they may live together in meaningful,
1 , . .Narayan,.A P l e a ,for.Reconstruction.o f .Indian.Polity, p . 58.
2« .I b i d ,, p .91.
3. Ibid., p . 77.
4. I b i d ., -p.55.
5. I b i d ., p . 3.
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understandables controlled relationships. In short, the problem 
is to re-create.the human,community.f^  The.achievement of this 
ideal society, he recognises, would be *a colossal task1 and 
would require the services of dedicated wo,rlcers., over a number 
of years to accomplish it - a task of ’moral regeneration1 and
2
’social engineering1, and not a political function of the state.
Jaraprakash1s political system is not by any-means original.
C.R. Das and Bhagwan has pleaded for this pattern in their Outline
Scheme of S w a r a j , published in 1923. One authority finds in his
ideas a close resemblance to those of Salvador de Madariaga, the
Spanish political philosopher, expressed in his he L’angoisse a La
hiberte*, published in 1953, and subsequently published in English
3
under the title Democracy Versus Liberty in 1958. But in
developing his ideas, in the words of Professor Morris-Jones, 
Jayaprakash ’represents a real and Indian point of v i e w , 1  ^ The 
stress on political decision-making by unanimity and consensus 
rather than by debate and division, eschewing the pursuit of power, 
focus of political life to be shifted from the national parliament 
to the village, the village community as the. principal organ of 
government, the inner transformation of man and society, not 
merely a change in institutional arrangements, are some of the 
ideas which are rooted in the Indian soil, Ja y a p r a k a s h ’s thinking 
has been dismissed as visionary and utopian. With India increasingly 
committed to heavy industrialisation, planning and centralisation, 
it would indeed be a gigantic task to dismantle the present 
centralised structure and to build afresh grass-roots democratic 
institutions based on the democratic tradition of the so-called 
ancient republics. His goal of'partyless democracy may arouse
1. Narayan, A Plea for Reconstruction of Indian P o l i t y , p,49*
2. Ibid., pp . 4,107.
3. Tinker, op. c i t ., p . 194 f.n,
4. W.H. Morris-Jones, The Ooyernmeht and Politics of India, p . 216,
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interest in the academic world, hut in the realm of practical
politics the ideal is difficult to realise, as he and his hand
of dedicated workers will have to resort to authoritarian methods
to do away with the party system*
All-, these Indian political thinkers (excepting, of
c ourse, Suhhas . Chandra Bose) advocate decentralisation., of political
power and authority, a society in which there are,no political
partie-s and where change will he brought about ..by activity in
villages and factories without governmental intervention. These
anti-power feelings are in large part the product of certain
Indian values, such as the gospel of renunciation, sacrifice, and
1
detachment from this world. G-andhi, Roy and Jayaprakash place 
emphasis on the participation of the people in the decision-making 
process of government; not democracy at the top hut democracy to he 
fashioned from below and to he broad-based and pyramid-like, Roy 
(an atheist and a Westernised man rather than basically Indian) 
stresses the political aspect, whereas Gandhi and Jayaprakash 
stress t h e „sociological aspect and may be regarded as basically 
Indian. Jayaprakash^political philosophy Is based on the notions 
of people, nation and community rather than the individual. Gandhi, 
Roy and Jayaprakash have visualised a world community which makes 
the entire humanity one single nation, irrespective of colour, crsed 
or religion*
The Muslim political t h i n k e r s ,reject wholesale the concept 
of 1majority rule' which in the Indian context mean the tyranny of 
the Hindu majority. Until 1940, the Muslim thinkers thought in terms 
of safeguarding Muslim interests within the framework of a united 
India, -Ultimately, they formulated the demand for a separate nation­
state. Abul Ala Mandudi thought differently: he opposed the creation
1. M. Weiner, nStruggle against Power: Notes on Indian Political 
Behaviour” , World P o l i t i c s , April.1956, p . 595*
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of a nation-state on the ground that Islam and nationalism were 
incompatible with each other. His solution was the establishment 
of an Islamic state, comprehending all the lands inhabited by the 
faithful. But with the creation of Pakistan he came to modify his 
views .and ,left ,India for the new state, Pakistan, where he believed 
that *the Islamic ideology could be realised within the body-politic 
of Pakistan. .
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CHAPTER V
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN INDIA
The Indian Constituent Assembly as originally
conceived was not a statutory body; its composition and
functions being defined in a statement of 16 May 1946, by
the British Cabinet Mission* The Assembly was to consist
of 389 members, representing both British IndiEj, and the
Princely States, on the scale, roughly, of one member per
million of population and it was to frame a constitution for
a Union of India, embracing all the provinces and states, but,
at the Union level, dealing only with foreign affairs, defence,
and communications. The elections to the Assembly were held
in July 1946 by indirect election. Members were elected by
communal groups in the provincial assemblies on a system of
proportional representation, under the terms of the 1935 Act
which conferred the franchise on approximately 11 per cent
of the total population# In a House consisting of 296 members
representing the provincas, the Congress had the strength of
206 (202 General, 3 Muslims, 1 Sikh), Muslim League - 74
(Muslims), Independent - 8 (7 General, 1 Muslim), Unionist
Party - 3 (2 General, 1 Muslim), Akali Party - 3 (Sikhs),
Communist - 1 (General), Scheduled Castes Pederation - 1# The
Congress could count upon the support of 212 members-, while in
1addition 6 members were likely to follow the Congress# Thus 
the Assembly was dominated by the Congress. On this basis the 
Assembly held its first sitting on 9 December 1946. The Muslim
1# A.C. Banerjee, The Constituent Assembly of India, pp.xxix, 
46-7, 350.
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league members refused to attend the sessions as they were
not satisfied with the Congress interpretation of the 1 grouping1
provision of the Cabinet Mission plan. Prom the very beginning
various difficulties arose which ultimately led to the passing
by the British Parliament of the Indian Independence Act. This
Act, which came into force on 15 August 1947, changed the entire
basis of the Assembly1s work* It partitioned India into two
independent Dominions - India and Pakistan - and made a
corresponding division of the Constituent Assembly, the members
representing the Pakistan areas being formed into a separate
Constituent Assembly for the Dominion of Pakistan while remaining
members formed the Constituent Assembly for the Dominion of India#
Each of the Assemblies was, in effect, given power to frame such
a constitution as it thought fit for its own territory. Each
thus became a statutory body invested with plenary powers by an
Act. of British Parliament which necessarily superseded the
Cabinet Mission*s statement of May 1946. The Act also provided
for adaptation of the Government of India Act, 1935, by way of
providing a provisional constitution for each Dominion pending
the completion of the work of its Constituent Assembly.^ We
are here concerned with the work of the Constituent Assembly of
India* In constitution-making, as in so many other matters, India
was more fortunate than Pakistan because she inherited much of
the former central government- and did not have to establish de novo
2either a national capital or a national government. Nevertheless, 
the leaders of the new Indian state were confronted with some basic 
problems in connection with constitution-making*
The most important problems may be listed as follows:
What would be the nature of the new Indian state? How far would, 
it incorporate some of the iideas and institutions of ancient India,
1. B.N. Rau, !,The Indian Constitution", India Quarterly, October-
December 1949, p. 291*
2. H. Purber, "Constitution-Making in India1,1 Par Eastern Survey,
April 20, 1949, p.86*
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and to what extent would it he modelled on the British and 
Western principles of democracy? How far would it embody 
G-andhian ideas? What type of government would be .created?
Would it be a presidential type of government as prevalent 
in the U.S.A. or the parliamentary system based on the British 
model or the Swiss composite executive? What would be the 
position of religious minorities? What would be the nature 
of the Indian federation? Would it have a strong centre of 
a weak centre? Should India have one or more languages as 
the official language?
The first task faced by the framers of the constitution 
was with regard to the type of government to be created. When 
the Constituent Assembly first met on 9 December 1946, the 
provisional Chairman, Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha, invited the 
attention of the members to some aspects of the question of 
constitution-making in Europe (especially Switzerland and France) 
and America. Explaining the significance of the.Constituent 
Assembly, he said:' !This political method of devising a 
constitution for a country has not been known to .... Britain, 
for the simple reason, that under the British Constitution, there 
is no such thing as a constituent law, it being a cherished 
privilege of the British Parliament, as the sole sovereign 
authority, to make and unmake all laws, including the 
constitutional law of the country. As such, we have to look to 
countries other than Britain to be able to form a correct
estimate of the position of the Constituent Assembly. He went
on, !... the present constitutional system of Switzerland has 
several notable and instructive .features#•• and I have no doubt
that this great Assembly will study carefully the Swiss
Constitution, and try to utilize it to the best advantage in the 
interest of preparing a suitable constitution for a free and 
independent India ... [and] pay in the course of your work
greater attention to the provisions of the American Constitution
1than to those of any other.‘ Moving the Objectives Resolution
in December 1946, Nehru emphatically declared that new India
would be a democracy but he at the same time pointed out that
India was ‘not going just to copy a certain democratic
procedure or an institution of a so-called democratic country.
We may improve upon it. In any event whatever system of
Government we may establish here must fit in with the temper of
2our people and be acceptable to them.’ In the Objectives
Resolution there was no mention of the panehayat♦ In the
debate on the resolution^virtually no single voice was heard as
regard this omission of the panchayat system of government*
Members mentioned about democracy and socialism, but not of the
necessity for indigenous institutions* Some people were
surprised by the omission of any reference to socialism, Nehru
himself seemed embarrassed by this omission, but.he wanted this
Resolution not tb be controversial in regard to such matters*
Perhaps Patel was opposed to its inclusion* Others viewed it as
an indication of the extent to which Nehru was prepared to
compromise as an inducement to the League. Both pressures were
probably at work. Congress unity was essential in this period
of crisis, and there was still hope of reconciliation with the 
3League. Further debate on the Objectives Resolution was 
postponed until mid-January 1947 in an effort to placate the 
League, When the Constituent Assembly reconvened on 20 January 
it was clear that the League did not intend to lift the boycott. 
Hence the Assembly proceeded to pass the Objectives Resolution 
unanimously (passed on 22 January 1947)*
PAIDi vol. i, pp.3-4*
2. Ibid., p .60
3. M, Brecher, Nehru; A Political Biography, p.330.
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The" Report of the Provincial Constitution Committee 
envisaged the cabinet system of government* !A Gandhian
1
constitution seems not to have been given a moments thought,1
Introducing the report in the Assembly in July 1947, Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel, stated; lFoth these Commit tee s^t-hef^fUnion
Constitution Committee and the Provincial Constitution
Committee - appointed in April 1947] met and they came to the
conclusion that it would suit the conditions of this country
better to adopt the parliamentary system of constitution with
which we are familiar *.* The Provincial Constitution Committee
has accordingly suggested that this constitution shall be a
2parliamentary type of Cabinet.1 The report also provided for 
an elected Governor on the basis of adult suffrage* In the 
course of the debate, the Muslim league members spoke against 
the introduction of the cabinet system of government* They 
were all unanimous in their opinion that the British system of 
democracy would not suit India. They advocated a fixed-term 
executive on the Swiss model, elected by the legislature on a 
system of proportional representation. *It would be a dangerous 
experiment1, said A*A. Khan, Tto think of planting English 
system of democracy, where party affiliations are based 
exclusively on political principles.1 It was absurd.to think 
that in India the religious groups would disappear and parties 
would be formed on political and economic principles. In view 
of the existence of various religious groups and sectional 
interests in India, he suggested that an elected coalition 
government on the Swiss and Austrian pattern could enjoy the
1. G. Austin, The Indian Constitution: Gornerstone of a Nation, p.3l
2. PAID, vol*iv, p.580.
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confidence of every party in the cabinet* The introduction
of the British system, in his view, had caused much strife in
India. Begum Aizaz Rasul did not want to repeat in India
what was happening in France. In order to secure a strong and
stable government it was necessary that the ministry Should
not be subject to the whims and fancies of the party or
legislature to which it is responsible.1 Only an irremovable
executive elected by the legislature for a certain period could
2'initiate long-range policies*1 The parliamentary system
was not a democratic system, said another member. !The model
3
that ought to be before us is the model of the Swiss GovernmentT * 
The previous experience in local bodies led Khaliquzzaman to 
conclude that it would be better to have an irremovable executive, 
otherwise, with the change of slogans there may be a change of 
Ministry1• Therefore, a provision should be included in the 
constitution to safeguard the ministers 'against these shifting
. 4parties and predilections of the groups in the legislatures.
The framers of the constitution replied that the Muslim
proposals would lead to the fragmentation of political life and
result in disunited and coalition ministeries of the French type.
K.M. Munshi stated: 'The mechanism of responsible government which
we have ... been following to a large extent in this country is
the British model, and a departure of this kind will weaken the
ministry to a large extend and the provincial legislature will
5be nothing else but a fragmented house ....' N.V. Gadgil 
drghdd that the Swiss system instead of securing a strong and
1. CAIB, vol. iv, p.633.
2* Ibid., pp.635-6,
3. Ibid., p.643.
4. Ibid., p.650.
5. Ibid., p.652.
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stable, government would result in a weak government. fIn the
absence of collective responsibility there will neither be
continuity nor consistency in administration*1 The parliamentary
system presupposed that there must be at least two major parties
and 'the Leader of the House must have the confidence of that party
1which is in the majority in the House*1 Seth G-ovind Las explained
that the system of responsible government prevalent in other countraae
indicated that Responsible government cannot function unless
there is joint responsibility. And thetfe cannot be joint
responsibility until and unless the Premier chooses his 
2
colleagues.1 The British system of parliamentary democracy
could not be held responsible for the conditions prevailing in
India because the system had not yet been put in operation in
India. Lr. Sitaramayya called for fa new angle of vision1.
With the adoption of joint electorates, he hoped, the political
parties would be organised on a new basis* G-overnment would
represent all the religious communities - Muslims, Christians 
4and Parsees.
The Muslim members put forward the earlier argument 
when the Report of the Union Constitution Committee was presented 
on 21 July, 1947* K.S* Karimuddin pointed out that the communal 
tension and disruptive forces in India would justify an'
5irremovable executive independent of the. votes of the legislature. 
Mahboob Ali Beg observed that t&e parliamentary democracy 
obtaining in England was not really democratic. rIn the first 
place, parliament does not choose the ministers; in the second 
place, the electorate cannot turn them out*1
PAID, yoliolv, p,640.
2* Ibid., p.657.
3* Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.647.
5. Ibid., pp.909
6. Ibid., p.919
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At some of the earlier sessions of the Constituent
Assembly, when the main principles of the new constitution were
being laid down, there was a substantial body of opinion in
favour of the American presidential system and this found
expression in certain decisions of the Assembly, not only as
to the mode of election of the head of the federation and of
the heads of the constituent states, but also, to some extent,
as to the relations between the heads of the states and their 
1ministers. During the debate on the Union Constitution Committee,
some members proposed that the President should be elected by
adult franchise, that the word 1Rashtrapati' should be substituted
by the word 1Neta' or *Karandhar1 and that the President should
2
be elected alternately from ti&e North and South India. Nehru
said; 1 ... We want to emphasize the minsterial character of
the Government, that power really resided in the Ministry and
in the legislature and not in the President as such. At the
same time we did not want to make the President just a mere
figure-head like the French President. We did not give him any
real power but we have made his position one of great authority
and dignity.1 On the question of electing the President by
adult suffrage, Nehru observed that the adoption of the American
system would !prevent the development of any ministerial form
of Government and we shall waste tremendous amount of time and 
%
energy,1
While there was a general agreement that there should be 
a parliamentary system of government, the drafting of the con­
stitution was handed to a Drafting Committee (formed 29 August 
194-7) under the chairmanship of Dr. Ambedkar. The-committee
1. B.N. Rau, H The Indian Constitution'1, India Quarterly, October-
December, 1949 > p.299; India1 s Condiitution in the Making, p.316,
2. CAID, vol,iv, pp.818-846.
3# Ibid., p.734.
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worked on the original draft prepared by B:*N. Rau, the 
Constitutional Adviser. Rau brought to bear on His task a 
detailed knowledge of constitutions of other countries and 
an extensive knowledge of the conditions of India as well as 
his own administrative experience. The draft of India1s 
Constitution was released to the public on 26 February 1948*
The draft consisted primarily of the committee^ borrowed and 
modified provisions of the British and American Constitutions 
and the Government of India Act, 1935* The word panchayat did 
not once appear in the draft. Even the minutes of meetings of 
the committee shows that the committee members showed no interest 
in a Gandhian constitution,^ Introducing the draft constitution 
in the Assembly in November 1948, Dr. Ambedkar explained the 
reasons why the framers of the Indian Constitution had discarded 
the American model after providing for the election of the 
President by an electoral college formed by members of the State 
legislatures and the .Union parliament. (In the Draft Constitution 
there is placed at the head of the Indian Union a functionary who 
is called the President of the Union. But beyond identity of 
names, there is nothing in common between the form of government 
prevalent in America and the form of Government proposed under 
the Draft Constitution. The American form of Government is 
called the Presidential system of Government. What the Draft 
Constitution proposes is the Parliamentary system .... The 
President occupies the same position as the King under the English 
Constitution. He is the head of the State but not of the 
Executive. He represents the Nation but does not rule the Nation. 
His .place in the administration is that ;of a ceremonial device.
The President of the United States is not bound to accept any
1. Austin, op. cit., p.34 -f.n.
advice tendered to him by any of his Secretaries. The
President of the Indian Union will be generally bound by
the advice of his Ministers ... The President of the United
States can dismiss any Secretary at any time. The President
of the Indian Union has no power to do so, so long as his
Ministers command a majority in Parliament ... The daily
assessment of responsibility which is not available under the
American system is, it is felt, far more effective than the
periodic assessment and far more n£dessary ihsa country like
India.1'*' He emphasised that a democratic executive must
satisfy two conditions: first, it must be a stable executive
and, second, it must be a responsible executive. It was not
possible to devise a system which could ensure both in equal
degree. The draft constitution in recommending the parliamentary
system of executive, had preferred more responsibility to more 
2stability. Dr. Ambedkar rejected the proposals for fvillage
republics' with contempt. He declared: 'The love of the
intellectual Indians for the village community is of course
infinite if not pathetic...I hold that these village republics
have been the ruination of India*.* What is the village but a
sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and
communalism? I am glad that the~ Draft Constitution has discarded
3the village and adopted the individual as its unit.1 ' This 
omission of the village panchayat system in the draft constitution 
produced reaction among the Assembly members who submitted 
amendments to the draft advocating the establishment of panchayats. 
Many members had doubts about the suitability of adult franchise"
1* CAID, vol.vii, pp.32-3.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p*39.
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in India due to illiteracy. The alternative to adult 
suffrage was some kind of indirect election based upon 
village communities and constituting them into electoral 
colleges. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the President of the 
Constituent Assembly, suggested the principle of adult 
suffrage at the village panchayat level and a system of 
indirect election for both the central and provincial 
legislatures. The question was referred to B.N.' Rau for 
his advice. Rau explained the difficulties involved in such 
a plan at the present stage and pointed out that the present
i
world trend was strongly towards direct election. M.A.
Ayyangar said in the Assembly: 'Left to myself, I would
have.preferred that the village ought to have been made the
unit, and panchayats must have been formed on adult suffrage
with local councils etc., and elections must have been
indirect. But we have chosen, in keeping with the times,
adult suffrage for this country.' The introduction of adult
suffrage was, indeed, a departure from the past, 'thus
raising the electorate at a stroke from thirty to a hundred
3and seventy-five millions.' But under increasing pressure
from the Gandhian section of the Congress Party the Assembly
leaders agreed that an article concerning panchayats should
appear in the Directive Principles. The Assembly adopted an
official amendment moved by K. Santhanam on November 22, 1948,^
and thus Article 40 came into the constitution which reads:
'The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and
endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary
1. B.N. Rau, India's Constitution in the Making, p.351.
2* PAID, voi.xi, pp663.
3. P. Spear, India, Pakistan and the West, p.215.
4. See CAID, vol.vii, pp.520,527.
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to enable them to function as units of self-government.1
The draft constitution envisaged an elected Governor. 
But some members of the committee were strongly in favour of 
appointment by the President because they felt that the co­
existence of a Governor elected by the people and a Chief
Minister responsible to the legislature might lead to friction
1and consequent weakness in administration. It was decided
in the Assembly that the Governors should be nominated by the
central government. In the words of Nehru, !We should always
view things from the context of preserving the unity, the
stability and the security of India* and should ’not take any
step which might tend towards loosening the fabric of India.1
The nominated Governors, it was hoped, would reduce the dangers
of provincialism and communalism and it would avoid wasteful
spending of time, energy and money which another election would 
2
entail. . While others like,Professor S.B. Saksena held the
view that the Governor should not be a mere figurehead and
his dignity and prestige could only be enhanced if he was
3
elected by the people.
The Muslim members of the Assembly opposed the
adoption of the parliamentary system, arguing that it proved a
failure before independence. K.S. Karimuddin emphasised that
suppression of political opposition and the absence of properly
working conventions and discipline were a danger to stability,
which could be better ensured by the introduction of the
presidential form of government together with strict separation
of powers and with an executive.fairly independent of 
4legislature. Mahboob Ali Beg stated: ’It is common knowledge
1. Draft Constitution of India, pp.vii, 57 f.n.
2. CAID, vol.viii, pp.'455-6.
3• Ibid., p.450•
4. CAID, vol.vii, pp.964-5*
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and from experience also we-have found - that the responsible
executive under which we have been working for the last two
decades has pointedly brought to our attention the fact that
a removable parliamentary executive is at the mercy of hostile
groups in their own party .... It is so unstable .,. always in
fear of being turned out by no-confidence motions* The
ministers have always been very careful to datisfy the various
elements in their party in all their legitimate and illegitimate 
1demands.' This school of political thought advocated therefore
a President elected directly by the people and not by an
electoral college, a cabinet responsible to the President and
not to the legislature, and real executive power vested in the
President. Not only the Muslim members, but some of the Hindu
members also, became sceptical about the parliamentary system.
They insisted on a strong presidential system of government.
Ramnarayan Singh said: 'We do not want Governors and even
Ministers ... I say emphatically that the constitution is
not what is wanted by the country... This parliamentary
system of government must go... Both in the Centre and in the
provinces*we must have all-powerful Presidents .*• who will
choose their ministers or secretaries... It is better to be
ruled by devils than by an army of ministers and secretaries,
2
etc.' He desired that the party system ought to be abolished.
3
'The party system is fatal to democracy.' Brajeshwar Prasad 
was perhaps the most vigorous exponent of the presidential 
system. He wanted all provincial and state governments abolished 
and all executive, legislative, judicial and financial powers
1* CAID, vol.vii, p.295* 
2? Ibid., p.249.
3* OAID» vol.iv, p.057
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vested in a President, assisted by four advisers. Like Plato,
he advocated the rule by a philosopher-king which he considered
to be !the best system of government* appropriate to India.
He referred to the traditions and achievements of ancient Indian
rulers, the Khalifas of Islam and the modern dictators, like
Hitler, Mussolini, Kemal Ataturk and Stalin, as * worthy of
e m u l a t i o n . L i k e  Hobbes, he said that * the will of man is
2nasty, brutish and short.1 rThe representation of the real
will of the people, as distinct from actual will, is the core
of democracy... The rule of the dictator is essentially
democratic, if he stands for the greatest good „of greatest
3 that the Assembly should adopt‘a special provision ‘
number.1 Professor K.T. Shah, proposing a motion/embodying
the doctrine of separation of powers, stated that the British
system was evolved in conformity with the genius of the British
people, not so much by a written constitution, as by evolving
constitutional conventions, supported by centuries of usage.
If the judiciary was not completely separated from the executive
and legislative organs then the undue influence might be exercised
over the judges by both the organs. He cited the example of
America where the separation between the executive and the
legislature had worked satisfactorily for over a hundred and
fifty.years. ,The American founding . fathers had before them the
model of the English Constitution but they had decided to devise
a constitution which kept completely apart the legislature, the
4
executive and the judiciary.
1. CAID, ..vol.vii, pp.372^3*
2. CAID, vol.xi, p.877.
3. CAID, vol.vii, p.373*
4. Ibid., pp.959^60, 962.
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At an earlier stage, the Union Constitution Committee
decided (with one or two dissident voices), that the central
government should he based on the British model and that the
American model was to be rejected for two valid reasons* The
two issues that came before the House and the several committees
were these: what would make for the strongest executive
consistently with a democratic constitutional structure and the
second issue was, which was the form of exe^itive best suited to
1
the Indian situation. The Assembly had already discussed the
question and had taken a decision in favour of parliamentary
government and on the basis of that decision, the entire
constitution was drafted by the Drafting Committee,
In reply, Dr* Ambedkar pointed out to the critics of the
parliamentary system that many Americans were themselves quite
dissatisfied with the rigid separation of powers. In view ofhthe
complications and phenomenal increase .in the (work ,of parliament,
the. members,of the legislature were required, to 1 receive direct
guidance and initiative from the members of the Executive,
2
sitting in Parliament.1 K, Santhanam remarked that the complete 
separation of powers in the American Constitution was a ’myth1# 
Even there the executive and the legislature were found to be at 
loggerheads. India could not afford, he added, to waste time 
in such conflicts at its formative period of economic
3
reconstruction. -*An infant democracy’, said A.K..Ayyar,
1 cannot afford, under modern conditions, to take the risk of a
perpetual cleavage, feud or conflict or threatened conflict
4between the Legislature and the Executive#1 K#M. Munshi
1# See the speech of K.M. Munshi, CAID, vol.vii, p,984.
2. Ibid., p,968.
3. Ibid., pp.966-7.
4. Ibid., p,985.
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asked.1,.* During the last several generations .*• public
men in India, have looked up to the British model as the
best. For the last thirty or forty years, some kind of
responsibility has been introduced in the governance of this
country. Our Constitutional traditions have become
parliamentary... After this experience why should we go back
upon the tradition that has been built for over 100 years,
and try a novel experiment ••. framed 150 years ago and which
1has been found wanting even in America?’ In reply to
Professor K.T. Shah, K.M. Munshi advanced the reasons why the
American system was not found acceptable* He said: ’It must
not be forgotten that the American Constitution was made long
ago in the 18th Century. The makers were then guided by
Montesquieu1 s interpretation of the British Constitution
that there was separation of powers in England. They thought
that they were transplanting Montesquieu’s analysis into a
constitutional structure* The powers that were given to the
President in the Constitution of America were based on what is
now held on all accounts to be a misreading of the British
2
Constitution in the 18th century,1
So;these reasons influenced the Assembly as well as 
the various committees, in adopting the cabinet system of 
government in preference to the presidential type. The 
constitution has vested the executive power of the Union- in 
the President’and contains a number of provisions specifying 
his powers in detail. There shall be a council of ministers to 
aid and advise the President in the discharge of hissfunctions 
butvdoes not.make .the advice.binding* According to C.H*
1. CAID, vol. vii, pp.984-5*
2. Ibid., p.984.
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Alexandrowicz, these provisions by themselves might defeat
the purpose and operation of cabinet government which in fact
prevails in India. Thus it must be assumed that in spite of
an elaborate written constitution, important constitutional
matters have been left to conventions which convert the
President1s position to that of nominal head of the executive*
Hbefurther maintains that no clear-cut distinction between
a real and nominal head of state can be drawn in India, and
that future Presidents may find inspiration and legal backing
in the provisions of the constitution to establish themselves
in the position of real head of the executive, somewhat
1
similar to those of South American Presidents. Professor
Alan Gledhill has postulated such a- President, who could
successfully conceal his ambition to establish an authoritarian
2system of government without violating the constitution* fIt
is conceivable, however1, comments another writer, ! that an
Indian De Gaulle might some day make use of~ the emergency
powers entrusted to the President under the Constitution to
3make Parliament subservient to the Executive,1 although it
was in part due to the feared misuse of executive power that
the Assembly adopted cabinet government instead of the fixed 
4executive* The working of the constitution during the period 
1950-56 clearly indicated, however, that the President was, in 
practice, only the ceremonial head of state. Fortunately for 
India there was during this period a stable government at the 
centre, one that always enjoyed the confidence of parliament.
It cannot be assumed that such a happy position will necessarily
1. C.H. Alexandrowica, Constitutional Developments in India, pp*l,
2. edhill, The Republic of India, p.121.
3. V;M. Dean, New Patterns of Democracy in India, p.85*
4. Austin, op.cit., p.127*
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last forever* In 1951, President Rajendra Prasad threatened
to use his power of veto unless the Hindu Gode Bill (which was
introduced in parliament by Nehru) was withdrawn. Consequently
1the bill was long delayed,-
Gandhian section^ of the Congress Party deplored the
whole constitution as a betrayal of Gandhian ideals. Prom
outside the Assembly, the Education Minister of Uttar Pradesh,
Sampurnanand, declared: !... Our Constitution is a miserable
failure. The spirit of Indian culture has not breathed on it;;
the Gandhism by which we swear so vehemently at home and abroad,
does not inspire it. It is just a piece of legislation like,
2say, the Motor Vehicles Act.’ V/ithin the Assembly, one member 
regarded it as ’a slavish imitation of - nay, much more, - a 
slavish surrender to the West,* Shankarrao Deo said: TIt was 
a political revolution which we have tried to embody in this 
Constitution. But as far as social or economic conceptions of 
Mahatma Gandhi’s ideology of life are concerned we must admit 
that we have to travel far before we can say that we are
anything, near to them ,,, The Constitution naturally reflects
. 4 ,the status quo.1 Lakshminarayan Sahu emphasised that ’in
framing the constitution we have deviated from the (^Indian!
ideals •*• The ideals on which the Draft Constitution is
framed have no manifest relation to the fundamental spirit of
India... After all what is there in the,Constitution to be
proud of? Damodar Swarup Seth found no ’mention of villages’
in the constitution. He suggested that the constitution of India
should be based on ’local self-government and should be Ta
6Union of small autonomous republics.1 . He went on: ’This
1, H. Tinker, India and Pakistan, p.121.
2, Address to University Convocation, Agra, November 19, 1949?;
quoted by Jaspat Roy Kapoor, CAID, vol.xi, p.760,
3, CAID, vol.vii, p.242; Lokanath Misra.
4, CAID, vol.xi, pp.730-2.
5, Ibid., pp.613-4*
6* CAID, vol.vii, p.212.
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Constitution as a whole, instead of being evolved from our
life and reared from the bottom upwards is being imported from
1outside and built from above downwards.1 This was quite 
contrary to what Gandhi stood for. ’Mathatma Gandhi advocated
ou.t
decentralisation through/his life. It is surprising that we
have forgotten that lesson, so soon after his departure, and are
now giving undue powers to the President and the Central 
2
Government*1 K. Hanumanthaiya stressed the same point: TThe
first and foremost advice which he [Gandhi] gave ••* was that
the constitutional structure of this country ought to be
broad-based and pyramid-like. It should be built from the
bottom and should taper right up to the top. What has been done
is just the reverse.* fOur country and our society1, said
Ramnarayan Singh, ’does not need a government ... We need in
our country Sevak Mandals, Societies of Servants and not a 
4
government.1 . Professor W.G. Ranga urged the need for
decentralisation as centralisation might lead to a totalitarian
state. ’We as Congressmen are committed to decentralisation •••
If we want on the other hand centralisation . that would only
5lead to Sovietisation and totalitarianism and not democracy,’
He looked forward to the day when it would be possible for 
India ’to achieve a co-operative Commonwealth; as Bapu was good 
enough to call it through the Kisan-MazdoorQbuddhijeebi-Kalakar raj*f 
Mahavir Tyagi characterised Western democracy as ra hoax and a 
fiction.’ He deplored that he could * see nothing Gandhian in this 
Constitution.’? While others like T. Prakasam considered the
1. CAID, vol.vii, p.212.
2. CAIP, vol.xi, p.696.
3* Ibid., p.616-7.
4. Ibid., p.640.
5. CAIP, vol.vii, p.350.
6* OAIP> vol.xi, p.630.
7. CAID, vol.vii, pp.360, 1223*
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establishment of village republics as the only possible way
1 tto contain Communism. H.V. Kamath desired that Indians
political institutions should reflect her own political and
historic past. As the specific answer to centralisation he,
like other speakers, urged the need for panchayat raj. He
added:; !A time will arrive when India is stabilized and strong,
and I hope we will then go back to the old plan of the Panchayat
Ra,j . or decentralised democracy, with village units^self-sufficient
in food, clothing and shelter and interdependent as regards other
matters. I hope we will later go back to that Panchayat Ra,i ♦
Sir, to my mind the only system that will save India and the
2world and is what I may call spiritual communism..,1
The Assembly1 s alternative to a G-andhian constitution 
was ,a constitution based on the British model. The Assembly1^  
decision to give India a parliamentary constitution took two and 
a half years from the first meeting of the Congress Experts 
Committee on the Constituent Assembly, held in July 1946, to the 
debate on the draft constitution in November 1948 - when panchayats 
were relegated to the Directive Principles and indirect election 
was buried away. G-. Austin in his recent book, The Indian 
Constitution: Cornerstone of a Natioh (p.32) argues that the 
length of time spent in arriving at this decision did not mean 
that . there was a genuine contest between the<two .major alternatives* 
Although most Assembly members favoured the development of village 
life, including greatly increased responsibility for village 
panchayats, few Assembly members could finally bring themselves 
to support a full-fledged system of indirect, decentralised 
government. He concludes that India would have a centralised
CAID9 vol.vii, p.522.
2. CAID, vol*xi, p.690.
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parliamentary government was nearly certain from the start , 
and increasingly during the lifetime of the Assembly the 
compulsion of events made that choice even more certain*
The decision to create a state on the principles of parliamentary 
democracy, in the words of K.M. Panikkar, 'lie in the traditional 
conservatism of the [Indian ] middle classes who were unwilling 
to try new experiments.1 Nevertheless, some of the G-andhian 
ideas were incorporated "in the Directive Principles. Article 40 
enjoins the state 'to organise village panchayats and endow them 
with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them 
to function as units of self-government.1 Most State governments 
had enacted legislation to implement this provision, giving legal 
status to panchayats, and parliament had passed a series of Acts 
designed to promote the panchayat system. But till 1956 most 
of the panchayats were not working satisfactorily. The Balvantray 
Mehta team in their report of 1957 stated that 'the available 
information indicates that possibly not more than 10 per cent 
of the total number of panchayats are functioning effectively', 
because 'the number of panchayats which are torn by factions or in 
which squabbles are rampant is large. In fact in some States 
they are in a majority ... Panchayat elections have resulted in 
creating or aggravating factional rivalries in about one-third of
p
the villages in which there was a contest*' Professor Tinker 
has come to the conclusion that*in general, the panchayat 
experiment has shown the same discouraging refusal to "get off the 
ground" as before independence,' Article 45 asks the state 
'to promote cottage industries ••* in rural ares.' Since 1950 
the cottage industries have not received encouraging support from
1. K.M. Panikkar, The Foundations of New India, p.171*
2. Quoted in Norman D. Palmer, The Indian Political System, p.153;
II. Tinker, India and Pakistan, p,191.
3. H. Tinker, "Authority and Community in Village India",
Pacific Affairs, December 1959, p.361.
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the Union and State Governments in view of the vast programme
of industrialisation undertaken under the auspices of the
Planning Commission. Article 47 directs the state to 'endeavour
to bring about prohibition' of intoxicating drinks and drugs.
In four States*Andhra, Bombay, Madras and Saurashtra,this
provision has been implemented and in nine States there is
1partial prohibition. Article 48 enjoins the state to take 
steps for 'prohibiting the slaughter of cows' and in four States, 
Uttar Pradesh, Madhya?Pradesh, Rajasthan and Bihar*slaughter 
has been forbidden by legislation.
Prom this analysis it appears that Austin overstates 
the parliamentary character of the constitution.
The next important task which confronted the framers 
of the Indian Constitution was the question of communal 
minorities. The principal minority communities which were 
involved in the constitutional debates on safeguards were the 
Muslims, the Scheduled Castes, the Sikhs,.the Indian Christians, 
the Anglo-Indians, and the Parsees. In the decades before 
independence, the British held the minorities problem to be 
the main stumbling block to a constitutional settlement in India.
To the Muslim League it was their raison d'etre, whereas to the 
Congress, it was an issue which was entirely a British creation, 
which would be satisfactorily solved as soon as India achieved 
freedom. Therefore, the Congress all along ignored the 
communal problem and repudiated all forms of separate representation 
for the minorities. The British attempted to solve this problem 
by gradually incorporating a series of safeguards in the 
constitutional system, which included separate electorates,
1. Assam, Madhy/a Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya 
Bharat, Mysore, Travancore-CochiU, Himachal Pradesh. This 
account is of 1954-55 period before the States reorganisation. 
See Report of the Prohibition Enquiry Committee, 1954-55, p.17.
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weightage, reservation of posts in the public services, and the
1
convention of minority representation in the provincial cabinets*
The Muslim demand for Pakistan having been conceded, it became
easier for the Indian constitution-makers to overcome this
problem of minority safeguards with the need to mollify the
Muslims removed. Still, India had numerous minorities within
her.borders including a substantial section of the.Muslim
community. The dilemma which the framers,of the Indian
Constitution was confronted with may be expressed in the words
of Sir iDvor Jennings: ‘To compromise with communal claims may be
the height of statesmanship because it enables the majority to
secure the support of the minorities. To recognise communal
claims, on the other hand, is to strengthen communalism. The
2Constituent Assembly has decided to ignore communalism.1
While the main principles of the constitution were 
being worked out by the Union and Provincial Constitution 
Committees and the Union Powers Committee, the task relating to 
minority rights and safeguards was handed over to an Advisory 
Committee.' The Report of the Advisory Committee on the subject 
of Minority Rights was introduced in the Assembly in August 1947* 
The committee 'by an overwhelming majority' proposed that the 
system of separate electorates be abolished. It recommended 
that all elections to the central and provincial1 legislatures 
should be held on the basis of joint electorates with reservation 
of seats for the different recognised minorities^ Muslims, 
Scheduled Castes and Indian Christians, the latter only so far 
as the central and the provincial legislatures of Madras and
1. Ralph Ii. Retzlaff, "The Problem of Communal Minorities in the
Drafting of the Indian Constitution" JViR.N. Spann (ed#), 
Constitutionalism in Asia, pp.56-7. .{
2. Sir. I. Jennings, Some Characteristics,of the Indian
Constitution, p.65.
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Bombay were concerned," 011 a population basis* initially for a
period of 10 years^with the right to contest general seats as
well,' The report was opposed to weightage for any minority
community. The question of separate electorates was of 1 crucial
importance1 not only to the minorities but to the political
life of India as a whole. ’This system’, it was recognised,
’has in the past sharpened communal differences to a dangerous
extent and has proved one of the main stumbling blocks to the
1development' of a healthy national life.’ The proposals that
were made by some members of the committee that there should
be a constitutional provision for the representation of
minorities in cabinets and the statutory guarantee of
representation in the public services were considered by the
committee as ’a dangerous innovation.* But it was agreed that
there should be a general exhortation in the constitution or in
the schedule asking the central and provincial governments ’to
keep in view the claims of all the minorities in making
appointments to public services consistently with the efficiency
2of administration.’ The Advisory Committee’s report claimed
that the recommendations^’where they were not unanimous, were
taken by very large majorities composed substantially of members
3
belonging to minority communities themselves.’ The Muslim 
representative from South India, B. locker, proposed an 
amendment which was also supported by Khaliquzzaman, the leader 
of the Muslim league Party in the Assembly, for introducing
1. Constituent Assembly, Reports of Committees (Second Series),
1948, p.30.
2. Ibid., p.33*
3. I b i d.f p *30* '
separate electorates. The representatives of the Scheduled
Castes, the Anglo-Indians, the Indian Christians and the
Parsees welcomed the report, -The Scheduled Gastes representatives
1wanted statutory reservation of posts in cabinets* The
report was accepted by the Assembly during August 1947? and had
been embodied in Part XIV of the draft constitution. The
proposals of the Advisory Committee were incomplete in so far
as the East Punjab and West Bengal were concerned, because at
that time 1 the effect of partition was not felt or known*1
At a later stage in December 1947 a sub-committee was appointed
to consider this question. This committee made its report to
the Advisory Committee in February 1948. The Sikh representatives
wanted time to consider the report and consult their own community
on the matter* Some of the Muslim representatives lhad changed
their opinions.1 ’They put forward the plea that all these
2reservations must disappear.1 By late 1948, some members of 
the Advisory Committee felt that, conditions having vastly 
changed since the committee made its recommendations in August 
19479 it was no longer desirable in the new context that there 
should be reservation of seats for minorities. 'Although the 
abolition of separate electorates had removed much of the poison 
from the body politic1, the reservation of seats for minorities, 
it v/as felt, would lead to 'separatism1 and,was .'contrary to the 
conception of a secular democratic state.1 Dr. H.C, Mookerjee, 
Tajamul Husain, L.K. Maitra and certain other members had given 
notices of resolutions to this effect. V.I. Muniswami Pillai, 
the .Scheduled Castes representative, moved „an amendment to these
1. See CAID, vol. vi, nos.8 and 9*
2. CAID9 vol.viii, p.270.
5. Constituent Assembly, Reports of Committees.(^hird Series), 
1950, p.241.
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resolutions seeking to safeguard the Scheduled .Castes. .
Accordingly, the Advisory'Committee in its meeting ,of May 1949,
Twith one dissenting voice1, passed the resolution as amended
by Pillai: 1 That the system of reservation for minorities other
than Scheduled Castes in Legislatures be abolished.1 . The
reservation of seats was also extended to certain classes of
Sikhs in East Punjab who were included in the list of Scheduled 
1
Castes. When the report was debated in the Assembly in May
1949, the Muslim League members from South India, such as B.
Pocker and Mohamed Ismail, with Muhammad Saadullah of Assam,
insisted on separate electorates and reservation of seats.
Pocker said, 1 When this reservation goes, the only chance of
the minorities having their representation in the legislature 
2
also goes.1 . Mohamed Ismail charged that the Muslim members 
who had agreed to the abolition of reservation had no
3
Representative character.1 Saadullah revealed that out of 4 
Muslim representatives present at the meeting of the Advisory 
Committee only one supported the resolution in favour of 
abolition of reservation, of seats, there was one opponent and 
the other two (including Maulana Azad) remained neutral. As 
’Ralph H. Retzlaff observes: !The effect of the fragmentation 
within the Muslim and Sikh communities played a decisive role 
in enabling the committee to adopt the resolution calling for 
the abolition of reservation.*
1. Constituent Assembly, Reports of Committees (Third Series),
1950, p.241.
2. PAID, vol.viii, p.274.
3. Ibid.,. p. 277..
4. Ibid.., p.304.
5. Ralph H. Retzlaff, op.cit., p.71.
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The Muslim representatives from West Bengal, Bihar and
U.P. agreed to the proposals embodied in the report and placed
their trust in the good will of the majority community, hoping
that the political parties in the future would not ignore the
minorities, especially Muslims, Thus, Naziruddin Ahmad opposed
reservation of seats: 1 jteservation would be really harmful to the
Muslims themselves* and ’to the entire body politic,* He
strongly advocated that ’religion should have nothing to do with
politics,,. Religion is a private matter ... Whether in this
Assembly or in public life outside, we are neither Hindus nor
Muslims.*^ Muhammad Ismail Khan believed that ‘reservation of
2seats would only keep alive communalism.* Begum Aizaz Rasul
held that 1 in a secular st^te separate electorates have no 
3place.1 . , Tajamul.Husain said that the parliamentary system
was inconsistent with reservation of seats. He added: fWe
desire neither reservation nor separate electorates. We want
to merge in the nation,.., We are Indians first and we are 
4Indians last.’ Tajamul Husain deniedf the allegation made by
Setadullah. He demonstrated from his own statistics that the
majority of the Muslim members of the Assembly were in favour
of joint electorates. Out of -fee 23 Muslim members on the roll
of the Constituent Assembly, 4 were in favour of separate
electorates, 4 for reservation of seats, 1 for cumulative voting,
5
13 for joint electorates and 1 unknown. Hasrat Mohani stated:
*If we are to establish a true democratic state, then there is
6no room for any religious or communal parties.* fSardar Patel 
on the final day of the debate on minority rights made a bitter
1. , .CAID, jvol.viii, pp.296-7,
2. Ibid., p.323.
3. Ibid,, p.300.
4. Ibid.,, p.333-
5. Ibid. , p.337.
6. Ibid., p.341.
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reply to those who insisted on separate electorates. TThere
1is no place here for those who claim separate representation#1
He appealed to the minorities that ’in the changed
conditions of this country it is in the interest of all to
lay down real and genuine foundations of a secular State,
then nothing is better for the minorities than to trust the
good sense and sense of fairness of the majority, and to
2place confidence in them#1
Earlier in the debate on the draft constitution some
of the spokesmen of the minority communities advocated the
system of proportional representation so that the minorities
who would he elected could truly represent their community#
K#S. ,Karimuddin feared that the representatives who would be
elected under joint electorates with reservation of seats
would not be the representatives of the minorities for whom
the reservation was given and this would create permanent
statutory minorities in the country. The proportional
representation by single transferable vote, he believed,
would protect the rights of the minorities- ’the only
democratic system known in Europe for the protection of
Political and Communal minorities.1 He pleaded for the
adoption of a non-parliamentary executive which could protect
as
the interests of minorities as well^was not liable to be
3
removed by their supporters. Z.H. Lari referred.to Ireland,
Belgium and Switzerland where the system was working
4satisfactorily. Hussain Imam stated that ’the d&Uger of 
reducing India to a Fascist state1 could only be avoided by
1. .CKID,.vol.viii, p.350*
2* Ibid., p#272#
5* CAID, vol.vii, p.243.
4. Ibid., p.299; vol.viii,pp.282-7.
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1
adopting the system of proportional representation* The
adoption of proportional representation was also supported
by the Sikh representative, Sardar Hukam,Singh,and a Hindu
member, Professor K.T. Shah. According to Sardar Hukam Singh,
the communalism implicit in the system of separate ..electorates
and reservation of seats could be avoided by proportional
2representation, whereas Professor K.T. Shah advocated the 
system not so much to perpetuate communal minorities but to 
represent the various shades of political groups in the
3
legislature* Outside the Assembly, D.R. Gadgil made a plea
for the system of proportional representation. The system of
representation on the English mode], he said, was not suitable
for India* In his view, proportional representation 1 would allow
for a.proper representation of the. numerous types,of minorities
that,exist in India - religious minorities, social minorities,
linguistic minorities, political minorities, das's ..or occupational
4minorities and others.1 But this solution did not commend
itself to the Congress Party in the Constituent Assembly which
obviously believed in strong party government. Nehru could
’think of nothing more conducive to creating a feeble ginisirynb
and a feeble government than this business of electing them by
5proportional representation.1 Election of ministers by 
proportional"representation, - said Sardar Patel, ’cuts.at the 
very root of democracy1 and ’contrary to the whole framework of 
this constitution.’ While Ambedkar replied that this 
complicated system would involve literacy on a large scale and 
would not be suited to the form of government which the
1* .CAIP,;vol.vii, p.303*
2* Ifrid., p.1250.
3. Ibid., p.1238. -
4* D.R. Gadgil, Some Observations,on the Draft Constitution, p*92.
5. PAID, vol.iv, p.915*
6. Ibid., p.654.
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constitution laid down* He argued that the 1 proportional
representation is really taking away "by the back-door what
has already been granted to the minorities*1^  Thus the
system of proportional representation involving multi-member
constituencies was rejected and the system of majority voting
based on single member constituencies was adopted for elections
to the lower house of parliament and to provincial legislative
assemblies* The principle of proportional representation was
accepted in the matter of election to the upper house of
parliament. Jennings commented: *•*• The effect of a system
of single-member constituencies is invariably to give a
preference to the prevailing majority •*• In Asia there is
grave danger that voting will be on communal lines and
accordingly that communal minorities will be inadequately
represented* Ceylon guarded against this problem in its
Constitution, while India apparently believed it to be 
2unimportant*1
In the general elections held in 1952, under the 
electoral system in force, the success of the smaller parties 
was limited to certain regions only and none of them could be 
expected to achieve national status. Of the two main opposition 
parties, the Socialist Party contested seats on an all-India 
basis, whereas the Communist' Party adopted a technique of 
regional concentration in contesting seats* The policy of the 
Socialist Party led to under-representation of the party in the 
iok Sabha, while the Communist Party secured half the number of 
votes obtained by the Socialists but got twice as many seats. The 
Socialist approach would have been an‘appropriate method of
CAID, vol.vii, p,1261-3*
2. Jennings, op* cit*, p.29.
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obtaining immediate results under the system of proportional
representation which helps minority parties to secure adequate
representation in multi-member constituencies all over the 
1country.r
So far as the Muslims were concerned, in the 1952
elections, in terms of population the Muslims could have
expected about 49 seats, but they secured only 28 out of
2
489 elected seats in the Lok Sabha. In the State Assemblies 
(excluding Jajwmu and Kashmir) out of a total of 5283 seats, the
3
Muslims secured only 171* In the Rajya Sabha, Muslims secured
more than proportionate representation winning 24 out of 200
seats, likewise in the States where upper houses exist, Muslims
4were generally better represented* However, this inadequate 
political representation might be ascribed to other factors.
First,the volume of Muslim participation in politics has been 
smaller in the post-partition years. Second, there has been 
’the erosion of leadership at various levels and the inability 
of the Muslims, due to a variety of reasons, to adjust themselves 
to the growing modernization of and structural changes in Indian
5
society.1
When the Constituent Assembly met in December 1946, 
expections were still fixed on a loosely federated united India 
on the American model because of the suspicion and fear of the 
Muslims of a strong Hindu-dominated centre. The terms of 
reference of the constitution-makers were defined in a Resolution 
on Aims and Objects, moved by Nehru, of which para 3 states:
’... the said territories (British India and the Princely States)
1. Alexandrowica, op. cit. , pp.209-10.
2, Sisir K. G-upta, "Moslems in Indian Politics’^ India Quarterly,
October-December 1962, p.371*
3* Ibid., p.373*
4. Ibid., p.378.
5. Ibid., p.362.
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shall possess and retain the status of autonomous Units,
together with residuary powers, and exercise all powers and
functions of government and administration, save and except
such powers and functions as are vested in or assigned to the 
1Union,. ..* Even at this stage, Ur, Ambedkar called for *a
strong united Centre, much stronger than the Centre we had
2created under the G-overnment of India Act of 1935 ■*.
severe limitation on the scope of central authority in the
Cabinet Mission’s plan was a compromise in order to accommodate
the Muslim League, The partition was a settled-fact by June
1947, The members of the Union Powers Committee (of which Nehru
was Chairman) were unanimously of the view that it would be
injurious to the interests of the country to provide for a weak
central authority which would be incapable of ensuring peace,
of co-ordinating vital matters of common concern and of speaking
effectively for the whole country in the international sphere*
fWe have,,, come to the conclusion ... which was also reached
by the Union Constitution Committee - that the soundest framework
3for our constitution is a federation, with a strong centre.1
The emphasis was shifted to the need for a strong centre
symbolising national unity. This, was revealed in the speech
of K.M. Munshi: * We ... feel free to form a federation of our
own choice — .a federation with a centre as strong..as we can make
4it. ... We have now a homogeneous country....1 . , N.G-. Ayyangar, 
introducing the Report of the Union Powers Committee, said: fThe 
Committee came to the conclusion that we should make the Centre 
in this country as strong as possible consistent with leaving a
1, CAID, vol.i, p,57,
2• Ibid., p.99•
3. Constituent Assembly, Reports of Committees.. (Plrst Series), 
1947, p.66.
4* CAID, vol.iv, pp.544-5,
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fairly wide range of subjects to the Provinces in which they
would have the utfriost freedom to order things as they liked,
The members of the Committee also thought that the residuary powers
2should remain with the centre. During the Assembly debate on 
the report voices were raised against a strong centre. Professor 
Morris-Jones has written that the 1919 and the 1955 Acts 
* introduced on to the stage the provincial politician* and had 
given him an opportunity to appreciate the scope and importance 
of government at the provincial level* *It was unlikely that these 
men, when they came to form a significant proportion of the 
members of the Constituent Assembly in 194S-49,would alow much
'Z
talk of a'purely unitary constitution,* K. Santhanam spoke
bitterly and very vehemently about the powers that were proposed
to be given to the centre, *1 do not want Efiy,.constitution
in which the Unit has to go to the Centre and say *1 cannot
educate my people; I cannot-give sanitation; ,give ,me a dole for
the improvement of roads, for industries, for primary education?*
The distribution of powers as adopted in the Union Powers Committee
Report, he held, would result in a situation in which * all the
provinces would revolt against the centre* within three years.^
Ram Narayan Singh desired that the primary units of government
should be established in villages. The greatest measure of
power should *>est viipage republics and then in the provinces
and then in the centre. But he still wanted that the centre
should be made strong but residuary powers must \fest in the 
5provinces.
1, CAID, .vol.v, p. 39*..
2, Constituent Assembly, Reports of Committees (ffirst Series-), p.67*
3, W*H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in .India, p. 17*
4* CAID, .vol.v, p*57,
5. Ibid,, pp.92-3*
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The circumstances prevailed preceding and accompanying 
partition necessitated that only a strong government could 
survive the.communal troubles, accomplish the administrative 
tasks created by partition and the transfer of power, and 
resettle the refugees. Only with centralised co-ordination 
and control could the food crisis be solved and the economy 
of the country saved from disaster. Only a strong central 
government could deal with the problem of the Princely States, 
few of which had any semblance of representative government 
or effective administration or seemed inclined to co-operate 
with the new government. There was also the fear that provincial 
governments might not be able to bear the strains of their new 
responsibilities, particularly in regard to the maintenance of 
lav/ and order and the food crisis, Above all, if the back­
wardness of India in industry, technological skill, agricultural 
production and the numerous other economic factors which rendered 
her ineffective, were to be remedied and the crucial .problem of 
transforming her from an under-developed area into a great modern 
nation solved, by raising the standard of living, of health, of 
education and of general welfare, then the planning for all this 
had to be under a central direction unhampered by the statutory 
rights of provincial governments. The prolonged legal battles 
in the U.S.A, Australia and Canada on these issues had convinced 
the fathers of the Indian Constitution that wisdom lay in altering 
the balance in favour of the central government and entrusting the 
provinces only with such powers as would not hamper the policy
1
of the centre in matters of general interest to the whole of India. 
These events were combined with the task of framing the 
constitution and largely affected the outlook oijfoembers. A strong
1. Austin, op.cit., pp.190-1; K.M. Panikkar, op.cit., p.155.
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central government became a matter of urgent necessity. 'But
the strengthening of the central authority}.-observes Dr. Spear,
'was no departure in principle but ratherva fresh ,emphasis on a
1principle always stressed by the British.14 -
The Drafting Committee, following the language of the
Preamble to the British North America's Act, *1867,-adopted the
term.'Union* instead of 'Federation1 on the ground that it would*
not be inappropriate to describe India as a Union, although the
2constitution might be federal in structure. According to Dr.
Ambedkar, the word was .used to indicate two things?(a) that the
Indian federation was not the result of an agreement by the States
and (b) that no State would have the right to secede from it.
Dr. Ambedkar explained that 'All federal systems including the
American are placed in a tight mould of federalismfi. . . It
cannot be unitary. On the other.hand the Draft Constitution can
be both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements
4of time and circumstances.' The classic theory of federalism
would hold nh good in the context of India. The present world
tendency was towards 'centralization of Powers'. One had to
consider the 'progressive increase in the power of the National
G-overnment' in America, which notwithstanding, the very limited
powers given to it by the constitution, had outgrown its former
5self and had overshadowed and eclipsed the State governments.
In order to counteract centrifugal and fissiparous ■ tendencies^ 
said another member, India required a sthong central government.
1. Spear, op. cit., p.215* *
2. Draft Constitution of India, p.2.f.n .
5* CAID, vol.vii, p.43*
4. Ibid., p.34.
5* Ibid., p .42; vol.xi, p.951? T.T. Krishnamachari.
6* Ibid. , p.247; L.IC. Maitra.
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Federalism would lead to the 1 vivisection of the country.1 1 It
t
is suicidal to divide powers into federal, concurrent and
provincial. Any such division of powers will weaken the hands
1
of the nation on all fronts.1 Political cohesion, said S.C.
MaoumdaVp 1 presupposed & strong unifying Central authority.1
’The time has now come to curb the bias in favour.of the so-called
2"provincial autonomy11 which arose from historical . causes. 1
■ •■'V f
Some members criticised the inroads into provincial autonomy,,that
in some matters unnecessary provisions have been introduced,
making it appear as if the Provincial Autonomy under this
Constitution is much less than even under the Government of
3India Act of 1935#1 K.S. Karimuddin observed: ’Provincial 
autonomy is only a sham institution* If the opposition 
party is elected in some of the Provinces and the Centre does not 
want them.to continue under any pretext, under any of the
4
provisions of the law, the Constitution can be suspended.1
K* Hanurnanthaiya pointed out the centralised character of the
constitution. - 1 The draft as it stands ... is rather too much
over-Gentralised. It practically makes the Indian Union a
' Unitary State and not a Federal State ... They [the framers] have
given too much legislative and financial powers to the Centre,
and have treated the provinces and States as though they were mere
5districts of a grovince.1 Sampurnanand also" criticyed this 
feature. ’The attempt at centralisation of all power is hardly 
veiled and provincial governments have been sought to be reduced
g
to the position of agents of the Centre.1 The emergency 
provisions especially came under heavy fire. Many members
1. iCAID,.vol.vii, p.371; Brajeshwar Prasad.
2. Ibid., p.377#
3* CAID, vol.xi, p.718; K. Santhanam.
4. Ibid., p.725#
5. CAID, tvol.vii,p.559*
6* CAID, vol.xi; quotedy(J.R. Kapoor.
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criticised that the provisions were 1 far too.sweeping' and
1 . 2 reduced provincial autonomy to a farce1 .and ra .sham institution.1
Article 277A of the draft constitution which later became Article
355 of the constitution laid down that it was the duty of the
Union to protect every province from external aggression and
internal,disturbance, and to ensure that government in the
provinces was carried on according to constitution. . H.V. Kamath
declared: 'I have ransacked most of the constitutions of democratic
countries of the world ... and I find no parallel to this chapter
of emergency provisions in any of the other constitution of democratic
countries of the world. The closest approximation to my mind is
reached in the Weimar Constitution of the Third Reich which was
destroyed by Hitler, taking advantage of the very same provisions
contained in that constitution... But those emergency provisions
pale into insignificance when compared with the emergency provisions
3in this chapter of our Constitution.' The.term 1 internal
disturbance1 was described as 'a very wide and elastic1. It was
feared that this particular term might be employed for political
purposes if a party was elected in a province in opposition to the 
4
centre. According to B. has, these provisions would make the
President a 'new Frankenstein'' , 'something like the South American
Presidents who will exercise all emergency powers.- all financial
5powers and even starve the provinces.' The framers.of the 
constitution did foresee such possibilities. .Ambedkar stated in 
reply: it has been suggested that■these articles are liable to
be abused, I may say that I do not altogher de^ny that there is a 
possibility .of these artciles being,abused or employed for political
1. .CAIj), tyol.ix, pp. 142-3; S .1. .Saksena.
2. .Ibid., p.115; K.S. Karimuddin.
3# Ibid., p.105.
4* Ibid., pp.115-6; K.S. Karimuddin.
5. Ibid., p.517.
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purposes. But that objection applies to every,part,of the
Constitution which gives power to the.Centre to .override the
Provinces ... The proper thing we ought to expect is that
such articles will never be called into operation and that they
Xwould remain a dead letter.’ ’These emergency provisions', said
T.T. Krishnamachari, ’have got to be tolerated as a necessary
evil, and without those provisions it is well nigh.possible
that.all our efforts to frame a Constitution may ultimately be
jeopardized and the Constitution might be in danger unless
adequate powers are given to the executive to safeguard the 
2Constitution.’
The emergency provisions bear close resemblance to 
similar provisions under the 1935 Act. ’The difference is, of 
course, that such powers are now to be wielded by an Indian 
authority drawing its sanction from the Indian people, rather 
than by a non-Indian authority responsible to the British
3
Parliament.’ The reasons for .including the emergency .provisions 
in the constitution are clear. The framers, for all their 
doubts and reservations, felt that the central government of 
the new state in its infant stage of democratic experiment had 
to be given adequate authority and powers to deal with 
emergency situations arising from internal disorders and 
divisions or from external dangers. The security of India was 
a matter of far greater importance to them than provincial 
autonomy. The leaders had a fear, justifiably, in the light 
of contemporary and subsequent events that without a strong centre 
this infant democracy would be in danger of being destroyed by 
disintegrating forces from all sides, a decentralised scheme of
1. :CAID,.vol.ix, p.177.
2. Ibid., p.125*
3* H. Furber, ’’Constitution-Making in India” , Far Eastern Survey, 
April 20, 1949, p.88.
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government was sure to let loose fissipai'ous tendencies
resulting in the ultimate disruption of the country, particularly
in view of the regrettable existence in India of the hydra.-
headed monster of provincialism, communalism, linguism, caste/ism,
social and . economic imbalance.'1' In several constitutions,
particularly in the French Constitution between the years 1813 and
1853j provisions had been made for the declaration of what was
called a state of siege, which perhaps.was the counterpart of
the constitutional dictatorship envisaged in Article 48 of the
Weimer Constitution. Not even a country like England was
completely free from the possible exercise of such emergency
powers. After the First World War, England came under the
Emergency Powers Act of 1920 wherein they gave full powers to
the .executive to deal with the situation as they liked and to
issue proclamation of emergency subject only to parliamentary
approval and for one month1s duration. Clauses similar to
Article 355 appears in the American and Australian Constitutions
but one clause has been added in the Indian Constitution, namely,
that it shall also be the duty of the Union to maintain the
constitution in the provinces as enacted by law. The clause
which gives powers to the American President as the Commander-in-
Chief to maintain law and order, to fight aggression and also to
lead the country in times of war, is enormous. So,in incorporating
these provisions the Indian leaders were smerely following the
example of America and Australia and had made no departure from an
3
established principle.
1. See Norman P. Palmer, op. cit., p.115* .A.K. Ohosal,
"Federalism in the Indian Constitution1’, Indian Journal of 
Political Science, October-December, 1953, p.331*
2* John Willis, The Parliamentary Powers of English Government 
Departments, (Harvard University Press, 1933), pp.109-111.
3. Seq the speeches of Dr. Ambedkar and A.K. Ayyar in CAID, 
vol.ix, pp.150,176. '
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The unitary character of the constitution becomes 
evident from the division of powers among the three lists,
1
Union, States and Concurrent (Part XI and Seventh Schedule) 
and the vesting of residuary powers in the Union government 
unlike the Constitution of America or the Commonwealth of 
Australia; the control over and distribution of finances (Part 
XIl).; ,the organisation of all-India services. (.Part ,XIV) ; the 
appointment of State G-overnors by the President (Part VI, Chapter 
II) ;;,-the right of parliament to form new States or alter existing 
boundaries or name of any State (Article 3). There are also 
important emergency provisions (Part XVIIl) which enable the 
government and parliament of the Union to convert the Union Into 
a unitary state if it believes that the situation warrants it. 
Article 352 says that the President of India may, if he is 
satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of 
India or any part of it is threatened, whether by war or external 
aggression or internal disturbance, issue a proclamation of 
general emergency. Such a proclamation expires after two months 
unless it is approved by the Union parliament. The effect of 
the proclamation is to giye the.executive of the Union power to 
control the executive of the States and the Union parliament to 
legislate upon any matter irrespective of whether it is within 
the competence of the States. Under Article ;356 the President 
has powers .also, if he is satisfied that .the government of a 
State cannot be carried on in accordance with.the provisions of 
the constitution, to direct that the government of the State be, 
in effect, taken over by the executivesand .parliament of the Union. 
Besides emergency powers, there are in addition other similar powers 
of intervention and direction in the administration of State
1. The powers- granted in the exclusive Union list (97 items) and 
in the Concurrent list (47) cover, as in Western G-ermany, 
almost all subjects of importance and what is left to the 
exclusive authority of the States (66) tends to be of 
subordinate concern.
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affairs in the constitution which reduce the independence 
*
and sovereignty of the States* After analysing these
provisions the observers have.concluded that the Indian
1
Constitution is 1guasi-federal’* , K.V. ,Rao tlhad .effectively
demonstrated- that the working of these proyisions pointed to a
trend towards a unitaryystate. He had established how the State
G-overnor was .becoming an agent of the centre, how the initiative
was taken,from the States and how collective responsibility in
the States had come to mean merely understanding the policy of
the centre and executing it. He asserted that the Union
government, especially the Planning Commission (created in 1950)-
which he described as ’a new Leviathan’ and ’the Super-cabinet’ -
was in practice usurping powers which it did not formally possess
under the constitution. This ’super-cabinet’ was entrusted with
the taking of all important decisions, while the central cabinet
2had become only a registering body. It has been defined by 
another writer as 'the Economic Cabinet, not merely for the Union
3
but also for the States.’ Myron Weiner castigated this process
of usurpation as 'a kind of unprincipled authoritarianism, where
the Ideals of a democratic, pluralistic society operat&en, but
where, in reality, government is centralized, leadership tends to
be authoritarian, decisions are made by a relative few, and
. 4responsibility ... is weak and remote.1 As Benjamin N. Schoenfeld
pointed out: ’When the character of the Indian government is viewed
in terms of the socialist objectives of the planned economy which
has been an adopted goal in India, then the federal character of
5
that government becomes even more difficult to envisage.'
1. K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, p.27; B.N. Banerjee, Some
Aspects of the Indian Constitution, especially ch.iv.
2. K.V. Rao, "Centre-State Relations in Theory and Practice,"
Indian.Journal of Political Science, October-December, 1953? 
PP.349; ,353-55.
3. Asok Chanda, Indian Administration, p.92.
4. M. Weiner, "Some Hypotheses on the Politics of Modernization in
India," in R.L. Park and I. Tinker (eds.), Leadership and 
Political Institutions in India, p.24*
5* Benjamin H. Schoenfeld, "Federalism in India - 11", Indian 
Journal of Political Science,. July-September 1959? p*195*
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The powers of reorganisation and intervention had heen exercised
in practice. The new State of Andhra was created in 1953 out of
the States of Madras and Hyderabad, and the political map of India
was redrawn on a linguistic basis by the States Reorganisation
/
Act of 1956. From the inauguration of the constitution until 
1956thUrerwOtee no proclamations of national emergency made 
under the President's powers. Through 1956 there were four 
instances of President's rule or intervention by the Union to
suspend the government of a State (the Punjab, 1951$ PFPSU, 1952;
~ ’ 1 Andhra, 1954; Travancore-Cochijfl, 1956).
The problem of bringing the Princely States into an 
Indian federation posed a problem of great magnitude to the 
Constituent Assembly, These States numbered about 562 and 
varied in size from small tiny principalities to big States like, 
Mysore, Hyderabad, etc., covering more than one-third of the 
territory of Indianand one-fourth of the population of the 
country. Mien the British left they declared that all the 
treaties and engagements they had with the Princes had lapsed#
The paramountcy which they -had so long exercised and by which 
they could keep the Princes in order also lapsed. The Indian 
government was then faced with the problem of tackling these 
States which had different traditions of rule. Some of them had 
some form'of popular representation in Assemblies, while some had 
completely autocratic government. As a result of the declaration 
that the treaties with the Princes, together with^paramountcy had 
lapsed, it became possible for any Prince or any combination of 
Princes to assume independence and even to enter into negotiations 
with any foreign power. The Constituent Assembly had, therefore, 
at the very beginning omts labours, to enter into negotiations
1. See Austin, op.cit. , p. 216; A. Gledhill, op. cit. , p.131;
M.V. Pylee, Constitutional Government in India, pp.585-6.
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with, them to hring their representatives into the Assembly so 
that a constitution might he framed in consultation with them. 
During the period of nearly three years that elapsed between the 
first session of the Assembly and the final adoption of the 
constitution., big changes took place and the States falling within 
the territorial jurisdiction of India or adjoining it not only 
acceded to India but had practically fallen into line with the 
provinces*. A very large number of these had been integrated 
with the adjoining provinces, others had formed unions of their 
own and thus became integrated units*. This task of administrative 
integration was undertaken and accomplished by the State1s 
Ministry under the guidance of Sardgur Patel and has been described 
elsewhere*^" The constitution mentioned all its component units, 
comprising both the provinces and the Indian States, simply as 
States* The territories of the States were described in Part A,
B and C in the First Schedule. Part A States corresponded to the 
former Governors1 provinces* Part B States represented the 
former bigger Princely States, Part G States represented the 
former Chief Commissioners1 provinces plus smaller Princely 
States* Under this system, the constituent States of the Union 
had no uniform status* All the Part A-States were full-fledged 
members of the Union and their status were based on the concept 
of federalism. Part B States were not to enjoy the fullest 
measure of autonomy as defined by the constitution. Article 371 
laid down that the government of all Part B States were to be 
under the general control of, and compky with such particular 
directions as issued by the President. Another noteworthy feature 
of the Part B States was that they were headed by Rajpramukhs 
and not Governors as in the case of Part A States, The Part C 
States were directly administered by the Union on a unitary basis*
1, See V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*
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The number of these States made a total of 28, In addition, 
there was another category known as the Part I) States (the 
Andaman and Uicobar Islands) which were under the direct and 
full control of the Union government. The integration of the 
Princely States into the Indian federation has been described
1
by Dr. Spear as a Revolutionary change* in the constitution.
As a result of the States Reorganization Act, 1956, the four-tier 
state-system was reduced into two and India has become a Union 
of fourteen States and six centrally administered territories* 
Under the new scheme all the States have equal status. O.H. 
Alexandrowics: observes: ’Constitution-making was terminated in 
1949 > but federation-making has only begun and will presumably 
last foydr years to come ... The boundaries of the provinces and 
states did not generally coincide with the frontiers of 
linguistic communities in the Indian subcontinent with all their 
different traditions and cultures. These communities, though 
deprived of an opportunity of bargaining in the process of 
constitution-making, have now appeared on the political horizon
2and have brought about a re-drawing of the federal map of India.!
During the process of drafting a new constitution
considerable time and energy were devoted to the language
question. The question was whether India should have one or more
languages as the official language. It was apparent that
renascent nationalism demanded an Indian ’national* language
and that English, associated with' the British rule could not
retain this status indefinitely and that no nation could become
3
g'reat on the basis of a foreign language* In India the complexity 
of the,problem,was enhanced by the fact that there were over a 
dozen dif f£*Te.!)It well-developed languages with their appropriate
1. Spear, op.cit., p.216.
2. Alexandrowica, op.cit., pp.3-4*
3* See CAID, vol.ix; J. 'Nehru, p.1410.
scripts, each spoken "by a large number^ of people. In view 
of the number of languages the problem defied easy solution that 
had been successfully employed in countries like Switzerland,
Belgium and Canada, of a general and wide-spread bilingualism 
or multi-lingualism. The 1951 census by lumping Hindi together 
with Urdu, Hindustani and Punjabi produced about 42 per cent of 
the total population as speakers of this language. With the 
attainment of independence, the problem that presented itself 
to the Indian leaders was to devise a linguistic medium which 
would maintain the political unity of the country, and subserve 
in the words of Article 351 of the Constitution, ras a medium 
of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of 
India.’.
The problem of the official language had assumed
formidable proportions nven in the early stages of the deliberations
of the Assembly when some of the members insisted upon the business
of the House being conducted in Hindi. They also demanded the
official text of the constitution to be adopted by the Assembly
In Hindi and not in English. The President of the Assembly, Dr.
Rajendra. Prasad, managed to tackle the situation by assuring
these members that the Hindi version of the constitution would
simultaneously be made ready along with English. Mainly because
of the sharp differences that existed between the pro-Hindi
group and those who opposed them, the Assembly postponed the
consideration of the question to almost the very last stages of
1its deliberations*
The Union Constitution Committee recommended in its 
report that the language of the- Union Parliament should be 
Hindustani (Hindi or Urdu) or English with the members permitted
1. Pylee, op. cit.9 pp.664-5*
173
to use their mother-tongue if necessary . . The Provincial
Constitution Committee recommended that in provincial legislatures
business should be transacted in the provincial language, or
2languages, or in Hindustani or in. English When these two
reports were presented in the Assembly in,July 1947 > the debate
on the question of language was postponed because it was
recognised as ’a controversial matter.1
With the partition of India the Assembly members turned
against Hindustani. As one member, K. Santhanam, explained, fIf
there had been no Partition, Hindustani would without doubt have
been the national language but the anger against the Muslims
&turned against Urdu.1 In the draft constitution which appeared 
in February 1948 there was no mention,about official language but 
it was provided that the language to be used in parliament was 
Hindi or English with the members permitted to use their mother- 
tongue if necessary. In the provincial legislatures the business 
should be transacted in language or languages used in that province
r
or in Hindi or in English. There was no set debate on the 
language question in the Assembly though occasionally there were 
stray references to the ’linguistic fanaticism’ of the Hindi- 
speaking members by the members from the South and Bengal.
Hehru urged adopting a more cautious approach, while not attempting
to impose a particular language even by a majority on an unwilling
minority.^
There was a fair measure of agreement that Hindi should
be the official language of the Union but the Assembly members
split into bitterly contending factions over the other issues. The
1* Constituent Assembly, Reports of Committees ,(First Series), p. 93. 
2* - Ibid..pp. 38-9.
3. CAID, vol.iv, p .691; Sardar Patel.
4. Quoted in Austin, op.cit., p.277*
5. Draft Constitution of India, 1948, pp.44, 83. •
6. See CAID, vol.vii, pp.234~5> 249.
7. Ibid., p.321.
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central points of the controversy were the length of time English
should continue to be used as the language of government and the
status to be accorded other regional languages. The militant
Hindi-speaking members from the provinces of North-Central India
constituteclone faction. This group believed that Hindi should
be not only the ’national’ language by virtue of being the most
popular and wide spoken language but that no other language had
acquired an all-India importance and it should replace English
for official Union purposes at the earliest possible moment.
In opposition were the moderates who came largely from South
India, Bombay and Bengal. Some of the national leaders like
Nehru were associated with this group. They believed that Hindi
might be declared the 1 official1 language of the Union because
spoken by the largest number of Indians but that the other
regional languages should have national status. They also
demanded that English, as the de facto national language should
1
be replaced gradually and cautiously.
Hence a compromise formula, which became known as the
Munshi-Ayy&ngar formula was approved. All, major Indian languages
were listed in the Eighth Schedule. The languages were not made
either national or official languages, as in the Swiss, Pakistan
and South African Constitutions, the only constitutions in which
2
the languages of the country are given by name. Hindi in 
Devanagri script was made the 1 official language’ ofthe Unionj 
and English was to continue as the ’official language’ for 
fifteen years from-the commencement of the constitution. The 
change-over to Hindi was to occur in 1965 unless parliament 
legislated otherwise. So far as the ’official language* £of
1, Austin, op.cit., pp.266-7*
2* Ibid. 9 p. 297. Assamese, Bengali, G-ujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kash­
miri, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu. 
Sanskrit was added later in the final constitution, though it was 
returned as a mother-tongue of only 555 persons in the 1951 census* 
While English which was shown the mother-tongue of 171,742 persons 
was not mentioned. ’By this action*, one writer observed, ’the 
framers of the Constitution have undoubtedly shown their anti-English 
bias’, K.C.Sen, ’'The Official Language of the Union”, Economic Weekly* 
October 19, 1957, p.1563*
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a State was concerned it was provided that a State might adopt
any one or more of the languages in use in the State or Hindi as
the official language but English was to be continued unless a
State legislature otherwise provided. The formula provided for
the formation of language commissions in 1955 and I960 to recommend
to the President, among other things, for the progressive use of
Hindi for the official purposes of* the Union. A provision was
made, however, that within the stipulated period of 15 years the
President might authorise the use of Hindi in addition to English
for any of the official purposes of the Union.
According to U.G-. Ayyang&r,the Congress Assembly Party
members 1 reached a fairly unanimous conclusion1 over the language
provisions. The provisions were the result of ra great deal of
thought1 and Ta great deal of discussion* - ra compromise between
, 1opinions which were not easily reconcilable.* But Dr. Ambedkar
later revealed that the Congress Assembly Party meeting reached
deadlock over the Hindi question* Finally it was resolved in
2favour of Hindi by the margin of only one vote. According to the
Hindu ,this one-vote margin was made possible only because Congress
members of the Constituent Assembly *had to obey the Party* s 
3directive.* It was very largely owing ta the importunity of the
north Indian Hindi-speaking members of the Congress Party, told a
distinguished member from the South, Dr. P. Subbarayan, * that the
people in non-Hindi areas agreed to accept Hindi, the majority of
/4them with reservation.?. This was also corroborated by Dr. S.K.
5Chatterji, one of the members of the Official Language Commission.
1. CAID,.vol.ix, pp.1317, 1319*
2* B.R. Ambedkar, Thought 011 Linguistic States, p. 14*
3. Hindu, January 27, 1958; quoted in Selicj, S. Harrison, India: The
Most Dangerous Decades, p.9*
4. P. Subbarayan, **Minute of DissentM, Report of the Official
Language Commission, 1956, p.319*
5* Ibid., p.283.
In September 1949 a new part XIV-A on language was
introduced in the Assembly. The complexity of the language
problem could be gauged from the speech of the President of the
Assembly, Dr. Prasad. He said: 1 There is no other item in the
whole Constitution which will be required to be implemented from
day to day, from hour to hour ... from minute to minute in actual
practice .... It will not do to carry a point by debate ... The
decision of the House should be accepted to the country as a whole*,
otherwise,* the implementation of the Constitution will become a
1most difficult problem,* V/hile Prasad and other national leaders
were asking for a^ unanimous decision, the Hindi supporters, 
confident of their majority support, argued that if there were 
differences on any issue it could only be decided by votes. The 
Hindi protagonists declared that Urdu had largely drawn 
inspiration from outside India. India had one cultural tradition 
for thousands of years and in order to maintain this tradition India 
required one language and one:script for the whole country. This 
language could only'be Hindi, not Hindustani or Urdu. The use of 
English in the Hindi-speaking areas for 15 years was regarded as
o
*a retrograde proposition.*. Purushottam Das Tandon hoped that
the replacement of English by Hindi would begin within a much
shorter time. He saw the limitations upon Hindi as unduly
restrictive. He cited the example of Ireland, which had not
much literature and a sufficient vocabulary, yet adopted Irish
as the national language. But Hindi, Tandon believed, was already
a powerful language and *with the backing of Sanskrit can face all
■5
the difficulties of vocabulary with eq-se.* Hih&i supporters 
regarded the language provisions as * a fraud on the Constitution
1. CAID, vol.ix, p.1312.
2. Ibid. , pj*„1325, 1327-8; Seth G-ovind Das.
I b i d pp. 1443* 1445*
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itself, which*perpetuates English for many, many years to come.’
Nehru detected ’a tone of authoritarianism’ in the speeches of
Hindi-speaking members and called it ra dangerous approach’ to
impose a language upon other people. Nehru regarded Hindi not in
its restricted sense, but in the broader sense, as representing
that composite language which was both the language of the people
and the language of various groups and others in Northern India*
Gandhi stood by that interpretation and made it an inclusive
language by incorporating all the language elements in India?
together with some Urdu .or a,mixture of Hindustani. This language,
Nehru emphasised, was to be allowed to grow naturally, and not to
2be forced upon an unwilling people* Mrs. Durgabai of Madras
advocated a broad-based Hindi and not the ’special brand of C.P.
3or U.P. Hindi.’ S.P. Mookerjee of Bengal welcomed the listing
of principal regional languages of India in the draft, but he
pointed out that many people belonging to non-Hindi speaking
areas had become nervous about Hindi because of the aggressive
character of the protagonists of Hindi in insisting upon their
demands.^ Originally some members outside the controversy, such
as Sardar Hukara Singh and Prank Anthony, supported the adoption
of Hindi in Devanagari script; but gradually they shifted their
position because, as one member observed, of the ’fanaticism’ and
5’intolerance' of the supporters of Hindi. The effort to
< 6Sanskritcize Hindi was described as a retrograde step.’ There
were a few members from Bengal, Assam and from the South who 
suggested the adoption of Sanskrit as the national language. Dr.
P. Subbarayan and Sftrdar Hukam Singh proposed the adoption of 
Hindustani in Roman script* Other amendments came from Muslims* 
The Muslim members(including Azad) supported Hindustani, written
I* PAID, vol.ix, p.1469; Prof. S.L. Saksena.
2* Ibid., pp.1411, 1414-5*
3. Ibid., pp.1426, 1428.
4# Ibid., p.1391.
5* Ibid., p.1436-7; Sardar Hukam Singh.
6* Ibid., p.1440; Jaipal Singh.
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in both Davanagari and Urdu scripts, as a national language.
They pointed out that this was the solution of the language
problem envisaged by Gandhi, for which the Congress had stood
for twenty years. Some suggested the continuation of English
until an all-India language was evolved. Amendments were moved
for the inclusion of Sanskrit and English in the Schedule,
More than 300 language^ were submitted but finally all but
five were withdrawn. The amendments of five members were put to
•the vote and were rejected by a large majority.
Since the inauguration of the constitution, the Union
government has not employed Hindi to any great extent in the
conduct of its affairs. English is still for the greater part,
1the language of the Union. According to the Report of the Official
language Commission,1 considerable progress* has been made in the
Hindi-spealcing States in using Hindi. Several of these States
(Bihar, Madhya Bharat, Rajasthan and Uttar pradesh) have passed
Official Language Acts. Among the non-Hindi speaking States only
Madhya Pradesh (Marathi and Hindis) , Orissa and Saurashtra have
adopted their regional languages. In other States'English has
continued to be used as their .official languages. In the case of
Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Bharat, Rajasthan and Saurashtra, this
2provision has been fully implemented* In the Lok Sabha, the
percentage of speeches delivered in English was/about 83 per cent
/
and 16 per cent in Hindi, and under 1 per cent in regional
languages. In the Rajya Sabha, about 85 per cent of speeches were
delivered in English and 13 per cent in Hindi during the period
1954. In the State legislatures ’the large bulk of speeches*
4are delivered in regional languages.
1". Report .of the Official language Commission, 1956, p. 118.
2. Ibid., pp.139, 150-1, 443-50.
3. Por a full list of the use of different languages in the central
and all provincial legislatures see Ibid., pp.451-5.
4. Ibid., p.173.
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The theoretical adoption of Hindi in the constitution
in 1949 was thought to he something very simple. Now Indian
leaders are facing the 'stark realities of the situation1. After
the move hy the central government and the Hindi speaking States
to adopt Hindi, which has become more and more, insistent, the
linguistic problem has assumed 'a very great importance.1 It
has taken the form of rivalry between Hindi speaking and non-
Hindi speaking States; between regional languages and English;
and between English and Hindi. These rivalries are posing a
threat to the unity and solidarity of India.^ In this connection,
the observations of Sir Ivor Jennings may be recalled. Jennings
remarked that the Indian Constitution 'Vests control in the Hindus
of the north and provides no adequate protection for minorities.'
'If Hindi were the national language the Hindi-speaking peoples
of the north would become as dominant, a class as the English-
speaking are now. English is at least neutral, a language which
all can learn on equal terms. Hindi would .give a preference to
2some and so would be anathema to others.'
1. S.K. Chatterjee, "Note on the Report of the Official Language
Commission as a Minority Report", and P. Subbarayan, "Minute
of Dissent" in Report ,of the Official Language Commission ,1996, 
pp.284, 320.
2. Jennings, Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution, p.64;
Jennings, The Commonwealth in Asia,p. 48.
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CHAPTER VI
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN PAKISTAN, 1947 - 1956 <
The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan comprised those
members of the original Constituent Assembly of undivided India
who now belonged to Pakistan. At the time of its inauguration
the total membership of the Assembly was sixty-nine.'*' Additions
were made to the Assembly in order to give representation to the
Muslim migrants from India, five extra Muslim seats were given
to the Punjab and one to Sind together with members nominated
to represent the Princely States which had joined Pakistan.
These included Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Chitral and Swat to which
were alloted one seat each. At the end of its life the Assembly
had a total of eighty seats. But many members were not in a
position to attend sessions as they held offices as ministers,
governors and ambassadors. The average sessional attendance of
members was calculated to range from thirty-seven to fifty-six
2
for the period from 1947 to 1954. Just as the Congress dominated 
the Indian Constituent Assembly, so the personnel of the Pakistan 
Constituent Assembly comprised an overwhelming Muslim League 
majority; and an opposition mainly consisted of twelve Hindu 
members who belonged to the Congress Party and 
Iftikharuddin who represented the Azad Pakistan Party. Apart 
from these opposition groups, one belonged to the Scheduled 
Castes Federation. Shaukat Hyat Khan was a former Unionist 
and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was a 1 Red/shirt1 who was in jail
1# Civil and Military Gazette. August 12, 1947.
2. Gallard, op. cit., p.80.
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for a considerable period of time*
The constitutional debate in Pakistan was even more 
long-drawn-out than in India and a constitution was not finally 
adopted until February 1956* It took almost eight and a half 
years* Until then, the Government of India Act, 1935 became 
(with certain adaptations) the basis of Pakistan's interim 
government# The Constituent Assembly was given two separate 
roles; to prepare a eonstitution?and to act as the parliament 
until that constitution came into force* The 1956 Constitution 
was never fully put into operation, and was totally suspended 
by the military regime in October 1958* There were many reasons 
for this protracted delay* After the death of Jinnah and 
Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's politics was marked by momentous 
political conflict, involving constitutional crisis. Concurrent 
with this was the growing factionalism within the Muslim league. 
There were fundamental differences on two major questions: the 
role of Islam in the political system, and the problem of 
relationships between the Fast and West wings and the central 
government. How far could Islamic principles be incorporated 
in the constitution? What would be the position of non-Muslims 
in an explicitly Islamic state? What would be the nature of the 
federation? Would it have a strong centre or a weak centre? 
Whether Pakistan should have one state language or two. Inability 
to find answers to these intractable problems and other questions 
delayed the prospect of an early constitution in Pakistan.
In surveying the proceedings of the two Constituent 
Assemblies we may note eight important milestones marking the 
progress towards the framing of a constitution.
(l) March 12, 1949, The Constituent Assembly passed an 
Objectives Resolution, the first main step in the framing of 
the constitution^and voted to appoint a committee known as the 
Basic Principles Committee which should recommend the main 
principles on which the future constitution should be based*
(2=) September 7, 1950, the Interim Report of the Basic 
Principles Committee was presented to the Assembly.
(5) December 22, 1952, the Report of the Basic Principles 
Committee was presented to the Assembly.
(4) October 7, 1953, the constitutional deadlock over the 
structure of the federal legislature was resolved by the 
'Mohammed Ali formula1 and the debating of the 80-page report 
began in earnest*
(5) September 21, 1954, the Report of the Basic Principles 
Committee (as amended) was adopted by the Assembly.
(6) September 30, l£55, the Assembly passed the Establishment 
of West Pakistan Act, merging the provinces and small principalities 
of the West into 'one unit'.
(7) January 9, 1956, a draft constitution was presented to 
the Assembly, and the Assembly took up the consideration of the 
draft clause by clause.
(8) February 29, 1956, after the 52-day debate, the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was finally 
adopted.
The first and the most difficult task faced by the 
framers of the constitution was to decide the exact J?ole of 
Islam in the state. It was generally agreed that Pakistan 
should become an Islamic state, but there was no agreement as 
to the meaning of the term 'Islamic State*. This caused a long- 
drawn-out controversy between the Western-educated politicians 
and the ulama» We have discussed Jinnah*s view regarding the 
future form of the constitution in chapter ii." While Jinnah
*83
did not live long enough to offer a constitutional formula, 
he seemed to envisage a modern secular state, similar to new 
India* So long as Jinnah was alive everybody seemed to agree 
to his vision of a secular state* But even during his (Jinnahrs) 
lifetime, 0*M. Sayed, the Sind Muslim League leader, found in 
Jinnah1s speech a 'chastened mood' which amounted to an abandon­
ment of those fundamental principles on which the Muslim League 
had based its programme and carried on its struggle for Pakistan.TJufc 
Lawn tried to correct this 'misinterpretation1 of Jinnah's 
speech* According to^ Eawn, Jinnah merely meant that *a Hindu 
or any other person not professing the Muslim faith will not 
be debarred from participating in the administration of Pakistan,
nor will be discriminated against by its laws, nor will he
1
suffer economically*' The ulama, who remained silent at that
time, later pronounced that a state based on this idea would be
'the creature of the devil*. None of the ulama could tolerate
2a state based on nationalism, with all that implied. Maulana 
Shabbir Ahmad Osraani, an outstanding figure among the ulama of 
Pakistan and the President of the Jamfat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, 
completely by-passed the inaugural speech of Jinnah to the 
Constituent Assembly. He reminded: 'Islam has never accepted 
the view that religion is a private affair between man and his 
Creator and as such has no bearing upon the social or political
3
relations of human beings.' Gsmani referred to a letter 
written by Jinnah in November 1945 to the Pir Sahib- of Manki 
Sharif (a religious leader of N.-W.P.P.) in which he was believed 
to have stated that the Constituent Assembly, a predominantly 
Muslim body, would frame laws not inconsistent with the Shariah
1* Lawn (Delhi), August 26, 1947, editorial, 'Perverse Propaganda', 
quoted in K.B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, p.274*
2. Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II 
of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1955»
(cited hereafter as Munir Report), p.203*
5* CARD, vol. v, p.44.
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and the Muslims would no longer be obliged to abide by un- 
1 ■
Islamic laws* Khwaja Nazimuddin, a veteran Bengali Muslim 
Leaguer, who after Jinnah*s death became Governor-General 
and then followed Liaquat Ali Khan as Prime Minister, stated 
that Jinnah himself preserved the ideal of an Islamic constitution 
and that it was on this assurance that Pakistan had been achieved* 
Nazimuddin explicitly stated that a single nation, consisting
of Muslims and non-Muslims with equal rights of citizenship was
2not Jinnah1s view of an Islamic state* ‘ So Jinnah1s view was 
rapidly by-passed by the ulama and the politicians alike* The 
politicians who tried to evolve a via media between the 
principles of democracy and the principles of Islam were not 
successful in their attempts for a long time* The Objectives 
Resolution which was introduced by. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali 
Khan on March 7, 194-9 and passed by the Assembly on March 12,
1949, was to embody the main principles on which the constitution 
of Pakistan was to be based. It began with the Islamic invocation 
to the Almighty: fIn the name of Allah, the Beneficient, the 
Merciful* and proceeded to state that 1 sovereignty over the 
entire universe belongs to God1 and that the authority delegated 
by Him to the people of Pakistan is a sacred trust* The resolution 
envisaged a sovereign independent state exercising its powers and 
authority through the chosen representatives of the people in 
which the principles of democracy, freedom, equality and social 
justice, as enunciated by Islam, should be fully observed, and 
where Muslims might lead their lives in accordance with Islamic 
teaching. Fundamental rights were to be guaranteed to all, and
1* OAPD, vol. v, p*46. 
2* Munir Report* p.295.
1adequate provision was to be made to safeguard the religious,
1
cultural and other legitimate interests of the minorities.
Liaquat Ali Khan in his speech said that 'Pakistan
was founded because the Muslims of this sub-Continent wanted
to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and
traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the
world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which
2have crept into the life of humanity today*1 But he also 
wanted to emphasise that a state based upon Islam would not be 
a theocracy. 'Islam does not recognise either priesthood or 
any sacerdotal authority; and therefore the question of a 
theocracy simply does not arise in Islam.' Liaquat Ali Khan 
seemed quite sure that Islam was on the side of democracy. 'As 
a matter of fact it has been recognized by non-Muslims through­
out the world that Islam is the only society where there is
4real democracy.' In this approach he was supported by Maulana 
Osmani* 'The IslamiG State is the first political institution 
in the world which abolished Imperialism, enunciated the 
principle of referendum and installed a Caliph (head of the 
state) elected by the people in place of the King.'
Liaquat Ali Khan deplored the activities of certain
6'so-called Ulemas' who, in fact, misrepresented Islam. Dr*
Omar Hayat Malik talked of 'limited democracy*. 'The principles
of Islam and the laws of Islam as laid down in the Quran are
7binding on the State*. The resolution was strenuously debated 
for five days* During the debate,, the Muslim speakers uniformly 
supported the resolution as the corner-stone' of the new constitution.
1* CAPD, vol. v, pp.1-2
2« Ibid. p.2.
3. Ibid. p.3.
4. Ibid. p.96.
3. Ibid. p.46 •
6. Ibid. p.94.
7. Ibid. p*78. .
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Dr. I.H* Qureshi explained: tThe Resolution says that our
1polity should he based upon God-consciousness*1 Iftikharuddin,
though still a member of the Muslim League,expressed the only
Muslim criticism of the resolution: fI see that a section of the
press gave it out as if they scored a journalistic scoop by
reporting that the authority is derived from the Higher Power*
Sir, the authority, whether we say it or not, is derived from
that Power. It does not lie within our power to change the
laws of nature or ... Nature1s God... In having stated that,
2we have not done anything very extraordinary...1 He deplored
its failure to guarantee political, social and economic
justice. rThe fight in this country, is not going to be between
Hindus and Muslims. The battle in times to come will be between
Hindu have-nots and Muslim have-nots on the one hand and Muslim
3and Hindu upper and middle classes on the other.1 Qureshi,
£afrullah Khan,and Dr. Mahmud Husain declared that the preamble
merely affirmed the need to keep religion as a moral force linked
to politics, finding fault with Western notions of separating
religion from politics. Mahmud Husain referred to Bodin, blaming
him for introducing the idea of absolute sovereignty, and cited
Machiavelli, whom he blamed for the modern concept of raison
dfe t a t then he summed up stating: *The plain question is
whether we propose to bring back morality to that sphere from
5
which it has been banished, namely, the political sphere.1
The ministers who spoke for the government emphatically 
repudiated the accusation that the privileges and status of non- 
Muslims would be less than those of Muslims. 'A. non-Muslim^ said
1* GAPD, vol. v, p.39*
2. Ibid., p.51.
3* Ibid.. p.54*
4. Ibid., p.84.
5. Ibid., p*85*
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- * 1 Liaquat Ali Klikn, 4 could be the head of the administration.^1
Zafrullah Khan deplored the reputation for intolerance that
Muslims had earned for themselves and asserted that Islam
itself had from the beginning inculcated the widest tolerance*
The minorities would be protected by the very teaching of the
2Quran guaranteeing freedom of conscience* Sardar Nishtar 
replied that nothing was being done, or proposed to be done, 
that was contrary to the declarationsof Jinnah. He also 
explained that even if Jinnah had given pledges to the minority 
communities, he had also given pledges to the majority and the
Objectives Resolution was intended to redeem pledges to the
3maiprity as well as to the minorities. Several government 
leaders argued that Islamic democracy offered a middle way 
between Capitalism and Communism. Nishtar suggested that a 
society based upon Islamic principles could be the best alternative* 
Osmani asserted that the Islamic state could bring about an 
equitable distribution of wealth by employing methods peculiar
5
to it and distinct from communistic practices.
The Objectives Resolution had produced mixed reactions*
A section of the intelligentsia thought that its effect was to 
put aside, or render obsolete, Jinnah*s concept of a modern 
national state. Others characterised the resolution as 1nothing 
but a hoax1 which did not 'contain even a semblance of the 
embryo of an Islamic State* and whose provisions *particularly 
those relating to fundamental rights, are directly opposed to the
g
principles of an Islamic State*1 «,
7The Interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee
1. CAPJ), vol. v, p.95*
2. Ibid., p*69.
3* Ibid.* p*62#
4. Ibid., pp.62-3*
5* Ibid.* p.45*
6. Munir Report* p.203*
7* The B.P. Committee was appointed on March 12, 1949* The Interim 
Report was presented to the Assembly in September 1950* It was 
a short document covering thirty-eight pages in the Constituent 
Assembly Official Debates. See CARD, vol.viii, pp.13-50*
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was attacked by the ulama on, the ground that it failed to
1give the constitution a sufficiently Islamic colour* The
debate on the report was put off indefinitely in order to allow
members of the public to make suggestions to the Basic
Principles Committee* The number of suggestions received
2was described by the committee itself as fenormousf, and a 
special sub-committee was appointed to examine these suggestions 
and to suggest appropriate amendments* After nearly four years 
of work, the Report of the Basic Principles Committee, a 80- 
page document,was introduced in the Assembly by Nazimuddin on
December 22, 1952. The report was the result of long discussions
3held with the ulama* In his speech presenting the report, 
Nazimuddin stated that it corresponded not only to the aspirations 
of Pakistan but also to its needs and genius - which was a 
synthesis between the principles of democracy and the principles
4
of Islam.* He announced with pride that the constitution 
recommended by the Basic Principles Committee was 1fully- 
democratic, even more democratic than-the constitutions of
5
many1 old democracies* In his view, the recommendations
implemented the terms of the Objectives Resolution by interpreting
the principles of Islam in the light of twentieth century
democratic practice* The provision that the head of the state
must be a Muslim was not a departure from recognised democratic
practice. It was justified by reference to the fact that the
monarch of the United Kingdom should be a member of the Church 
7of England*
The recommendations made elaborate provisions whereby
1. Round Table* March 1951, p*172.
2. Report of the Basic Principles Committee (1952), p.i*
5* Munir Report* p*295. The B*P*C* report was signed by twenty-one 
Muslims (Mian Iftikharuddin dissenting) and by .three Hindus* 
Report of the Basic Principles Committee (1952), p.ii*
4. CAPD, vol. xii, pp.57-8.
5. Ibid., p.61.
6. Ibid., p.57.
7* Ibid., p.59.
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no laws could be enadted which were repugnant to the Quran 
1and Sunnah. A board of ulaimay consisting of persons well-
versed in Islamic laws, was to be set up to whom all proposed
legislation could be referred in order to ensure that nothing
repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah should be enacted. In fact,
as the Munir Commission described it, this Report of the Basic
Principles Committee made provisions whereby the ulama would
2
have a virtual veto on the working of the legislature. The 
recommendations designed to ensure the Islamic character of 
the state were controversial* Some of them found place in a 
set of*Directive Principles of State Policy1 which included 
the prohibition of drinking, gambling and prostitution, and the
3
elimination of usury. The ulama received some encouragement 
from Nazimuddin who, to quote the Munir Report, was fintensly 
religious and a man of deep and sincere convictions.r He tried 
to avoid a * head-on clash* with the ulama,^  who appeared to 
gain the upperhand: with the result that the proposals of the 
committee caused the utmost dismay amongst the modernists and
intellectuals among whom must be numbered most of the civil
5servants and officers of the defence service. The report 
was widely condemned as un-Islamic, because it appeared to give 
recognition to the existence of a priesthood, and undemocratic 
because it placed in authority bodies of persons who were not 
elected by the people and not responsible to them. Government 
spokesmen pointed out that the board would have only advisory 
powers, but the intelligentsia remained unconvinced and regarded 
this proposal as a surrender to the mullahs andfojfche forces of
1# Report of the Basic Principles Committee (1952), pp.6-7.
2* JMunir Report, p.289.
3. Report of the Basic Principles Committee (1952), p.2.
4. Munir Report, p.264.
5. P.M. Innes, f,The Political Outlook in Pakistan11, Pacific
Affairs. December 1953, pp.305-6.
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1
obscurantism# The report did not appear to satisfy the
aspirations of the ulama either# Thirty-three ulama published
a statement disapproving of the proposal to set up a board of
ulama and instead they demanded that five ulama should form a
kind of special Supreme Court which, in consultation with one
judge from the existing Supreme Court, qualified for the purpose
by his knowledge of Islamic law, would decide whether laws
enacted by the legislature were repugnant to the Quran ?and Sunnah 
2or not# This suggestion was described by Pakistanis leading
3newspaper Pawn as ’Ulemacracy1. Two other ulama proposed the
appointment of Qaris. The ulama also demanded that Ahmadis
4should be declared as a separate community* Governor-General 
G-hulam Mohammad in a speech in May 1953 said that there were some 
people who wanted Pakistan to be ruled by the dictates of a few 
ulama who should have special powers vested in them but there 
was no authority in the Quran for the proposition that only 
certain people had the sole right to interpret and represent
5
Islam* Inside the Assembly, there were several sharp critics
of the report. Shaukat Hyat Khan called the report ’nothing but 
6hypocrisy* #
The requirement that the head of the- state should be 
a Muslim, the deception of the people by proposing a board of 
ulama, and the proposal for separate electorates, according to
7
him, constituted a breach of faith# Iftikharuddin was more 
severe in his attack* The Islamic constitution promised by 
Idaquat Ali Khan was understood to offer a new type of democracy 
which would not be sham but would b.e real, that would not only
1# Round Table, March 1953, pp.173-4*
2* Pawn, January 23, 1953#
3* Ibid., January 24, 1953; editorial, ’Ulemacracy.1
4. Ibid., January 23, 1953*
5. Ibid., May 14., 1953*
6. cjjjro, vol. xv, p. 127*
7. Ibid., pp.127-33*
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give the people the right to live and vote freely but would
also create conditions under which they could live and vote
freely* He characterised the Indian Constitution ^as ’more
Islamic1 in the sense of the greatest happiness of the greatest
number**1' He deplored the betrayal of the interests of the
Muslims as well as of the minorities by the parochialism of the
2
proposed constitution* As for a tribunal of ulama to review
legislation, he said, fthe only tribunal before which we can
go - however fallacious, however backward, however illiterate
and however politically unconscious - is the tribunal of the
people*1 Thus, there were those who proposed that Pakistan
should proceed to imitate the model of an Islamic state during
the early period in practical operation - the Constitution of
Medina* Others, mostly politicians and intelligentsia, urged
a more liberal approach* Qureshi stated: ’These (back to
Medina^ persons would want us to reproduce, a society which no
longer exists and a polity which was suited to that society*
They would make us believe that all that was done at that time
was the final interpretation of Islam and it is not possible
for the human intellect to deviate from it in any detail •*•*
If we are told to follow the principles which guided the creators
of the Republic after the death of the Prophet, there could
have been no difference of opinion with them. But when for
every action or institution we are expected to find a precedent,
. 4we are being asked to act in a most un-Islamic manner1• He 
went on: ’It has been recognised in all Muslim countries that in 
many respects the mutable part of the Sharf requires considerable
1* CAPD, vol. xv, p.292.
2* Ibid♦, p.294*
3* P*293*
4* I*H# Qureshi, Pakistan: An Islamic Democracy* pp.3-4*
overhauling and the immutable bases need a. new interpretation*^
To make a provision, in the constitution giving a power of veto
to a body of learned theologians and jurists on laws passed
2by the legislature would be a most retrograde step. fIf the
mass of the people are Muslims and their faith is sound, they
will instinctively accept the correct interpretation. If they
do not accept the correct interpretation and wilfully persist
3in error no authority can put them right.' So according
to him,A Shariah is not entirely immutable and is to be
interpreted by the application of human reason in response to
4
the changing needs of humanity in different conditions. The 
reinterpretation and reorientation of the Shariah can only be
undertaken by the legislature as the supreme representative of
5 6the people. Qureshi*s view was very similar to that of Iqbal.
tThe constitution of a country must reflect the ideals on which
its people want to base their political life*, observed Qureshi.
The Assembly was right in setting for itself the ideals of Islam.
But these ideals should be given a rational, dynamic interpretation,
for the people of Pakistan failed to keep abreast of progress
7
in the development of political institutions and social fabric.
Progress and Islamic ideals can be reconciled in a three-fold
definition of sovereignty in an Islamic state: (l) the legal
sovereign shall be the Muslim law; its definition shall be in
the hands of the legislature? (2) the political sovereign shall
be the people who will elect and dismiss their governments;
(3) the real sovereign will be basically the principles of Islam,
8brought into the public forum and discussed at length.
1. I.H. Qureshi, Pakistan; An Islamic Democracy, p.21.
2* Ibid., p.23*
3* Ibid., p.26.
4. Ibid., p.20.
5* Ibid., p.23*
6. See Chapter ii.
7. Qureshi, op.cit., pp*2,5.
8. Ibid., pp.26-7.
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Modernists replied that the Islamic scriptures offer no practical
guide to the framers of a constitution* A*K* Brohi, who was later
to become the Minister in charge of the draft constitution of 1954*
wrote: *The problem of constitution-making in Pakistan has
become complicated due to the false emotional associations that
have been formed due to what I call a wrong insistence on the
slogan, viz* that the constitution of Pakistan would be based
on the Islamic Law. To me at any rate this appears to be a
1paradoxical position*The Quran could not be 1 expected to provide
a pattern of constitution for a State -which would be valid for
2all the time to come.1 This viewpoint was strongly attacked as
a betrayal of the ideals of Pakistan. Brohi wrote two more
articles to show that he had not intended to advocate a
constitution in which Islam played no part* 1...If there be any
clear and direct statement in the Quran as to what our constitution
should be like, then of course it has got to be followed: the
problem then is not one of re-writing the constitution, which
3already exists in the Quran* but one of enforcing it.1 He added: 
*1 have never said that I do not want Islamic constitutions all 
I have said is that having regard to the accepted notion of what 
constitutional law is, it is not possible to derive from the text 
of the Quran any clear statement as to the actual content of the 
constitution of any State.Qureshi had a similar idea in his 
mind when he wrote: *... there is no such thing as an Islamic 
constitution. The quest in Pakistan was misdirected; the search 
should have been for an Islamic way of life in this twentieth 
century, not for an Islamic constitution.1 Nishtar said: !Any 
law which is againsflQuran, of course, will be void, but any law
-**• Ra-wu* August 24, 1952, A.K. Brohi, 1Thoughts on the Future 
Constitution of Pakistan*1
2. Ibid.
3* Ibid.* September 21, 1952.
4. Ibid.* September 7, 1952.
5. I.H. Qureshi, !,Islamic Elements in the Political Thought of
Pakistan," in R. Braibanti and J.J. Spengler (eds*)> 
Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development, p.241.
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which deals with that sphere of law which has been left to the
discretion of the people by the Quran, and such matters cover 95
1per cent of affairs, will not be void.* He had pinned his faith 
on the parliamentary system* l... We had the parliamentary 
system in existence for many years in this country and for six 
years even after the establishment of Pakistan* We have got used 
to it.1^
This view of an Islamic state was not accepted by the 
ulama* * Our law is complete and merely requires interpretation 
by those who are experts in it* According to my belief no 
question can arise the law relating to which cannot be discovered
3
from the Quran or the hadith,* so said Maulana Abul Hasanat, 
President, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan* One of the most vigorous 
exponents of an Islamic polity was Maulana Maududi. He was
4opposed to the idea of separation on the basis of nationalism, 
like all groups that had opposed the creation of Pakistan, ’the 
Jama^at was under a cloud. The JamaT"at was inactive from August 
1947 to January, 1948,^ After this brief period of silence, 
Maududi began to put forward his claim# for a full-fledged 
Islamic constitution* The establishment of Pakistan was !to 
achieve the real and ultimate objective of making Islam a 
practical, constitutional reality*1 He askeds ,**. if secular 
and G-odless instead of Islami^ponstitution was to be introduced 
and if the British Criminal Procedure Code had to be enforced 
instead of the Islamic Shariah what was the sense in all this 
struggle for a separate Muslim homeland?*^
1* CAPD, vol.xvi, p.328,
2* CAPD, vol.xv, p*475*
3* Munir Report, p.211.
4. Maududi1s pre-partition views have been discussed in ch.ii.
5* Binder, op. cit** p.96.
6. S.A.A. Maudoodi, Islamic Law and Constitution, p.17.
195
According to Islam, he says, the ultimate sovereignty 
in matters of legislation rests with God. The main object of 
Islamic law is to enable Muslims to lead virtuous lives, and 
for this it classifies legislation into three categories: the
mandatory (fard and wajib), the recommendatory (matlub), and....
the permissible (mubah). The obligatory elements of Islamic
law as classified by Maududi are broadly those laws laid down in
clear terms in the Quran or the authentic traditions of the
Prophet, such as the prohibition of alcoholic drinks, interest
and gambling, the punishments prescribed for adultery and theft
2and the rules for inheritance. The recommendatory provisions
are those which the Shariah desires Muslim society to observe
and practise. *Some of them have been very clearly demanded of
us while others have been recommended by implication and
deduction from the Sayings of the Holy Prophet.1 The remaining
sphere, permissible legislation is very wide and is 1 exactly
the sphere where we have been given freedom and where we can
legislate according to our discretion to suit the requirements 
3
of our age.1 It is. flexible and fhas thus the potentialities
. 4of meeting the ever-increasing requirements of every age.1 
Permissible legislation may come into being by interpretation 
(ta^Vil), analogous deduction (qiyas), disciplined judgment of 
jurists where no precedents exist (ijtihad) and juristic 
preference (istihsan)♦ But these four methods can be exercised 
only by properly qualified persons and within the limits 
prescribed by Islam. The rules derived by these methods must 
be accepted unanimously (ijma) or having the approval of majority
1. S.A.A. Maudoodi, Islamic Law and Constitution, pp.24-5*
2. Ibid., p.34.
3* Ibid., pp.25-6
4. Ibid., p.34.
5. Ibid., pp.35-6.
1
of Muslims. Maududi is even prepared to accept the sub­
ordination of the executive to the majority decisions of the 
legislature, since it is not likely that a Caliph cto a
consultative council of the moral calibre of the early Islamic
2society can now be found in Pakistan* The sub-continent had
suffered an infidel rule for so long that its moral, social,
economic and political life had been deviated far from the.
Islamic ideals* *It is, therefore, inevitable that the required
reform should be gradual and the changes in the laws should be
effected in such a manner as to balance favourably the change
in the moral, education, social, cultural and political life
3of the nation*1 Maududi attempts to explain his point by
referring to the institution of a body of persons whom the
Prophet and his successors consulted on all matters relating to
affairs of gtate. The decisions taken by them undoubtedly
served as precedents and were in the nature of ijma which,
however, cannot be said to be the new legislation but the
4
application of an existing law to a particular case*
As regards the traditional Islamic punishment of 
severing of hands for thefts,Maududi argues that under the 
conditions of present day society where there are gross and 
unjust inequalities of wealth even the punishment for committing
thefts is doubtful, *not to speak of cutting off the thief*s
5hands,. I1 But under an Islamic social order where the state 
ensures the basic necessities of life to all, the punishment 
for such criminals would naturally be very severe because they 
are unfit to live in such a just, generous and healthy society
1* Maudoodi, op* cit*, p.
2. Ibid*, pp.126-7*
3* Ibid., p.52.
4* Munir Report, pp.211-2.
5* Maudoodi, op. cit., p.29*
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and would cause tremendous harm to it, if left unchecked!>*«
As for the objections raised against the reintroduction of ike
Shariah in the same rigid form as was in vogue in the classical
period of Islamic history, Maududi claims that the Shariah
existed in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent up to the beginning
of the nineteenth century* For example, the penalty of severing
the hand of an habitual thief was inflicted as late as 1791*
By the middle of the 19th century the whole of the Shariah had
been abrogated excepting of course injunctions regarding purely
2personal matters of Muslims like marriage, divorce, etc*
Therefore, 1 coming to our own times and our own country, Pakistan, 
if we wish to promulgate Islamic Law here, it would mean nothing 
less than the demolition of the entire structure built by our 
British masters and the erection of a new one^its place*1
Non-Muslims may enjoy all the civil rights; even in 
economic matters there will be no discrimination; but they will 
be exempted from the responsibility of defending the state*
Maududi along with the leading ulama agrees that the position 
of non-Muslims in an Islamic state will be that of zimmi/fe and 
they will.not be the full citizens of Pakistan because they are 
not entitled to the same rights as Muslims. fThey will have no 
voice in the making of the law, no right to administer the law
4
and no right to hold Public offices*1 Those who complain about 
the unequal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims in an Islamic 
state Maududi retorts: fIf any one has any objection with regard 
to these two kinds of citizenships in an Islamic Statq^nd their 
distinctive features, he should try to acquaint himself with the
1* Maudoodi, op*1 cit** p*30* 
2* Ibid*, pp.15 f*n*, 50-1* 
3* Ibid*, p.51*
4* Munir Report, p*212*
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details of the treatment meted out practically by all ideological 
states to the people who do not believe in their ideology and 
with the disabilities attaching to all national minorities of 
all national states.1 The question, therefore, whether a 
person is or is not a Muslim will be of fundamental importance;
and in this matter when the leading ulama were questioned, each
2of them gave an answer different from the rest.
The new Constitution of the JamdP’at-i-Islami of
Pakistan adopted on July 4, 1952,’enforces strict conditions
for membership. Apart from the observance of the religious
obligations of Islam and obeying of teachings and practices
of the Prophet, Quran and the Sunnah, a member must strive
wholeheartedly for the realisation of the main objective of
the Jama~"at, namely, the establishment of an Islamic way of
life in Pakistan. He must swear to abide by the creed of the
JamaTat. The process of selection was very rigorous. At the
' 3time of partition there were only 625 members of the Jama at.
4The membership figure rose to 999 by 1954#
In his Law College lectures delivered in February 1948,
Maududi insisted that the Constituent Assembly must make the
following unequivocal declaration; f(i) That we Pakistanis
believe in the supreme sovereignty of Cod and that the State
will administer the country as His agent;
(it) That the basic law of the land is the Shari rah which
has come to us through our Prophet Muhammad (peace be on him);
(iii).That all such existing laws aseare in conflict with
the Shari^ah will be gradually repealed and no such law as may
—  t-thz} .
be in conflict withy,Shariah shall be framed in future;
1• Maudoodi, op. cit., p•145•
2. Munir Report, pp.215-8*
3* 'K.B. Sayeed, !,The Jama* at-i-Islamii Movement in Pakistan,"
Pacific Affairs, March., 1957, pp.63-4.
4* Munir Report, p.243* I
l'9;iD
(iv) That the State, in exercising its powers, shall have
1no authority to transgress the limits imposed "by Islam,1
This declaration, Maududi "believed, would have a 
far-reaching effect on the national life. The electorate 
would elect those most suited to carry out the intention of 
such declaration* The development of an Islamic state from 
this basis would take but ten. years, *and as this change comes 
about gradually, the previous laws can.be amended or repealed 
and Islamic laws substituted for them,f In his constitutional 
proposals written in August 1952 and submitted to the Constituent 
Assembly of Pakistan, Maududi changed his former views on the 
right of the head of the state to interpret the Shariah and was 
in favour of granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction in questions 
of the repugnancy of acts of the legislature against the Shariah, 
He wrote: ',*• neither the mere insertion of the Objectives 
Resolution,,, nor the inclusion of an article in the Directive 
Principles to the effect that no legislation will be made 
against the Qu3?an and the Suaaah, or even the formation of a 
Committee of %lama for consultative purposes (but not having 
final voice),,, will serve that purpose,.,. That purpose can , 
only be achieved if provision is made in the body of the 
Constitution itself that no Legislature, Central or Provincial,
shall have the power to enact any law which conflicts with the
fip tfe-
Q^uran and the Sunnah. Moreover there should be a specific 
provision in the Constitution that every citizen will have the 
right to challenge in the Supreme Court any law passed by a 
Legislature on the ground of its being repugnant to the teachings 
of the Quran and the Sunnah and therefore ultra virfis of the 
Constitution.1 In addition to his original four demands he
1* Maudoodi, op. cit, pp*54-5» 
2* Ibid., p.56.
5* Ibrd., p,153*
added other new demands relating to civil rights and the 20{
independence of the judiciary, the. responsibility of the state 
to provide food, clothing, housing, medical aid and education 
to every needy citizen, the declaration of the Ahmadiyya community 
as a non-Muslim minority, educational reforms in accordance with 
Islamic idealogy, religious training for civil servants and the
provision of facilities whereby civil servants might observe the.
1 ~. tenets of Islam. The main support for the Jama at comes from
cities. Lahore is its headquarters and its most important branch is
in Karachi* It is still extremely weak in East Pakistan. Maududi has
an appeal among those Mullahs who are neither ultra-reactionary nor
tinged with Westernism. Politically, however, his party has never
demonstrated much strength. It has lacked the funds to wage much of
a campaign and has had continually to fight against government
candidates. The role of the JameT~at against the Ahmadiyya community
2during the 1953 Punjab riots apparently weakened the party.
The Munir Report spoke of 1 the ceaseless clamour for
r*K iIslam and*Islamic State that is being heard from all quarters 
since the establishment of Pakistan.1 But it also stated *that 
the form of Government in Pakistan, if that form is to comply 
with the principles of Islam, will not be democratic is conceded 
1* Maudoodl, op. cit., pp*153-64.
2* The Ahmadis are the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) 
who claimed to be a Prophet and the promised Messiah. The claim, 
according to other Muslims, put him and his followers outside the 
pale of Islam. Prophet Muhammad is believed by the general body of 
Muslims to be the last Prophet. Ahmadis for the first time were shown 
as a separate Muslim sect in the census report of 1901. The number of 
Ahmadis is stated to be in the neighbourhood of 200,000 in Pakistan.
The anti-Ahmadiyya agitation gathered momentum since the establishment 
of Pakistan. Other Muslims, especially the prominent ulama of Pakistan, 
started a movement against the Ahmadis and demanded that the Ahmadis 
should be officially declared as a non-Muslim minority community, that 
Zafrullah Khan (an Ahmadi) be dismissed from the office of Foreign 
Minister and that the Ahmadis be barred from high public offices.
These demands, according to the leading ulama, we**e a corollary from 
the Objectives Resolution. The rejection of the demands culminated in 
the Punjab riot of 1953* Munir Report, pp.9,10,127,186-7*
3* Munir Report, p.231*
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1by the ulama.1 The report pointed out that 1 an Islamic State...
cannot ... be sovereign, because it will not be competent to
abrogate, repeal or do away with any law in the tQui*an or the
Sunnatu... Sovereignty, in its essentially juristic sense, can
only rest with Allah.1 In an Islamic state, therefore, people
cannot make laws, because ^ijma-i-ummat in Islamic jurisprudence
is restricted to ulama and mujtahids of acknowledged status and
> 2
does not at all extend, as in democracy, to the populace, 
legislature in its present sense is unknown to the Islamic 
system... There is in it no sanction for what may, in the modern
3
sense, be called legislation.1 If the ulama point of view was 
to be accepted, the need for a legislature would virtually 
disappear. The idea that law-making was to be confined to the 
practitioners of Islamic law would seem to approach veryclosely
to theocracy. This fear was shared by non-Muslims as well as
of TKe~
by many -other Muslim intelligentsia and professional politicians.
So the framers of the constitution had to confront this 
question for many years, and this hurdle in the way of making a 
constitution proved to be formidable* The Basic Principles 
Committee Report, as adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 
September 1954, ensured a parliamentary form of government. The
real executive authority was vested in a cabinet which would be 
responsible to the legislature. Although there were many Islamic 
provisions and clauses the ulama were not given any special 
privileges to interpret the Islamic principles and the report 
could not be called truly Islamic as demanded by the ulama* The
complicated procedure for dealing with legislation repugnant to
1. Munir Report gw 210.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.211.
the Quran was replaced by a new section. The Supreme Court
rather than the ulama board was given jurisdiction over this 
1
matter* It was provided that for a period of at least twenty- 
five years, the repugnancy section should not apply to 1 fiscal 
and monetary measures, laws relating to banking, insurance,
provident funds, loans and other matters affecting the existing
2economic, financial arid credit system.* Finally came the
recommendation that,the head of ^ fefee state should be a Muslim.
After the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly,
Major-General Iskander Mirza, the new regime*s Minister of
Interior, urged the need to begin fwith a clean slate1 in
planning a new constitution. Hei talked of Controlled democracy1
and said that the attempt to work democracy on British lines
made during the last seven years, had led to disaster. It was
proposed to adopt the American constitutional system with 
%
modifications# In East Pakistan, the muddle which he found 
reinforced the very poor opinion which he had formed in West 
Pakistan about the suitability of parliamentary institutions to 
serve the real needs of the country. Presumably, an executive 
appointed for a fixed term and not dependent for its existence 
on a shifting and uncertain parliamentary majority - was the 
best form of polity to aim at. Mirza began publicly to* voice 
his conviction that religion and politics ought to be kept
4
separate, 1 otherwise there would be chaos.1 Sir Ivor Jennings 
was asked to draft a constitution in which, to quote his words,
1 the American idea of an executive irremovable for four years 
was grafted on to a British system of representation.1 Jennings, 
however, emphasised that there was no intention to produce an
1* -Report of the Basic Principles Committee (1954)» p*41
2. Ibid.
3i H. Peldman, A constitution for Pakistan, pp.66-7.
4* Round Table. December 1954, p*50.
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undemocratic system. On the contrary, it was thought that a
system in which the nature of the government was determined "by
bargains between the leaders of- political groups, as in France,
was likely to be less democratic and more corrupt than a system
in which the government was given four years to carry out its
policy♦*** These ideas did not, of course, please the members
of the Constituent Assembly* Mirza found that if he wanted to
put them into operation, he would have to do things for himself*
The draft constitution which was presented to the Second
Constituent Assembly in January 1956, was the outcome of prolonged
2discussions in the Coalition Party* The Coalition Party, with 
its several component groups - the Muslim league, the United 
Front, the Nizam-l-Islam, the Congress and the United Progressive - 
held diametrically opposite views on fundamental constitutional 
issues* There were months of bitter controversy on the role of 
Islam in the State* But all the Muslim groups in the Coalition 
Party agreed upon Islamic provisions* The Awarai league directed 
the main opposition to the Islamic provisions. The Awamis had 
not only dropped the nomenclature 1 Muslim1 from their organisation 
and opened its door to non-Muslims but had with renewed vigour 
pledged themselves to the joint electorate demand*
H.S. Suhrawardy, the Awami league chief, raised 
objection to calling fa State an Islamic &tate when it is not 
an Islamic $tate.*^ He vehemently opposed restricting the head 
of state to a Muslim. He added: ’Surely calling a Republic an 
Islamic Republic when there is hardly anything in the Constitution 
or in our administration to justify it is not an Islamic provision.••
1* Sir I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Covernment, p.IB*
2. CAPD, vol. i, p.1792, January 9, 1956.
3* Round Table* December 1955, P*76.
4* CAPD, vol. i, p.3655, February 29, 1956*
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Surely limiting the headship of the State to a Muslim in a
country where 88 per cent of the people are Muslims is nothing
1else but childish patter or.a bauble to please some fanaticsr 
By incorporating Islamic provisions, I£tikharuddin said, they
had done *a great injustice to Muslims of the world, and to
2Islam in general.1 The title 1Islamic Republic1 came under 
heavy fire. Three non-Muslim ministers voted with the Awami 
league and others to give a recorded division of forty-seven to
3
twenty-two.
The constitution, in its final form, incorporated 
some Islamic principles, such as the * promotion of Muslim 
tinity and international peace1 and 'promotion of Islamic 
principles.* It was stated that 'steps shall be taken to 
enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively to 
order their lives in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah*• 
Article 198 reads *Ho law shall be enacted which is repugnant 
to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy tjuran and 
Sunnah... and existing law shall be brought into conformity 
with such Injunctions.* But this clause was left to the good 
faith of the legislatures to enforce. The President had to be 
a Muslim and Articles 197 and 198 instructed the President to 
set up *an organization for Islamic research and instruction 
in advanced studies to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim 
society on a truly Islamic basis* and to appoint a commision to 
make recommendations for bringing existing law into conformity 
with the injunctions of Islam. But the personal laws of non- 
Muslims would remain unaffected by this provision. Apart -from 
these few clauses, the constitution did little to intensify the 
Islamic character of the state. The parliamentary system was adopted.
1. CAPD, vol. i, p.3653? February 29, 1956.
2. Ibid., p.3684.
3. Ibid., pp.3410-1, February 21, 1956.
Our survey with regard to the controversy over the
Islamic state will not be complete unless we consider the views
of non-Muslim representatives in the two Constituent Assemblies*
The non-Muslims had pi specific reason? for uneasiness arising
from the decision to bring into being an Islamic state* Their
model was a secular democratic state. They had listened
hopefully to the words of Jinnah. But the gradual compilation
of the proposed constitution showed the addition of more and
more Islamic provisions. It began with the presentation of an
Objectives Resolution, when as many as seventeen amendments
were moved by Hindu members seeking to establish the secular
1position of the state. B.K. Dutta voiced the objections of
the Congress Party. 'Politics and religion belong to different
regions of the mind... Politics... belongs to the domain of
reason. But as you intermingle it with religion, as this
Preamble to this nobly conceived Resolution does, you pass
2into the other sphere of faith.* The clause *as enunciated 
by Islam*, he said, at once created a ruling race, the 
Patricians of Pakistan and condemned the minorities to the 
position of the Plebeians. The nation would remain communally 
divided into two. distinct houses, the minorities tasting neither 
democracy, nor freedom, nor equality, nor social justice but 
being merely tolerated. The leader of the Opposition, S.C.
Chattopadhyaya^also protested Vigorously. The minorities, he 
said, would be reduced to the position of 'the drawers of water 
and hewers of wood.*^ Professor R.K. Chakraverty stated that 
'religion and politics should not be mixed up. Religion is 
after all a matter of faith and belief... a matter private to
1. CAPD, vol. v, pp.98-100.
2. Ibid., pp.13-4.
3. Ibid., pp.27-8.
4. Ibid., p.91*
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one’s life.'*** While the Report of the Basic Principles
Committee (1952) was Being dehated in the Assembly, the Hindu
members roundly attacked both its basic philosophy and
particular provisions, B.K. Dutta feared that the achievement
of Pakistan had encouraged the mullah element and that the
2political leaders were likely to be overwhelmed by them* ’The 
pattern of the constitution proposed is Parliamentary Democracy,1 
said Dutta* An ‘attempt has been made to sew the Islamic design
into it*** You can have it either Islamic or Parliamentary,
3not both at the same time*1 He quoted Blackstone on parliamentary
government and then surveyed prominent Muslim political thinkers
from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, all of whom deviated
from the idea of the Islamic state and leaned towards the idea
4of the sovereignty of the people. The members of the Basic 
Principles Committee, said Dutta, undertook the task abandoned
a thousand years ago, as absurd of reconciling two irreconcilable
5 6 principles. ’Democracy and religiosity cannot go hand in hand.’
The proposal to bring the existing laws into conformity with
Islamic principles was denounced. The different Muslim sects
do not agree on the interpretation of the Quran, much less on
the other three sources of Islamic law. The ’narrow exclusive-ft
ness* that prescribed that the head of state should be a
Muslim would cause the Muslim majority to regard itself as ’God’s
elect*, the non-Muslims to be considered ’helots’, and the
7
country .to lose prestige before the world. In a country with 
an overwhelming Muslim majority the head of fcfee state would 
always be a Muslim without ’^ his inglorious exhibition of an
1* CAPD* vol. v, p.38*
2. CAPD, vol. xv, p.23-
3* Ibid. pp. 22,23.
4. Ibid. p.23-4.
5. Ibid. p.25*
6. Ibid. p. 28*
7. Ibid. pp.28-9,
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utterly selfish outlook.1'*' He referred to the constitutions
adopted by other Muslim countries. He then deplored the
2majority recommendation on separate electorates. Professor
R.K, Chakraverty found the constitution Islamic in so far as
was convenient to the framers, but neither thoroughly Islamic
nor thoroughly modern. The report, he contended,betrayed Jinnah
and Liaquat Ali Khan. The committee had created six classes of
citizens instead of one and by separate electorates had made one
of them a perpetual majority and another in perpetual minority.
It had betrayed the unborn generations by a surrender to mediaevalism
3and priesthood. There were other non-Muslim speakers but only 
one, a Parsi member from the Punjab, professed to be satisfied
4
with the ’undiluted Islamic constitution.* The Hindu members 
threw themselves into an appeal for the principle of joint 
electorates insisting that they needed no special protection, 
that all Pakistanis should be treated alike and there should be
C
no discrimination on the basis of religion. They tabled many 
amendments to liberalize the Basic Principles Committee Report.
But they were defeated by an overwhelming majority on each attempt.
In November 1953, they walked out of the Assembly. In a statement 
in the Assembly before they left, S.C. Chattopadhyaya declared 
that the minority members had worked in the Assembly to make 
Pakistan a modern democratic state but had been disappointed 
by the repeated insistence on the ’two-nation* theory, the 
refusal to assure the minority that its personal laws would not 
be interfered with on the ground of repugnancy to the Quran and 
Sunnah, the setting up of an organisation by the government to 
propogate religion, the name ’Islamic Republic of Pakistan’, the
1. CAPD, vol. xv, p.30.
2. Ibid., pp.30-5.
3. Ibid., pp.76-7, 80.
4. Ibid., p.46; P.D. Bhandara.
5. CAPD, vol. xvi, pp.266 ff.
requirement that the head of -the state should he a Muslim, the 
thrusting of separate electorates on the minorities, the 
undemocratic method of arriving at decisions in the Assembly 
and frequent references and undue emphasis on the Islamic 
constitution. All these factors, he asserted, had helped to 
make the pre'sence of the Hindus in the House useless*1
With one or two exceptions they did not return to the 
Assembly for discussions on the Basic Principles Report until the 
final debate on the adoption Of the report as a whole* After 
the departure of these twelve men, progress was swift because 
the amendments in their names were not moved* On the final day 
of the debate, S.C* Ghattopadhyaya cried outs *.*• we are 
stateless; we are pariahs; we are outlaws*1 Professor R.K* 
Chakraverty characterised the constitution as funfair and
3undemocratic* and as having 1broken the solemn words* or Jinnah* 
When the Basic Principles Committee Report, as amended, was moved 
on September 21, 1954, twenty-nine members, all Muslims, voted in 
favour; eleven members, all Hindus (including - the Scheduled Caste 
members), voted against*^
In the Second Constituent Assembly, the non-Muslim 
members vehemently criticised the Islamic provisions. The 
Congress Party, one of the main components of the Coalition 
government, dissociated themselves from constitution-making 
with respect to three clauses, namely, the nomenclature of the 
constitution, the provision that the head of jfefce state would be
5
a Muslim and the character of the electorate * The Assembly 
made no decision on the vexed question of ;joint versus separate 
electorates and it was left to the provincial assemblies to decide*
CAPB, vol. xv, g>*658-9.
2. Qfifeti, vol. xvi, p.528.
3* Ibid., p.509.
4. Ibid., p.571.
5. CAPB, vol. i, p.3719, February 29, 1956.
6* Ibid* ?pp* 3467-8, February 21, 1956.
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The second great dispute revolved round relations 
between the centre and the provinces and between East and West 
Pakistan* When Pakistan came into existence, it was established 
constitutionally as a federation* The Government of India Act, 
1935 provided the structure of this federation* After its 
inception, the country was faced with grave and abnormal situation 
that could be met only by strong central action. The provinces 
had to act as agents of the central government in the restoration 
of law and order and the establishment of administrative control* 
As the years went by, the degree of central control instead of 
diminishing rather gradually was increased. The central 
government’s powers in legislative, financial, administrative 
and political spheres were so great that, for practical purposes, 
the country’s governmental framework could not be described as 
federal. The most important of these central government’s 
powers was the exercise of political control in provincial 
politics through its power of dismissal and appointment of 
provincial ministry by the provincial Governor who in his 
relations with his ministers was to act as the agent of the 
Governor-General. The highly centralised structure of the 
dominant party, the Muslim League,also contributed towards 
centralisation* Moreover, the central government could always 
exercise administrative control over the provinces through the 
members of the centrally-recruited civil service of Pakistan.
Even within the limited field of provincial control the provinces 
were handicapped by lack of financial resources. This made them 
more and more dependent on the central government. The 1935 Act 
had given the major sources of revenue to the centre. The 
original distribution of sources of revenue was further amended 
to the advantage of the central government* After independence, 
in view of central government’s needs for funds to deal with the
emergency situation, the sharing of the proceeds of income tax
with the provinces was discontinued; the sales tax was taken
over hy the centre although 50 per cent of the net proceeds was
allowed to the provinces subject to a guaranteed minimum for
East Pakistan, The central government also took over the estate
1and succession duties on agricultural land* Sir Jeremy Raisman
in his report (submitted in December$ 195l) recommended that the
original distribution of financial resources as made under the
1935 Act should be resumed and his recommendations were accepted
2by the government. The provinces, particularly East Pakistan, 
however, were not satisfied with the allocation of financial 
resources. The Awami League continued to press for paiity in 
the allocation of financial resources between the East and Vest 
wing during the discussions of the 1956 draft constitution in the 
Constituent Assembly.
Then, there are certain circumstances whereat in the 
very structure of Pakistan which led to difficulties. The 
inherent geographical peculiarity, vix. the existence of two 
wings, separated by / mores,thar^ ftJthousand miles of foreign 
territory and the distribution of population, have no close 
parallel in any other country. These additional difficulties 
created fear, mistrust and suspicion and added to the political 
difficulties of reaching an agreement.
The Objectives Resolution envisaged a federal form of 
government. The decision in favour of a federation was regarded 
by liaquat Ali Khan as the 1 dictate of geography,1 He said: *It 
would be idle to think of a unitary form of Government when the
1* See Callard, op. cit., pp*158-72;
G.W, Choudhury, Constitutional -Development in Pakistan,
pp.200-1;
Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, chs. ix, xii and xvi.
2. Financial Enquiry regarding Allocation of Revenues between 
the Central and Provincial Governments (1952), Report by 
Sir Jeremy Raisman, pp.2-5*
two parts of our country are separated by more than a thousand 
1miles.1 The Interim Report, which marked the second stage of
drafting the constitution, made no attempt to survey all aspects
of the constitutional structure* But the main outlines w*2Ye
visible and its federal structure bore a marked resemblance
to the 1935 Act* One member commented: *So far as this
Constitution is concerned, if Mr. Churchill had been the
Deader of this House (which God forbid), he would have drawn
2
up just such a constitution.* This was a little muddle-
headed as Churchill was the main opponent of the 1935 Acti
The report gave rise to a storm of opposition. A Muslim
leaguer from East Pakistan expressed his fears on the floor of
the House. He stated that the report had aroused grave, although
erroneous apprehensions in East Pakistan. There was a growing
belief that the report contained principles which, if adopted,
would 1 reduce the majority of East Bengal into a minority,1 and
would turn East Bengal into a colony of Pakistan.1 The
provincial autonomy, it was feared, would disappear, leaving a
3unitary central government. Even before the publicatbn of the 
Interim Report, the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Nurul Amin9 
felt it necessary to air the legitimate grievances of the province 
in a speech to the provincial legislature (March 1949). Nurul 
Amin observed: *.♦. the anxiety on the part of the Central 
Government to encroach on every field of provincial activities...
I consider this to be the most unsound and short-sigited policy.
The provinces must be allowed to enjoy the full autonomous 
position, must be as free from the Central Government as it is 
thought practical. But particularly this province of East Bengal
1. CAPD. vol. v, p.5.
2* CAPD, vol. viii, p.163; Shaukat Hyat Khan.
3. Ibid.» p.183; Nur Ahmed.
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which, is so far flung from the capital of the Central Government 
must enjoy the fullest autonomy*1^  East Pakistan1s chief 
complaint against the report was that the bicameral system had 
been so designed as to deprive the province of the majority 
weightage to which it would be entitled on the basis of population. 
Opposition assumed the dimension of a full-scale agitation and 
it seemed that a serious split had occurred between the centre 
and the province.
The Basic Principles Committee Report (1952) 
recommended that Pakistan should be organised as a federation.
There was to be a parity of representation between the two wings 
in both the houses of the legislature. The parity proposals 
gave rise to the sharpest controversy between East and Y/est 
Pakistan which was mainly a Bengali-Punjabi controversy. The 
main point of contention between the two major provinces of 
Pakistan was the quantum of representation for each in the future 
central legislature. More than anything else it was this issue 
which for several years held up progress in drafting a constitution 
for the country. Provincialism had always been recognised as 
a hydra-headed monster posing threats to the unity and stability 
of Pakistan. Since the publication of the Interim Report 
provincial jealousies and rivalries had increased rather than 
diminished. It gave rise to serious disturbances in East Pakistan, 
where the people were convinced that its proposals were designed 
to deprive their province of the majority in the federal 
legislature to which it was entitled on the basis of population, 
while V/est Pakistan-was apprehensive that the Government of 
"Nazimuddin would be swayed by the agitation into making undue
1. East Bengal Legislative Assembly, Proceedings, vol. iii, p.265, 
quoted in Callard, op. cit., p.175*
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concession to the East wing. It was thus in an electric 
atmosphere that the report saw the light of fctee day. It 
attempted to produce an acceptable compromise by the parity 
formula. There wasrto be 400 members* 200 from each wing in
1the lower house and 120 in the upper house, 60 from each wing.
East Pakistan was to lose its majority but to get equal
representation with West Pakistan in the upper house, in respect
of which the original proposal had been that each province,
including even Baluchistan, would have an equal numbei/of seats.
The representatives of West Pakistan, among whom the Punjabis
were the most vocal, regarded this compromise formula as 'an
affront to the dignity of'West Pakistan.1 The press of Karachi
and of the Punjab, with few exceptions, joined in a chorus of
protest, freely accusing the government of surrendering to
pressure from East Pakistan and perpetuating the split between 
3the two wings. Mian fiTumtaz. Daultana, the Chief Minister of
the Punjab, who was one of the members of the Basic Principles 
Committee, did never give his unqualified assent to the parity 
proposals and stated that he had signed the report subject to a 
notecdf dissent. The issue almost developed into a personal
4
dispute between Nazimuddin and Daultana. The political flood
tide swept away the last hope of a completed constitution in 1953*
Pood and economic crisis and his failure to deal.decisively withled to the dismissal of
the anti-Ahmadiyya riots in the Punjab/resulted Nazimuddin'1 % 
(who still commanded a majority in the legislature) d4-sm-iseal- by 
the G-overnor-G-eneral, G-hulam Mohammad^ in April 1953. He was 
replaced by another Muslim Leaguer Mohammed Ali who had been 
active in Bengal politics prior to partition and at the time of 
his appointment was the Ambassador to the United States* The
1. Report of the Basic Principles Committee (1952), pp.11,14.
2. CAPD, vol. viii, p.21.
3* Round Table, March 1953, p.174.
4* Munir Report, p.285.
new Premier, Mohammed Ali,evolved a new formula known as the 
fMohammed Ali formula* to solve the question of representation
in the central legislature* The compromise on representation 
was the result of discussions between the central and provincial 
leaders of the Muslim league*^ The fMohammed Ali formula*, 
which rather surprisingly satisfied the Punjab, was that East 
Pakistan should have its majority in the lower house - 165 out 
of a total of 300 seats - while in the upper house there would 
be 50 seats divided equally among the five units; thus East and
West Pakistan would share equally in the aggregate membership 
’ 2
of both houses* To give the parity reality it was laid down 
that each house should have equal powers, and every measure
3would have to be passed by the upper as well as the lower house.
In the case of a difference of opinion between the two the bill 
would have to be placed before a joint session to be passed by 
a majority vote, but the majority should have to include at 
least 30 per cent of the members present and voting from each 
.of the two wings* As'a further safeguard to maintain the 
balance between the two wings it was provided that a vote of 
confidence and no-confidence could be moved only in a joint 
session, and could be passed by majority only if the members 
voting for it included at least 30 per cent of the members from
each wing. No controversial measure could be passed unless it
4received substantial support from both wings* The country as
5a whole welcomed the new formula with relief.
While the Report of the Basic Principles Committee (:1952) was 
being discussed in the Assembly, several members raised their 
voice against the unitary features of the report. According to 
B.K. Dutta, the report had * reduced the Provinces to no more
1. CAPD* vol. xv, p.14.
2. Ibid*, p.13.
3. IWd., 14-5.
4. Ibid., p*15.
5* Round Table. December 1953> p*85*
1than mere local bodies.1 He called for a constitution on 
a new model which was akin to Gandhi's Panchayat Raj. ’The 
sovereignty of the people will find full expression in the 
village and other primary republics, which will surrender 
powers they are.naturally incapable of wielding to higher and 
higher bodies* Call it a federation or a confederation, let
2no one funk before this unorthodox idea of constitution-making.1 
His ge^l was to achieve maximum decentralisation of power 
along with a decentralised economy. The nationalisation of
basic industries and rational over-all planning for the state
3as a whole would be required. Shaukat Hyat Khan insisted that
the fullest autonomy should be given to the provinces. fOur
4call is autonomy, autonomy, and autonomy.1 Contrary to the
report, the residuary powers must remain with the provinces.
Iftikharuddin argued against the Mohammed Ali formula of
representation and a strong centre* The former would produce
only provincial antagonism. Centralisation would not ensure
unity and East Pakistan would revolt against the nominally
5federal government. The allottment of 67 of the most 
important subjects of legislation on the federal list, 37 on 
the concurrent list and 36 only on the provincial list was, in
g
his opinion, ’totally unjust’ and ’most unnatural*’ Nur
Ahmed observed: ’The whole idea which runs through the whole
gamut of this Report, is to make a strong Central head, a strong
7Centre tantamount?to monarchical form of Government.1 Pazl-ul- 
Huq voiced the demands of East Pakistan for complete zonal
o
autonomy on the basis of the ’Lahore Resolution' of 1940.
1. CAPE, vol. xv, p.38.
2. Ibid. , p.44.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. , p.134.
5. Ibid. , pp.295-7, 305
6. Ibid. , pp.304-5.
7. Ibid. , p.149.
8. Ibid. , p.397.
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The East Pakistani members, especially the Hindus, demanded
that residuary powers should '.Vest--an the units, and that powers
in respect of defence, currency and foreign affairs only should
1be conferred on the centre. Piroz Khan Uoon, the Chief Minister
of the Punjab, urged that more powers be delegated to the
provincial government in East Pakistan and to the provinces in
West Pakistan jointly to be exercised by some sort of
administration. There was a considerable body of opinion in
favour of giving more powers to East Pakistan because it had
been felt for some time, especially in view of&he experience
over the past seven years that the province must be administered
in many subjects by the legislature in Dacca rather than by the
2central legislature in Karachi# The framers of the constitution
argued in favour of a strong central government. Mahmud Husain
called for fa federal constitution but with as much centralization 
3
as possible# A.K. Brohi, the Law Minister, argued that if there 
had been geographical contiguity between the two wings, then the 
principle of decentralisation of power might have been the basis 
of the constitution. But to overcome this natural barrier in 
the way of the unity of the people of Pakistan there was no
4alternative but to provide for a strong central government#
The framing of the constitution was affected by the 
changing fortunes of the political parties and was closely tied 
to current politics. In the elections in East Pakistan held in 
March 1954,, the United Pront, ranging from the right-wing 
Nizam-i-Islam to the Communist G-anatantri Dal# won 223 of the
5237 Muslim seats, the Muslim League 10, in an Assembly of 309#
The political and economic ills of the province, the language
1# CAPD# vol. xv, pp#152-3* See also CAPD# vol# xvi, pp.375ff#
2# CAPD, vol. xvi, pp#356-7, 359*
3* CAPD* vol# xv, p.155*
4* Ihid., p*349.
5* Civil and Military Gazette* April 5, 1954#
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issue and the fear of having an undemocratic constitution, were 
among the causes of this overwhelming defeat of the League*
Thus, it was a vote against the outgoing provincial ministry, 
which stood thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the people 
of East Pakistan. To a considerable- extent it was a vote 
against the central government on the grounds that it was Muslim 
League itself and that it supported the provincial League and 
its unpopular leaders* The people in East Pakistan had become 
violently anti-centre and more provincial and parochial in 
outlook. They had almost felt that with the departure of the 
British, the only change that had come to them politically was 
the change of masters. Politicians, industrialists, educationists, 
technicians, engineers and others from West Pakistan were no more 
than a bunch of 'foreigners1 and 1 exploiters*• These charges 
were much the same as had been levelled against the Hindus and 
the British during pre-independence days* Since independence,
East Pakistan was being administered in all important matters, 
from Karachi. The dearth of trained civil servants among the 
Bengali Muslims made it necessary for the local administration 
to be carried on mainly, at the higher levels, by officers deputed 
from the Punjab. The main Bengali grievances were that they were 
treated unfairly in such matters as the allocation of revenues, 
development projects, and government posts by the central 
government.1 Writing in Far Eastern Survey in 1959, R.D. Lambert 
advanced three reasons which contributed to Bengali regionalism:
(i) the gradual isolation of East Pakistan from the surrounding 
area, (ii) the sense of threat and exploitation which made 
regionalism an aggressive force, and (iii) the continuous
1* S. Maron, "The Problem of East Pakistan", Pacific Affairs* 
June 1955, p.132.
dialectic of regional versus national loyalty*1 The United
Front leaders cleverly exploited the situation* In its
election manifesto, the United Front, among other things, had
demanded complete autonomy for Fast Pakistan in all matters
2
except defence, currency and foreign affairs* In April; 1954*
the United Front formed a government with Faz:l-ul-Huq as Chief
Minister. The United Front insisted after the elections that
the East Pakistani incumbents in the central assembly no longer
represented the province since most of the members of the
Constituent Assembly were members of the league* It demanded
the resignation of the central cabinet, the dissolution of the
Constituent Assembly, and an end to constitution-making until
3
the national assembly had been reconstructed*
The proceedings of the Constituent Assembly had become 
somewhat unrealistic ever since the results of the East Pakistan 
elections had proved that members from that province had forfeited 
the confidence of their constituents and were no longer represent­
ative of public opinion in East Pakistan. They continued their 
deliberations in the Assembly and went ahead in giving final 
touches to the draft constitution. The most vital and important 
clauses of the draft constitution were passed when attendance 
was thinnest. At times it was difficult to raise the necessary 
quorum for holding the Assembly session. Meanwhile, the two-month- 
old United Front ministry was dismissed in May 1954 by the Covernor- 
General under emergency powers and East Pakistan was put under
A
Governor1s rule. In the Assembly, the Bengali group with the 
help of certain League members from West Pakistan attempted to
1. R.D. Lambert, "Factors in Bengali Regionalism in Pakistan",
Far Eastern Survey, April 1959, p*49.
2. R.L. Park, "East-Bengal; Pakistani Troubled Province," Far
Eastern Survey, May 1954, pp.72-3*
3* Gr.J. Calder, "Constitutional Debates in Pakistan II," Muslim 
World, April 1956, p.150*
4* There was a general breakdown of law and order, and Fazl-ul- 
Huq was charged with treasonable activities.*
curb the powers of high-handed Ghulam Mohamm&d, First, the
five-year-old (Public and Representative Offices Disqualification
Act) was repealed; thereby, the politicians thougtt they had
1
disarmed the executive from coercing them. Next, without the 
usual notice a bill was introduced and rushed through the 
Assembly divesting the Governor-General of the power to dismiss 
his cabinet which still enjoyed the Assembly’s confidence and
2making it obligatory for him to accept the advice of his ministers.
The Governor-General responded by dissolving both the Constituent
Assembly and the incumbent cabinet a month later. The step which
was characterised as a ’constitutional coup’, had all the
elements of drama. It was a surprise move while the Governor-
General was away on tour. The bill was passed in great haste
and without any discussion. At once it was hailed as a democratic
move in one quarter and in another condemned as a reactionary
step aimed at placing powers in the hands of an ’unrepresentative 
3
coterie,1 The consequent legal proceedings and constitutional
4crisis need not be discussed here#
From the protracted, and not uninteresting, legal 
controversy over the Governor-General* s powers and functions 
which followed, the finding emerged that only a new Constituent 
Assembly could frame a constitution. In June 1955, complying 
with an order from the Governor-General, the provincial 
legislatures elected a new Constituent Assembly consisting of 
eighty members equally divided between the two wings of Pakistan,
\ v . . . . . . .  *
with eleven seats reserved for non-Muslims, The Muslim League 
with twenty-six members was still the largest, but without an
1, CAPD, vol, xvi, pp.419-51,
2, Ibid., pp.499-502.
3. Round Table, December 1954, p*48.
4. See Sir I, Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan.
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absolute majority. The ;f»arty position in the second Constituent
1
Assembly was as follows:
Muslim League 26
United Front 16
Awami League 15
Congress 4
Scheduled Castes Federation 3
United Progressive Party 2
Others 16
80
As a result of its failure to obtain a majority the 
Muslim League was forced to form the first coalition government 
in the eight years of Pakistani history with H.S. Suhrawardy's 
Awami League. £he -parliamentary government was restored in 
East Pakistan and the United front ministry assumed office with 
Abu Hussain Sarkar as Chief Minister. Earlier, during the 
period of Governors rule the United front had split, the Awami 
League having separated itself from the rest of the Front which 
was still led by Fazl-ul-Huq* In August 1955, Ghulan Mohammad, 
seriously ill, was replaced in office by Iskandar Mirza. Meanwhile, 
the Muslim League transferred its support from Mohammed Ali to 
Choudhury Mohammed Ali, the former Finance Minister and civil 
servant, who became Prime Minister and formed a coalition 
government with Fazl-ul-Huq's United Front in August 1955* Both 
the United Front and the Awami League offered.to join the coalition 
with the Muslim League on their own terms. The United Front*s 
terms were that the Awami League should be excluded from the 
government and that in exchange for support for the West Pakistan 
fone unit1 plan, the Muslim League should agree to regional 
autonomy in the new constitution. The,Awami League offered to 
join the coalition on the terms that Suhrawardy should be the
1. Callard, op. cit#. p.64*
should he the Prime Minister, that the new constitution should 
provide for joint electorates,, and that Bengali should he adopted 
as a state language. As it turned out, the Awami League's 
terms were not accepted and it moved into opposition, Fazl-ul- 
Huq, who not long ago charged with treasonable activities, became 
fc&e Minister of Interior*
The first important and the most radical measure 
passed by the1 Second Constituent Assembly was the Establishment 
of West Pakistan Act - the so-called 'one unit' scheme. Many 
people had for some time been pressing for this kind of arrangement 
which would simplify the most difficult constitutional problem - 
the representation of the East and West wings in the central 
legislature by creating a unified Western wing as the counter­
part of an already homogeneous Eastern wing. Even Jinnah and 
Liaquat Ali Khan seemed to have favoured this idea. But Jinnah 
died before he could do anything about it and Liaquat Ali too 
died before he could tackle the problem* There was a proposal
to similar effect made by the Baluchistan Muslim League in 
2December 1947* There were many budding politicans who put up 
strong opposition to the integration of West Pakistan initially 
because they thought that their personal position would be at 
stake. There was also the fear among the smaller provinces in 
West Pakistan of Punjabi domination (the Punjab being the largest 
province both in population and area in the Western wing of the 
country). As a compromise the idea of zonal federation caught on. 
This scheme was put forward hy Firoz Khan Noon in the first 
Constituent Assembly in September 1954* In such a federation 
the provinces and their assemblies would be left intact, but
1. Peldman, op. cit., p.97.
2. L.F. Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan, p. 140;:
Peldman, op.cit., pp.77~S.
would send their representatives to the zonal federation
assembly which would administer difficult inter-provincial
1
subjects such as communications and irrigation*
Firoz Khan Noon revealed that a committee, appointed
to consider distribution of powers between the centre and the
provinces* unanimously decided that the provinces of West Pakistan
2
should be united into *one unit1* This was challenged by other
West Pakistani leaders. The Chief Minister of Sind, Pirzada Abdus
Sattar,voiced firm opposition to such a scheme. fAt no time •»**
was this one-unit question or the Zonal Federation question
raised throughout all these six or seven years that we have
worked on this Constitution.1 He further said that the proposal
had come before the Muslim League Party meeting and the resolution
in favour of * one unit1 was defeated by thirty-two to two*^
When the Assembly was dismissed the government had less
need to worry about political opposition. It was alleged that
three provincial ministries, the Pirzada ministry in Sind (November
1954), the Rashid ministry in N.-W.F.P* (July 1955), and the
Noon ministry in the Punjab (May 1955) were dismissed by the
5central government on this issue. The scheme had first been
announced to the public by the Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali,in
November 1954. In the words of the Prime Minister, 1 their
^provinces} existence has served to breed provincialism* by
dividing the people in the West wing into Punjabis, Baluchis,
Sindhis, Patltans and so on. Within a month the provincial
assemblies of N.-W.F.P., Sind, and the Punjab met and voted
7their approval of the scheme. Ghulam Mohammad was so convinced
1. CAPD, vol. xvi, pp.356-95 Round Table, December 1954, pp.46-7.
2. CAPD, vol. xvi, p.357.
3* Ibid., p.371*
^* Ibid *, p.372*
5. Feldman, op. cit., p.84.
6. Round Table. March 1955, fp.175.
7. Callard, op. cit., p.187.
that unification was essential to the best interests of the
country as a whole, that at the end of 1954 and the beginning
of 1955, he tried to achieve it by purely executive action. He
had set up a council composed of Governors, ministers and high-
ranking civil servants to work out the administrative problems
involved in the integration. He was defeated, because of legal
obstacles pointed out by the Federal Court.**■
Suhrawardy, who as a Law Minister committed himself to
supporting the bne unit1 bill,now turned out to be its most
2uncompromising opponent, and when the new Minister for 
Parliamentary Affairs, Sardar Amir Azam Khan* introduced 
the bill in August 23, 1955,in the Assembly, it came under 
heavy fire from the Awami Leaguers, who made every attempt to 
obstruct its passage. The Bed-Shirt leader, Khan Abdul G-haffar 
Khan, and a prominent Awami Leaguer, the Pir Sahib of Manki 
Sharif, declared in most unambiguous terms their uncompromising
v
attitude towards the plan. They insisted that the question of 
West Pakistani merger was not an executive function of the 
central government, but was fundamentally a constitutional issue 
and should be decided in accordance with.the wishes ofjfche people 
through a referendum. They feared that if *one unit1 would come
into being it would be under the complete domination of the
3Punjabis.
Debate occupied thirty days of the Assembly's time 
and was frequently heated and bitter. The bill was attacked on 
two main grounds! that its real motive was to diminish the power 
of East Pakistan, and that in its origin and content the bill 
was arbitrary and undemocratic. * Fazlur Rahman, an independent 
member, pointed out that its effect would be to emphasise the
1. L.F. Rushbrook Williams, op. cit., p.141.
2. Suhrawardy said that he agreed with the principle of the bill
but the change in his attitude was necessitated by*a change 
in the very basis of this One-Unit Bill*. CAPD, vol. i, 
p.644, September 10, 1955.
3. Round Table. September 1955, pp*3B9-90.
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division of the country* !Sir, it has "been stated the greatest
merit of the Bill is to do away with the distinction between
Punjabis and Sindhis and Pathans and this and that but you do not
re&lixe that by dividing Pakistan into two, you are manifold
magnifying that provincialism, by making it a local patriotism
for the two regions* Then no longer the cry will be Punjabis
1and Sindhis but the cry will be Bengalis and Non-Bengalis*1
The essence of the bill, said Abul Mansur Ahmad, a prominent
Awami League leader, 'was that the political leaders of West
Pakistan fmust be able to talk to people of Hast Bengal in one
voice so that they may not use that position of numerical
superiority* That is the unfortunate basis for the integration
of West Pakistan* The very idea is wrong* If I were left with
bringing an integration Bill I would have given a much better
Bill which would not have been based upon fear for and conspiring
2against East Bengal.1  ^ Mian Jaffar Shah of N.-W.F.P.. moved 
that the bill for the creation of West Pakistan should be 
circulated for the purpose of obtaining public opinion by April
1, 1956 and added that the sponsors of the bill had 1 hatched a 
conspiracy*1 The general trend of the opposition was not so 
much to the general principle of the bill,'though they attempted 
to delay its acceptance by moving the motion that the bill be 
circulated for eliciting public opinion and that a referendum 
should be held. The members from East Pakistan objected to the 
inclusion of Karachi in the integrated province on the ground 
that a city that had been built up with national tax funds should 
be handed over as a source of income and prestige to the govern­
ment of one province, and demanded that it should remain a
1* dAfcii, vol. i, p*274, August 24, 1955.
2. Ibid*» p.1423, September3f>>1955*
3* Ibid., p.268, August 24, 1955.
1
separate entity as the federal capital of the whole of Pakistan.
On September 30, 1955? the Assembly passed the *one unit* bill
merging 310,000 square miles into a single province* The vote
2was 43-13, with 24 members abstaining* The *one unit* was
3
inaugurated in October 14, 1955#
As a constitution-making body, the new Assembly did
better than its predecessor, from whose immense legacy of
reports, memoranda and conclusions it profited* It began work
in July 1955 and presented a draft constitution in January of
the following year* It had also to surmount greater difficulties,
as unlike the first Assembly, there was no party with an
absolute majority. The Assembly was repeatedly adjourned in
November and December 1955 because the Coalition Party could not
resolve differences on constitutional matters* The different
groups in the party resorted to pressure tactics to get their
respective demands incorporated in the draft constitution.
There were months of bitter controversy on the.old issues such
as the role of Islam in the state, the strong versus weak centre,
fefee joint electorates versus separate electorates* The Congress
and the United Progressive Party which formed the coalition
threatened to cross the floor if the demand for joint electorates
was not conceded while the Nizam-i-Islam and the Muslim League
4would have nothing to do with joint electorates*
It seemed paradoxical that the United Front of Fazl-ul- 
Huq, so long out of power, was demanding maximum provincial 
autonomy, but now in office, was prepared to confer much wider
1* CAPD* vol. i, pp.268ff, August 24, 1955#
2* Ibid., pp.1471-2, September 30, 1955,
3* The tribal areas and Frontier States were expressly exiuded 
from the legislative power of the West Pakistan legislature, 
and the Governor of West Pakistan5in administering and 
legislating for these 1 special areas1>were to be under the 
general supervisory control of the Governor General*
4* Round Table, March 1956, • p.178*#; G.W. Choudury, op.cit* *P*162»
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powers on the centre, though it made a few important concessions 
by adding to the provincial list, such subjects as railways and 
industries* The Awami league insisted that no constitutional 
scheme would be acceptable to it if it failed to incorporate 
the famous '21 point1 programme (the election manifesto of the 
Awami league - United Front combination). Abul Mansur Ahmad told 
the Constituent Assembly that he did not find anything common 
between the two wings of the country except a common religion 
(barring a section of the people of East Pakistan) and the fact 
that they achieved independence on a common platform. Apart from 
these, everything is different: languages, traditions, cultures, 
customs, calenders, standard times, and even climate* He even 
spoke of the two wings as 'two countries' and 'two peoples.1 
He would not comprise even if he were convinced that Pakistan 
with a centre with only three subjects would not become a stable 
state.^
The left-wing of the Awami league led by Maulana
Bhashani had even held out a threat of secession* Addressing
a meeting jib Dacca on January 15 > 1956, he said that if the
centre did not right the wrong 'East Pakistan would have to
othink in terms of secession.* In the Assembly, Abul Mansur 
Ahmad launched a bitter attack against the draft constitution*
He regarded the draft constitution as *a bad replica of the 
Government of India Act, 1955, and a poor copy of the Indian 
Constitution*' East Pakistan's grievances in the financial 
sphere found better expression in the Assembly. It was 
consistently demanded that the constitution should ensure a 
fair and equitable distribution of resources in the absence of
1* CABD» vol. i, pp.1814-6, January 16, 1956. 
2* Round Table» March 1956, p.179.
CAPD, vol. i, p.1870, January 17, 1956.
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which provincial autonomy, it was feared, would become a
farce. Abul Mansur Ahmad referred to the anomalous disparity
between the two wings in the federal and military services,
development of industries, distribution of foreign exchange,
foreign aid and financial aid from the centre, and demanded
1that there should be parity in all respects. At 2tur Rahman
Khan, another distinguished Awami Leaguer, stated f... we must
have our economic freedom, economic liberty, because the two
2Unites are altogether different.'*
Iftikharuddin remarked that by giving East Pakistan
*a farce of federalism* the constitution-makers were actually
3
’setting up a unitary form of government.* He suggested that
a * federation or a sub-federation of linguistic Provinces in the
West, and a confederation on equal basis with limited subjects
a
with East Pakistan..* is the best way to national unity.*
Hamidul Huq Choudhury on behalf of the government pointed out
the absurdity of running the central government with only three
subjects. He claimed^ hat the draft constitution contained full
regional autonomy for East Pakistan and restricted the powers
5of the centre to the barest minimum.
The relation between the executive and the legislature,
particularly the powers and position of the head of the state
assumed great importance in view of certain controversial and
undemocratic actions of the head of the state under the interim
constitution. The draft had to be modified considerably in
respect of the provisions relating to the powers and position
6'of the head of -the state* A suggestion was made that the Prime
1. CAPD, vol. i, pp.l843ff*, January 17, 1956.
Ibid., p.2124, January 27, 1956.
3. Ibid., p.3684, February 29, 1956.
4. Ibid., p.3683.
5. Ibid., pp*2096ff., January 26, 1956.
6. See Ibid., February 14, 1956. Article 37 read: *... the
President shall act in accordance with the advice of the. 
Cabinet**
& & o
Minister should he elected by the parliament so that the
discretionary power of the head of -tfce state might not he
misused* It was alleged that under the interim constitution
the head of ’Wae state appointed somebody (Mohammed Ali of
Bogra) who was not even a member of the parliament and who was
1 flown from Washington without having any footing on the soil1
1and was 'planted as our Prime Minister.' Not only this, 'people
who have been turned out and kkifrked out from their constituencies,
2they have been made Ministers of our country'. The United
Front, which previously was very critical of emergency provisions,
retained almost all provisions of the draft constitution of
1954* The Awami League criticised the emergency provisions,,
which they thought would be a 'derogatory to the principle of
provincial autonomy* and occasion might arise when certain
provisions might be misused, especially when the centre and the
provinces would not be governed by the same political party.
They tried to restrict the central government's power of
interference in provincial matters only in times of 'war',
'external aggression' or 'armed rebellion', and opposed its
't 3application to 'internal disturbance.' Mahmud Ali of the
Ganatantri Dal referred to the Section 92-A of the Government
of India Act, 1935 (as amended) which was misused for political 
4ends. He added: we do niit understand, what is meant by
internal disturbance. Anything may be internal disturbance.' 
Similarly, the terms 'security of Pakistan* and 'the security 
of economic life of Pakistan' were stated to be vague. 'Anything
5 •
may be considered as endangering the economic life of Pakistan.*
1. CAPD, vol. i, p.3081, February 14, 1956.
2* Ibid., p.3083*
5* Ibid.« pp.2795ff., February 9, 1956.
4* Ibid., p.2797.
5* Ibid., p.3255, February 17, 1956.
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The federal framework of the constitution formed a
logical continuation of the provisions of the 1935 Act. In the
eight or nine years before the adoption of the constitution
virtually no steps had been taken to expand the degree of
autonomy of the provinces. It was not, therefore, to be expected
that the constitution-makers wouid be willing to permit a drastic ^
revision of the distribution of powers to begin in 1956. However,
the constitution made some concessions to the supporters of
maximum provincial autonomy. The number of items allotted to
1
the provinces was much greater than before. There were
provisions for parity in the services of the country and for
autonomy in certain subjects of legislation, such as railways
and industries. Residuary powers were vested in the provinces
whereas in the draft constitution of 1954 they were vested in the
head of state* The constitution, on the other hand, had made
little changes in regard to the distribution of financial
resources^which was the focal point of controversy between the
central government and the province of Bast Pakistan,, except that
estate and succession duties on agricultural land and stamp duty
were transferred to the provinces. The administrative relations
between the centre and the provinces also remained unchanged.
The federal structure in this sphere showed marked tendencies
towards central control.
Another crucial issue involving antagonism between tke.
East and West was that of the national language. This issue
caused the greatest anger and resentment in Bast Pakistan. Nearly
55 per cent of the total population speaks Bengali, whereas 28
2per cent speaks Punjabi and 7 per cent Urdu. But in West Pakistan
1. One reason for this sudden increase in the provincial list
is that, while nine federal taxes were grouped as one item, 
twenty provincial taxes were listed separately.
2. Figures are according to the 1951 census.
the common language among all of them is Urdu* Some of the
advocates of Urdu managed to convey the impression that the
defence of Bengali was both un-Islamic and opposed to the
interests of national unity.1 It was made clear from the start
that the national leaders intended to insist on Urdu as the
state language. In February 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan, in reply
to an amendment (moved by a Congress member) to the Assembly
rules to permit Bengali to be used in the House along with Urdu
and English, stated: f... Pakistan has been created because of
the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this sub-continent and
the language of a hundred million Muslims is Urdu... Pakistan
~is a Muslim State and it must have its lingua franca the
2language of the Muslim nation.1 About a month later Jinnah*s 
speech at Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, could leave no 
doubt concerning his view. * Let me tell you in the clearest 
language that there is no truth that your normal life is going 
to be touched or disturbed so far as your Bengali language is 
concerned... It is for you, the people of this province, to 
decide what shall be the language of your province. But let me 
make it very clear to you that the State language of Pakistan
3
is going to be Urdu and no other language.1
The people of East Pakistan remained dissatisfied 
over the language issue, and after the dominant personality of 
Jinnah was removed by his death, discontent be.came both audible
and visible. The Interim Report*s flat declaration that Urdu
4should be the national.language of Pakistan was subjected to 
severe criticism in East Pakistan. In February 1952 serious 
rioting broke out at Dacca. The immediate cause of the trouble
1* At~ciur Rahman Khan ascribed this view to Liaquat Ali and
to Punjabi leaders. CAPD, vol. i, p.518, September 6, 1955*
2. CAPD. vol. ii, p.17*
3* Speeches - Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah as G-overnor-G-eneral
of Pakistan. 1947-1948, p.86.
4. CAPP. vol. viii, p.41*
Iwas the language issue* In his tour of the province Prime 
Minister Nazimuddin (himself a Bengali) emphasised in a 
public speech that Urdu would have to be recognised as the 
sole state language of Pakistan, There was great indignation, 
especially among the student communities. For five days wild 
disorder prevailed at Dacca, Chief Minister Nurul Amin hastily 
moved a resolution in the provincial assembly calling on the 
central government to adopt Bengali as one of the state 
languages.
In April 1952 VNur Ahmed moved a motion in the
Constituent Assembly urging the adoption of Bengali as one of
2the state languages* The mover proposed his motion but
declined to speak to it. Other Muslim leaguers from East
Pakistan sat silent. The case for Bengali had to be.uyged
entirely by the Hindus, 'Sir,' said D,N, Dutta, 'it is most
regrettable that silenoe has been imposed upon my friends who
come from East Bengal1 The League utlimately voted solidly
A
for the postponement of a decision on the issue. Later that 
year, when the Report of the Basic Principles Committee was 
published, it made no recommendation as to the state language* 
The omission of all mention of language had been criticised as 
a defect of the report. The postponement of a decision resulted 
in uncertainty, bitterness and suspicion for the next two years, 
The framers of the constitution could not defer the decision for 
an indefinite period. The victory of the United Front (the 
language issue figured prominently in its election manifesto) 
compelled the Muslim League leaders at the centre to re-open
1* Round Table, June 1952, p.258*
2, CAPD, vol. xi, p.22*
3* Ibid,* p,37* Some members from West Pakistan, such as Shaukat
Hyat Khan, Sardar Asadullah Jan Khan>and Seth Sukhdeb^supported 
the motion. Ibid,, pp,25ff*
4* Ibid,, pp*46-7*
the issue. In April 1954, the Muslim,League Parliamentary 
Party agreed in terms of a 'language formula* that both
1Urdu and Bengali should be the official languages of Pakistan.
The 1language formula* which was accepted by the 
Constituent Assembly in May 1954 was to be found in the Report 
of the Basic Principles Committee, as adopted, by the Constituent 
Assembly. The report recognised Urdu and Bengali as the official 
languages of Pakistan, but expressed the pious hope that 1 the 
State should take all measures for the development and growth 
of a common national language* (without mentioning the name of
p
the common language). The 1956 Constitution did not entertain 
any hope of a common language^and recognised both Urdu and 
Bengali. * ' ,
1. Feldman, op. cit., p.53.
2. Report of the Basic Principles Committee (1954), p.72.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Both Indian and Pakistani Constitutions were largely 
moulded by the circumstances in which they were born. The Indian 
Constitution was the outcome of nearly three years' labour on the 
part of the Assembly and the country's leading constitutional 
experts, who had studied all the democratic constitutions in the 
world for adaptation to suit Indian needs and conditions. 'This 
was mainly the work of men trained in British constitutional 
ideas and adopted both the general character a  ^ -f the
detailed provisions of the 1935 Act. The Times .commented: 'Indeed,
A
Lord Templewood and other framers of the comprehensive G-overnment
of India Act of 1935 will find their labours embodied in many of its
fundamental features'. , Lurga Las Basu,
who analysed the sources which go to make up the Indian Constitution,
estimates ,that 75 per cent of the constitution owes its origin to the
Act of 1935* But its federal form is borrowed from Canada, its
ideological contents (namely, the fundamental rights and the
Hirective principles) from Eire and the U.S.A, while the principles
1
of responsible government are, of course, British. Sardar Hukam
Singh, the Sikh representative, described the constitution as a
’hybrid' on the floor of the Assembly: ’We have substituted', he
said, 'an American head in the form of a President, replaced the
old limbs by an English parliamentary system, poured Australian
flexibility in bones and flesh, infused Canadian look- of a single
judiciary and added an Irish appendix of Lirective Principles and
thus brought out a hybrid which we have been pleased to name the
2Indian Constitution.’
1. L.L. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, vol.i, p*5*
2. GAIL, vol.xi, p.749.
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The establishment of British rule brought into being 
educated middle classes attracted to Western ideas and methods.
The new big cities, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras' - represent a new 
principle: the organisation of the city as an independent unit.
We witness the full paraphernalia of European city life, with 
sheriffs, mayors, comporations and aldermen. It is the city that 
has created the middle classes in India. The emergence of the 
middle classes both as leaders in political and economic life 
and as reservoirs of essential scientific skills, has been in the
' J
main the outcome of the new life in the cities._ The growth of
organised city life has rendered obsolete the old political
1structure based on a rural economy. The new factors which
undermined the traditional social order were those of Western
education, a capitalist economy, a free judiciary, the press and
parliamentary institutions. These not only supplied the ideological
principle of liberalism but created new social classes to champion
2
those principles. A large proportion of the members of the 
Indian Constituent Assembly were lawyer-politicians, products 
of the big cities. Thus, the constitution framed by these people 
owed a great deal to Western political philosophy, and more 
especially to British liberal thought, which had powerfully 
incluenced Indian leaders. It is,therefore,not surprising that the 
constitution while it borrowed from the other countries, derived its 
inspiration from the British parliamentary system. ‘Borrowings’, 
according to Sir. B.N. Rau, one of the architects of the Indian 
Constitution, ’have been adapted to India’s peculiar circumstances.’ 
’To profit from the experience of other countries or from the past 
experience of one’s own is the path of wisdom. There is another 
advantage in .borrowing not only the substance but eyen the language
1. K.M. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance, pp.326—7.
2. B.B. Misra, The Indian Middle classes, pp.338-9.
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of established constitutions; for we obtain in this way the 
benefit of the interpretation put upon the borrowed provisions 
by the countries of their origin and we thus avoid ambiguity or 
doubt1 . But the Indian Constitution differs materially from the 
British constitution not only in being a written instrument but 
also in its contents (for example, the head of state is hereditary 
in Britain and elected in India^while the British Constitution
tfie
contains nothing corresponding to^directive principles;. Although
it might be said that the constitution had borrowed the idea of
fundamental rights and directive principles from external sources,
they were not entirely foreign to India. The basic- conception of
a law wfiich even kings could not alter and .had to obey in the fear
of deposition, was familiar in ancient India as early as the second
century B.C, and even the directive principles of social policy can
2be found in the Arthasastra of the fourth century B.C. Even the
position of the President as a constitutional head was rooted in
ancient India. 'It is not surprising’, said Rau 'because India
has been familiar from ancient times with the idea of ICings acting on
the advice of Ministers and occasionally, even changing Ministers
3in response to the will of the people.’ The Gandhian section of 
the Congress Party exercised important formative influences. Some 
of the ideals for which Gandhi lived and died (such as prohibition,
village panchayats «6o$Aa&e andustries, and the abolition 
of untouchability), were embodied in the constitution by his 
followers. A school of political thought advocated the introduction 
of the American presidential system, and some Muslim members preferred 
the Swiss composite executive. These proposals lost favour.
Altogether British constitutional ideas predominated, and Jennings
1. Rau, India’s Constitution in the Making, p.361.
2. Rau, 'The Indian Constitution - 1*, Manchester Guardian, May 2,1949.
See also Hindu, August 12, 1949*
3* Hindu, August 12, 1949.
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described the constitution as ra series.of lessons in British'
1
constitutional principles1.
One of the major difficulties which confronted the
framers of the Pakistani Constitution was how to reconcile the
requirements of an Islamic state with the accepted practices
of modern.democracy* '... The whole principle on which Pakistan
was .mooted and then established was Islamic* It was not a
territorial or an economic community that was seeking a state,
but a religious community. The drive for an Islamic state in
India was in origin not a process by which a state sought
2Islamicness but one by which Islam sought a state.1 Thus, in 
the case of Pakistan 1 the whole raison d!etre of the state is 
Islam: it is Islam alone which brought it into being, and Islam alone
■r 1
which holds it together.1 The Muslim League, a nationalistic
coalition of heterogeneous elements with diffftvga&j; ideas, proposed
the formula for Pakistan. The- leadership came largely from the
Westernising middle classes who were drawn mainly from the U.P.
with but a few from Bengal. They were marked off from the rest of
the Indian middle classes in an increasingly communal situation
by being Muslim, by being a minority which by its own admission
less advanced and severely disadvantaged.^" When Pakistan was first
established, only a very small minority of Muslims advocated that
ft
the state should be secular rather than Islamic. Unlike their
counterparts in India, the Westernising middle classes of Pakistan
6had failed to evolve a successful ideology. They merely voiced 
the demands of the people. The growth of big cities which had 
facilitated the emergency of middle classes in India had been
1. Jennings, The Approach to. Self^G-overnment, p. 16.
2. W.C. Smith, Pakistan as an Islamic State, p. 21.
3. Ibid., p.29.
4. W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, p.222;. See also S. Abid
Husain, The Destiny of Indian Muslims, p.117.
5. W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, p.252.
6* Ibid., p.230.
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largely absent in Pakistan; and consequently in a largely rural 
area those religious groups, who advocated a state based upon 
rigid Islamic principles and traditions, found a little opposition. 
This Islamic issue along with the problem of the relationship
ike.
betweenyiEast and West wings of Pakistan in the future political
set-up,of the country, delayed constitution-making for almost
eight and .a half years. The constitution was an attempt to
reconcile differing viewpoints, namely, the harmonisation of the
demands of Islamic purists, and federalists and unitary statists.
The' general consensus of opinion in the Constituent Assembly was
for the adoption of the parliamentary system. A'few leaders
advocated the Introduction of the American presidential system.
In the early part of 1955 ideas were running on the lines of a
constitution approximating more to the American type than to the
British. It was contemplated that the President should be elected
by the legislature for a term of four years, and that he should
nominate the leader of the majority party in the Assembly as Vice-
President. The latter would form a government, but his cabinet
would not necessarily be drawn from the members of the Assembly.
This solution was put forward in view of the fact that parliamentary
democracy in the British tradition had not been an unqualified
success in the eight years of Pakistan's existence.^ Sir Ivor
.Jennings revealed that he was asked to draft- a constitution on
the American model. The scheme was rejected on the ground that
the people of Pakistan were so familiar with the British Constitution
that any fundamental departure from it would be regarded with
2
profound suspicion. An analysis was made of the solutions provided 
in various countries to the problems that were before the Constituent
1. Round Table, December 1955, p.50*
2. Jennings, op. cit., pp.18-9.
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Assembly. Reference was made not only to the federal
Constitutions of Canada, Australia, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R,
but also to South Africa, India, .Ireland, Germany, Yugoslavia
1
and especially the Constitutions of Muslim countries. The 1956 
Constitution was broadly based on the British parliamentary system 
and made the executive, led by the Prime Minister responsible to 
parliament. With a view to appeasing the insistent orthodox 
Muslim opinion, an honoured status was given -to Islam in the 
provisions-of the constitution. (Por Example, the designation in 
the constitution of the ’Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the 
preamble and the directive principles- of state policy incorporating 
Islamic principles, the provision that the head of state should be a 
Muslim, the provision that steps should be taken to enable the 
Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the Quran and Simnah 
and that no law should be enacted which was repugnant to the 
injunctions of Islam as laid down, the setting up of an organisation 
for Islamic research and'institution and the appointment of a 
commission to make recommendations for measures to bring existing 
law into conformity with the injunctions of Islam). But they did
not override the fundamental democratic and secular ideas on
which the constitution was based. Islamic principles were not 
accepted as the basic foundations of the political structure of 
Pakistan: in many respects, Pakistan in 1956 accepted the principles
of parliamentary democracy. The federal framework was largely 
based on the 1935 Act and the American and Australian Constitutions 
in which the powers not allocated to the centre remain with the 
units. As' far as the judiciary was concerned, Pakistan followed 
the model of the Act of 1935 and the Indian Constitution-and not
the model of the U.S.A, where courts are divided into federal and
Jennings ,^ p.U.6,
2 3 9
state courts. In Pakistan the High Courts of the provinces and
1the Supreme Court formed one single hierarchy. Fundamental 
rights and directive principles were borrowed from the U.S.A. 
and Fire respectively. Irish directive principles clearly outline 
the fundamental feature ofaa Christian Catholic state.
1. K.J. Newman? Essays on the Constitution of Pakistan, p.202.
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